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ABSTRACT
The growing public dissatisfaction with the current federal tax system and the 
ongoing national debt crisis are generating serious consideration o f  alternative 
consumption tax systems, especially the value-added tax (VAT hereafter). The purpose o f 
this study is to objectively evaluate the distributional effects of both the current federal 
tax system and the alternative value-added tax system it is intended to (partially) replace.
This study finds some evidence that the current federal tax system becomes 
significantly more progressive over the period o f 2005 and 2009 under the annual income 
approach, which is contrary to the prior research findings that the current federal tax 
system became less progressive from 1960 to 2004 (Piketty and Saez, 2007). A potential 
explanation for this result is the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act o f 2009 
(ARRA, Public Law 111-5). This Act made several changes that lowered individual 
income taxes in 2009. Also, when only considering households who pay payroll taxes 
(defined as “working families” in the paper), the current federal tax system is 
significantly less progressive, even regressive for year 2005, under the annual income 
approach. However, there is no significant difference about the progressivity level under 
the lifetime income approach for both full sample and subsample with only working 
families.
The broad-based value-added tax system is regressive under both the annual and 
lifetime income approaches; nonetheless, it is significantly less regressive under the 
lifetime income approach. The narrow-based value-added tax systems (such as zero 
ratings and universal rebate) significantly alleviate the regressivity o f  the VAT under 
both the annual and lifetime income approaches. The narrow-based value-added tax 
system becomes progressive under the lifetime income approach, but it is still 
significantly less progressive than the current federal tax system. And the partial 
substitution o f the current federal tax system with the VAT (such as the combination of 
narrow-based VAT and federal personal income tax system) is proportional under annual 
income approach and progressive under the lifetime income approach.
The current study also analyzes the distributional effects of both systems based on 
age groups and locations (urban vs. rural). The results show that the progressivity levels 
among different age groups and locations are significantly different for both the current 
federal tax system and the alternative value-added tax system. Specifically, the current 
federal tax system for households with heads between 35 and 55 is proportional, instead 
o f progressive, under the annual income approach.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
The growing public dissatisfaction with the current federal tax system and the
ongoing national debt crisis are generating serious consideration o f alternative
consumption tax systems, especially the value-added tax (VAT). “In recent Congresses,
three major types o f  broad-based consumption taxes have been included in congressional
tax proposals: the value-added tax (VAT), the retail sales tax, and the flat tax” (Bickley,
2011). Although it is unfamiliar to most Americans, the VAT has been implemented in
nearly 150 countries worldwide and in every Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) country other than the United States. In U.S. history, the VAT
has been proposed as a replacement to the current federal income tax on several
occasions. In 1969, President Richard Nixon’s Task Force on Business Taxation
considered a value-added tax both as an alternative to the corporate income tax and as an
additional source o f Federal revenue (Brashares et al., 1988). And the Treasury
Department, in 1984, prepared a report on tax reform for fairness, simplicity, and
economic growth to President Reagan (1994). In this report, a VAT system o f taxation is
analyzed as a substitution for the current federal income tax. In 2005, VAT is analyzed
again as an alternative tax system in the report prepared by the President’s Advisory
Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005). Due to the growing national debt and the high
1
2budget deficits, VAT has again been put on the table and has been discussed very 
seriously as an alternative tax system. Sullivan (2011) notes that “VAT will continue to 
be in the thick of the policy debate as long as our country’s fiscal policies push the 
national debt to unprecedented levels.”
There are three widely accepted criteria for assessing tax policies: equity or 
fairness, efficiency, and simplicity (Government Accountability Office (GAO hereafter), 
2005). Among these criteria, equity is always a central issue in taxation (Bird and 
Gendron, 2007). Equity generally includes horizontal equity and vertical equity 
(progressivity). A system is defined as horizontally equitable if  taxpayers with equal 
capacities to pay taxes pay approximately the same taxes. Vertical equity deals with the 
distribution o f taxes across income groups. Vertical equity (progressivity) is the focus of 
this study as it is currently a highly contested issue. A VAT is generally perceived as 
regressive as it is a tax on consumption rather than on income or investment (Hooper and 
Smith, 1997). The regressivity o f a VAT compared with the income tax is the main 
obstacle to any adoption o f a VAT in the United States (Gravelle, 2011).
Previous studies, however, show that when analyzed under a lifetime perspective 
the consumption tax system is much less regressive than it appears under an annual 
perspective (e.g., Poterba 1989; Fullerton and Rogers, 1993; Caspersen and Metcalf, 
1994; Fullerton and Rogers, 1996; Metcalf, 1997; Metcalf, 1999; Maxewell, 2003; Kuang 
et al., 2011). And recent empirical studies from international data show that the VAT 
may not be as regressive as originally thought, in fact, it can be progressive (e.g., Ebrill et 
al. 2001; Jenkins et al., 2006; Bird and Gendron 2007; Mushi, 2009; Decoster et al. 
2010). Therefore, a more accurate distributional analysis of the VAT is needed.
3Meanwhile, prior studies show that the progressivity of the current federal tax system is 
decreasing (e.g., Pechman, 1985; Piketty and Saez, 2007; Iyer and Reckers, 2011). The 
progressive federal income tax is decreasing its progressivity level due to the special 
treatment on capital income. And the regressive payroll tax now is almost the same as 
individual income tax in federal revenues. A further distributional analysis o f  the current 
federal tax system is warranted. Also, a comparison between the current overall federal 
tax systems with the proposed VAT is worthwhile because taxpayers not only pay federal 
income tax but also regressive taxes such as payroll and excise taxes. As depicted in 
Chapter two o f the literature review, statistical inferences are absent on the tax incidence 
analysis. It is inadequate to rely only on summary indices (such as Suits index and 
Kakwani index) when addressing vertical equity issues (Iyer and Reckers, 2011). 
Observed distributional differences between alternative tax systems may be attributable 
to sampling variations. As a result, this study applies the statistical inferences on the 
distributional analysis to draw conclusions more accurately.
Overview o f the Current Federal Tax System 
The current federal tax system has four main elements: (1) an income tax on 
individuals and corporations (which consists o f both a “regular” income tax and an 
alternative minimum tax); (2) payroll taxes on wages (and corresponding taxes on self- 
employment income); (3) estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes, and (4) 
excise taxes on selected goods and services (GAO, 2005).
In 2010, about 82% of the federal revenue comes from individual income tax and 
payroll taxes used to finance Social Security, Medicare, and the federal unemployment 
insurance program (41.5% and 40.0%, respectively). Other sources o f revenues include
4corporate income taxes (9%), excise taxes (3%), and estate and gift taxes (1%) -  all 
together about 13% of revenues and nontax revenues such as earnings o f the Federal 
Reserve System, customs duties, fines, and various fees (Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO hereafter), 2010)
The U.S. federal tax system is generally considered to be progressive, although 
the progressivity is decreasing due to the rise of payroll taxes (Pechman, 1985; Piketty 
and Saez, 2007). However, it is being criticized as being unfair. Recently, Warren Buffet 
(2011) said he paid an effective tax rate o f 17.4% in 2010, while people who worked in 
his office made much less but paid higher effective tax rates of between 33% and 41%, 
averaging 36%. Former presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, paid federal taxes at 
approximately 15%, less than millions o f  middle-income American families (Raum,
2012). The main source o f income for wealthy people is not from wages and salary, but 
from capital gains on investments, which currently is taxed at a much lower rate 
(maximum 15%). A recent study shows that the US federal income tax system has 
experienced a significant reduction in real progressivity during 1995-2006, due to 
increasing inequality in before-tax incomes and protection o f some sources o f  income 
(capital gains among them) from progressive taxation (Iyer and Reckers, 2011). Also, in 
2010, the payroll tax, the second largest source for federal revenues, is about the same 
percentage as the individual income tax (i.e., 40.0% and 41.5%, respectively). Payroll 
taxes, as well as excise taxes, are considered to be regressive as they are at a flat rate with 
a threshold o f $106,800 in 2010. Whether the current federal tax system as a whole is 
progressive or regressive is an open question. And whether the current federal tax system
5is more or less progressive than before is questionable. In this study, the most recent 
database with statistical analysis is used to investigate these two questions.
Value-Added Tax (VAT)
Definition of VAT
A value-added tax (VAT) is a multistage sales tax that is collected at each stage or 
point in the production and distribution process. Value-added is simply the difference 
between the value o f the goods (or services) sold and the value o f goods (or services) 
purchased as intermediate inputs. Unlike the current federal tax system, VAT does not 
tax on investment or savings. There are several ways to impose such a tax. The most 
common method proposed in the US is a consumption type VAT using the credit method. 
An example o f this type o f VAT is provided in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1
Calculation o f  Value-Added Tax Liability by Credit M ethod (10% VAT) *
STAGE OF PRODUCTION
Firm A 
Manufacturer
Firm B Firm C 
Wholesaler Retailer
Total
Economy
Sales $350 $850 $1,100 $2,300
Tax on sales 35 85 110 230
Purchases 100 350 850 1,300
Tax on purchases 10 35 85 130
Value-added tax 
(tax on sales less 
tax on purchases)
25 50 25 100
*Source: Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, 1984, Volume 3, p.7
6As discussed in Ebrill et al. (2001), "the key features of the VAT are that it is a 
broad-based tax levied at multiple stages o f production, with taxes on inputs credited 
against taxes on output. Specifically, sellers are required to charge the tax on all their 
sales, but they can also claim a credit for taxes that they have been charged with their 
inputs. The advantages o f  this is that revenue is secured by being collected through the 
process of production (unlike a retail sales tax) but without distorting production 
decisions (as a turnover tax does).” To reduce the absolute burden on the poor and 
regressivity o f VAT, two forms o f relief (zero rating vs. exemptions) can be applied. Zero 
rating refers to a situation in which the rate o f  tax applied to sales is zero, though credit is 
still given for taxes paid on inputs. In this case, the firm is due a full refund o f taxes paid 
on inputs. Exemption is quite different from zero rating in that, while no tax is charged on 
outputs, tax paid on inputs cannot be reclaimed. Thus, no refunds are payable. In the 
current study, both the broad-based VAT (total consumption) and narrow-based VAT 
(zero rating and universal rebate) are used to analyze the distributional effect.
VAT vs. Retail Sales Tax
A retail sales tax is a consumption tax imposed at the time o f purchase upon the 
final consumer o f goods and services. The only difference between VAT and RST is that 
the VAT collects the tax at each stage o f production, while the retail sales tax collects the 
total amount o f tax at purchase by the consumer. Kim (2008) lists three advantages of 
VAT over a retail sales tax. First, a VAT distinguishes automatically between consumer 
and producer goods, while a retail sales tax often faces compliance problems regarding 
producer goods exemptions. Second, with the VAT spreading tax liabilities across many 
stages it is less susceptible to tax evasion. Finally, while a retail sales tax is mainly
7applied only to sales o f tangible personal property; services are somewhat easier to tax 
under the VAT. In the current study, the VAT as the tax base times the proposed VAT 
tax rates are measured.
Objectives of the Study
The current study attempts to extend the related literature in both the current 
federal tax system and the value-added tax. Specifically it has four objectives.
The first objective is to assess the progressivity o f  the VAT with multiple global 
indices and statistical inferences under both annual income and lifetime income 
approaches. Empirical evidence in the literature does not seem to provide a conclusive 
answer to the question o f regressivity or progressivity o f a consumption tax such as the 
VAT. Comparing to the existing literature in VAT, this study applies a more accurate 
methodology to estimate lifetime income, uses multiple global indices to measure 
progressivity, and applies a differential tax incidence analysis.
The second objective is to examine the progressivity level and the extent to which 
the current federal tax system decreases the progressivity. Recent studies show that the 
progressivity levels o f both the current federal tax system and its main component, the 
federal income tax system, are decreasing. At the same time, the regressive payroll tax 
increases its share o f the total federal revenues. This is the first time that statistical 
inference is applied to analyze whether the progressivity level of the current federal tax 
system has significantly decreased in recent years.
The third objective is to compare the progressivity levels of the current federal tax 
system and the VAT using statistical inferences. Iyer and Seetharaman (1997) note that in 
applied tax and income distribution studies, the predominant practice is to use the Lorenz
8curve and one or more indicies derived from the Lorenz curve to describe the 
distributional effects o f tax law changes. However, where sample data are used, sampling 
variation is present. Observed distributional differences across an alternative tax system 
may, therefore, be attributable to sampling variability.
The fourth objective is to evaluate the progressivity level o f the value-added tax 
with zero-rating on necessities and a universal rebate to households equal to the poverty 
level proposed by Burton and Mastromarco (1996). Additionally, this study will evaluate 
whether these narrow-based VATs can significantly alleviate the regressivity o f  VAT.
Significance of the Study
The current study extends prior research in several ways. First, comparing with 
prior studies in distributional analysis on the current federal tax system, this study uses 
the most recent data to analyze the progressivity and trends of tax incidence by annual 
income and lifetime income approaches. It is important because o f  increasing payroll 
taxes and gap between the wealthy and poor on capital incomes. Also, statistical 
inferences, such as bootstrap methodology, are applied in assessing the change in 
progressivity of the system. Furthermore, prior studies on the current federal tax system 
exclude the excise taxes in the analysis (e.g., Feenberg et al., 1997; Piketty and Saez, 
2007; Kuang et al., 2011), which is regressive. As a result, adding excise tax liabilities 
into the analysis will more accurately measure the progressivity of the current tax system. 
Second, the current study is a differential tax incidence analysis o f replacing the current 
federal tax system with a VAT, while Brashares et al. (1988), M etcalf (1994), and 
Caspersen and M etcalf (1994)’s studies are an absolute tax incidence analysis (e.g., 5% 
VAT on the current tax system). Also, when comparing with previous VAT analysis, the
9methodologies in this study have been improved: 1) using a much longer time period to 
estimate lifetime equivalent income (1968-2009) than Caspersen and M etcalf (1994) did 
(1968-1988). This should more accurately capture the income lifecycle effects. Fullerton 
and Rogers (1991) state that the lifetime tax incidence analysis requires data over longer 
time periods, because the results critically depend on the shape o f the whole lifetime 
earnings profile; 2) applying the AR(1) exact maximum likelihood model instead o f OLS 
or a fixed-effect model to estimate income in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID 
hereafter) data. Fixed effects methods offer few benefits for estimating the effects of 
variables that do not change over time, such as race and sex (e.g., Allison 2010). And 
when the data is first order autoregressive, then the fixed effects model will produce an 
inconsistent estimator (Keane and Runkle, 1992); 3) comparing the current federal tax 
system with the proposed VAT system is needed to foster a better understanding o f  the 
distributional effects o f both tax systems; and 4) employing multiple global progressivity 
measures to strength the validity o f  the results and applying statistical inference, such as 
the bootstrap method, to analyze the distributional effects o f  different tax incidents. The 
Lorenz curve and indices based on the Lorenz curve are frequently used to graphically or 
numerically compare the distributional effects o f alternative tax systems. Such observed 
effects, however, may be due to random sampling variation. It is anticipated that this 
study is the first time that statistical inference, such as bootstrap methodology, has been 
applied to evaluate the current federal tax systems and the proposed alternative tax 
systems by using U.S. data. Third, distributional analysis o f  the tax systems based on the 
age groups is also conducted in the current study. Hodge (2010) suggests that age should 
enter the discussion over tax policy as the data from the Internal Revenue Service
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(hereafter IRS or Service) provides some insights on the composition o f  tax filers by age 
and how much o f the nation’s tax burden they pay
Research Questions
The study addresses the following research questions:
1. Is the current federal tax system progressive or regressive, under both annual 
income and lifetime income approaches?
2. Is the current federal tax system more or less progressive than before, under both 
annual income and lifetime income approaches?
3. Is the VAT regressive or progressive under the annual income and lifetime 
income approaches? How much o f that regressivity is alleviated by the zero-rating 
or rebate?
4. Is the VAT more or less progressive than the current federal tax system under 
both the annual income and lifetime income approach?
5. Is there any significant difference in the progressivity level o f the VAT under 
annual income and lifetime income approaches?
6. Will zero-rating or a rebate system significantly change the progressivity level of 
the VAT under annual income and lifetime income approaches?
7. Are the VAT’s distributional effects significantly different among various age 
groups?
8. Are the VAT’s distributional effects significantly different between rural and 
urban areas?
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Overview of Research Design and Methodology
A brief description o f the research design and methodology is outlined below. A 
detailed discussion is presented in chapter three.
This study applies both annual income and lifetime income approaches to assess 
the progressivity o f  the current federal tax system and the VAT. Specifically, following 
Maxwell (2003), the panel study o f income dynamics (PSID hereafter) for the years 
1968-2009 is applied to estimate the age-income profiles. Next, the estimated coefficients 
from the regression are applied to 2009 consumer expenditure survey (CES hereafter) 
households to estimate the lifetime income. Then, sample households in the CES are 
divided into ten deciles based on the annual total income and estimated lifetime income. 
Both the global indices, such as Suits index (1977) and Kakwani’s index (1977), and 
statistical inference, such as bootstrap methodology, are applied to evaluate the level of 
progressivity o f the current federal tax system and the VAT system and to compare 
differences between the two tax systems.
As for the current federal tax system, the individual income tax and payroll tax 
are reported by the CES. The corporate tax is imputed following both Feldstein (1988)’s 
approach and Congressional Budget Office (CBO hereafter)’s method. Estate and gift 
taxes are imputed according to Feenberg et al. (1997) and Kuang et al. (2011) methods. 
Excise tax is estimated based on the aggregated numbers from the National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA hereafter).
In this inquiry, the VAT is proposed to replace the overall federal tax system, 
which includes individual income tax, corporate income tax, payroll tax, estate and gift 
tax, and excise tax. In addition, partial replacement o f  current federal tax system is also
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analyzed. The VAT revenue-neutral tax rate is calculated following Feenberg et al. 
(1997) method. Specifically, NIPA data is used to estimate the total current federal tax 
burdens. Then the VAT tax base can be estimated using the NIPA concept o f personal 
consumption expenditures (PCE) with some adjustments. The VAT rate equals the 
required revenue under the current federal tax system divided by the adjusted tax base. 
Both the broad-based VAT base and narrow-based VAT base (zero rating on necessities 
and a universal rebate) are evaluated.
Organization of the Study
The rest o f the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the related 
literature on the current federal tax system and alternative tax systems. Chapter 3 
addresses the research questions and discusses the databases and research methodology. 
Chapter 4 contains the results o f the study, and Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of 
the findings, limitations, and implications for future research.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview
In this chapter, the literature review is divided into the following four areas: 1) tax 
incidence o f the current federal tax system; 2) tax incidence of alternative tax systems, 
including value-added tax; 3) annual vs. lifetime income approaches to tax incidence; and 
4) contrasting related literature to the current study.
Tax Incidence of the Current Federal Tax System
In this section, a review o f the selected literature on the distributional effects of 
the overall federal tax system, and its components is presented. Next, a summary is 
provided of the distributional analysis for all current federal tax system.
Pechman (1985)
By using the Brooking MERGE files, Pechman (1985) measures the distributional 
effects o f  the federal and the state and local tax systems from 1966 to 1985. The MERGE 
files provide data for years 1966, 1970, and 1975. Data for 1980 and 1985 are projected 
from the 1975 file. Relative tax burdens are measured by comparing effective tax rates of 
family units. This study uses the current annual income to divide taxpayers into different 
population deciles. Pechman finds that the tax system becomes less progressive between
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1966 and 1985, primarily, because the corporate income tax and the property tax declined 
in importance while more emphasis was placed on the payroll tax.
Kasten et al. (1994)
Kasten et al. (1994) examine the effect o f the major tax policy changes during 
1980s, such as the Tax Reform Act o f 1986 (TRA), on the distribution o f the tax burden 
among income groups. They report results from simulations of a large micro-database 
that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has developed by combining data files from 
the Census Bureau and the Bureau o f Labor Statistics as well as tax-retum data from the 
IRS. Families are arrayed by a measure o f realized cash income, adjusted for family size. 
Kasten et al. compute income and taxes paid for different income groups for the years 
1980, 1985, and 1989 and project income and taxes paid for 1993. They use the effective 
tax rates to measure the distributional effects o f the federal tax system. Their data show 
little overall change in the level and distribution o f  federal effective tax rates between 
1980 and 1993.
Piketty and Saez (2007)
Piketty and Saez (2007) look at the trends in the progressivity o f the U.S. tax 
system, which includes individual and corporate income taxes, estate and gift taxes, and 
payroll taxes, from 1960 to 2004. They use the large, publicly available micro dataset o f 
individual tax returns produced by the Service, available most years from 1960 to 2001, 
to estimate individual income and construct the various income fractiles. The annual 
income approach is used for the study.
They find that the individual income tax is the main component driving 
progressivity in 2004. Payroll tax is regressive involving an average tax rate o f about
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11% of total income below the top decile and declining to about 1% at the very top. This 
result is due to the cap in the Social Security payroll tax (above $87,900 in 2004) and the 
fact that labor income is a smaller fraction o f total income at the top than in the middle of 
the distribution.
The lower tax burden in 1960 for the middle groups is largely due to the fact that 
the payroll tax, which falls primarily on the groups from P20 to P95, was much smaller in 
1960 than today. Piketty and Saez summarize that the decrease in the overall 
progressivity o f  federal tax system between 1960 and 2004 is due to the increased 
percentage of the payroll tax (regressive) and the decreased percentage from the 
corporate tax and the estate tax. Also, they use the annual income approach with the 
average tax rate to analyze the distributional effects o f current federal tax system.
Iyer and Reckers (2011)
Iyer and Reckers (2011) analyze the vertical equity effects o f  the US income tax 
system during 1995-2006 and show that income inequality increased substantially during 
the period combined with a significant reduction in real progressivity. Using a Lorenz- 
curve-based graphical method, the authors decompose progressivity and income 
inequality indices and identify and quantify how much each source o f income contributes 
to overall progressivity and income inequality. Results from the 1995-2006 period 
indicate that US income tax treatment o f  salaries and wages income were distributed and 
taxed progressively and contributed to a decrease in income inequality. However, the 
treatment o f net capital gains not only decreased progressivity, it negated the income 
inequality reduction achieved by salaries and wages. They introduce a graphical method 
o f decomposing two widely used income inequality and progressivity indices to precisely
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identify and quantify how much different sources o f  income contribute to inequality and 
progressivity,
Ricketts (1990)
Ricketts (1990) analyzes the effects o f growth in the social security tax (payroll 
tax), when combined with the income tax reforms, on progressivity and horizontal equity 
in the federal tax system in the 1980s. The analysis is based upon actual tax return data 
from 1980 and 1984 and upon simulated data representing 1988 tax burdens. The 1984 
IRS Tax Model File was used to estimate the distribution o f  income and social security 
tax liabilities among individuals under both 1984 and 1988 laws. The Tax Model File 
contains a stratified sample o f  approximately 80,000 tax returns filed for tax year 1984. 
This study used the Suits Index to measure the progressivity of a tax system. Taxpayers 
were divided into 17 adjusted expanded income groups. The Suits index is used to 
measure the vertical equity. The results indicate that both income tax reform and social 
security tax growth have had a positive influence on horizontal equity in the 1980s. In 
contrast, the consequences o f changes in the two systems on progressivity have been in 
sharp conflict. That is, increases in progressivity brought about by income tax reform 
have been more than offset by the effects o f growth in the social security tax. With regard 
to horizontal equity, the effects o f changes in the two tax systems appear relatively 
harmonious. The social security tax distribution appears more horizontally equitable than 
the income tax distribution. The growth in the social security tax actually increases 
horizontal equity in the combined distribution.
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Iy e r(1994)
Iyer (1994) evaluates the vertical and horizontal equity effects o f the growth in 
payroll taxation between 1984 and 1993. A sample o f taxpayers was collected from the 
IRS panel o f  individual taxpayers for the years 1984 through 1988. Mean income 
distributions were generated from these years on which the payroll and income tax 
liabilities were simulated for the years 1989-1993. Payroll taxes were also computed 
based on two incidence assumptions. For the equity effects o f taxation o f social security 
benefits, the tax liabilities were computed under the pre-1984 rules, post-1983 rules, and 
post-1993 rules. Friedman’s ANOVA and W ilcoxon’s Signed Rank test were used to test 
the significance o f the results.
Results indicated that the payroll tax was a moderately regressive tax during the 
period 1984 through 1989. The imposition o f  the payroll tax caused a significant 
reduction in the progressivity o f the income tax distribution. The regressive effects o f  the 
payroll tax dominated the progressive effects o f the income tax. The equity effects o f  the 
post-1983 law and the post-1993 law were not significantly different from each other.
Summary o f Tax Incidence Analysis on Current 
Federal Tax System
The current federal tax system is generally progressive, although the progressivity 
is decreasing with the rise o f the payroll taxes during the past 40 years. The individual 
income tax, corporate tax, and estate and gift tax are progressive, while the payroll tax 
and excise tax are regressive. Due to the special treatment o f capital income, the 
progressivity level of the federal income tax is decreasing. As the two largest components 
in the federal tax system, the rising percentage o f payroll tax and the decreasing 
progressivity o f the federal income tax trigger questions about whether the current federal
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tax system is progressive or regressive now and whether the progressivity level is 
decreasing compared to prior years.
Tax Incidence of Alternative Tax Systems
First, the literature about distributional effects o f proposed alternative tax systems 
in U.S. is reviewed. Next, a detailed literature review on the tax incidence o f VAT is 
provided.
Enis and Craig (1984)
Enis and Craig (1984) investigate the distributional effects o f substituting a true 
flat tax system with the current federal income tax system. The true flat tax system is 
defined as a single rate applied to a comprehensive income base eliminating all 
exclusions, deductions, and credits. The sample data is obtained from the National Tax 
Model compiled by the IRS Statistics Division for the tax year 1977, which consists a 
stratified systematic sample o f 155,212 individual income tax returns. Samples are 
grouped into deciles based upon economic income, and the average effective rate (AER) 
is computed for each tax return. The mean and median of these rates were computed for 
ten income classes to obtain the AERs for these groups.
The empirically-derived flat rate is 12.72% to yield the same tax revenue as under 
the existing system. The comparative analysis is performed on two groups: (1) all tax 
returns, and (2) families with dependent children. The results indicate that a true flat tax 
will transfer substantial taxes from the rich to the poor. Specifically, only the top two 
decile groups have a majority o f tax returns that will benefit from a true flat tax for all tax 
returns. Moreover, a significant proportion o f families with dependent children that fall 
into the first seven deciles will pay more taxes under a true flat tax. The findings o f this
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study are offered as a benchmark against which alternative tax reform proposals can be 
compared.
CBO (1992)
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) simulates the effect on families’ federal 
taxes and after tax income of substituting a combination o f  a flat-rate income tax and a 
value-added tax (VAT) for present federal income, payroll, and excise taxes. The changes 
were simulated at 1989 income levels using income and payroll rates in effect in 1992. 
The flat-rate income tax and the VAT rates were set so as to yield no net change in the 
federal deficit in combination with the simulated elimination o f those existing federal 
taxes. The tax base for the simulated VAT excludes medical care, education 
expenditures, and contributions to religious and charitable organizations. In the 
simulation, the benefits o f eliminating existing federal income, payroll, and excise taxes 
are distributed to families based on assumptions about who bears the burden o f each tax.
The primary data source for the study is the March Current Population Survey 
(CPS). The reported data on income from taxable sources from the CPS file were 
adjusted for consistency with reported incomes from the Statistics o f Income (SOI). Also, 
an extensive annual sample o f actual individual income tax returns was taken. Data on 
consumer expenditures were taken from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). Data 
from each o f the files were adjusted to expenditure totals as reported in the national 
income and product accounts. Families are ranked by adjusted family income. Percentage 
change in after-tax income and the change in effective tax rates are used to measure the 
progressivity.
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The results show that the combination o f a flat-rate income tax and a VAT would 
lower the effective tax rate for families in the top quintile but would raise the effective 
tax rate for families in the bottom four quintiles. For families in the lowest quintile, the 
effective tax rate would rise by 20 percentage points.
Iyer et al. (1996)
Iyer et al. (1996) analyze the distributional effects o f replacing the current income 
tax system with two prototype flat tax systems, each o f which had been introduced in 
Congress as a legislative bill: 1) the Armey-Shelby-Craig flat tax proposal, and 2) the 
Specter flat tax proposal. Using the current income tax system as a benchmark for 
comparison, they analyzed 1) how each flat tax would change the distribution o f tax 
burdens for various income deciles; 2) the overall progressivity o f  each flat tax; and 3) 
how effectively each flat tax would reduce inequalities in the distribution o f before-tax 
income.
The sample data is obtained from the Statistics o f  Income Panel o f  Individual 
Returns (SOI panel), which is a part o f the Ernst and Young/University o f  Michigan Tax 
Research Data Base. They focused on 1987-1990 data by creating a panel o f taxpayers 
who filed tax returns for each o f those years. The final sample consists o f a panel o f 
15,316 taxpayers. O f those taxpayers, 5,350 reported business income and 9,966 reported 
no business incomes. Annual income approach is used to analyze the distributional 
effects o f different tax systems. Both Suits index and Kakwani’s index are used to 
measure the global progressivity o f the different tax systems.
Iyer et al. find that replacing the current income tax system with either flat tax 
system would result in a modest increase in the average tax rate for taxpayers in the first
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income decile. For the remaining taxpayers, such a switch results in reductions in the 
average tax rate that tend to increase as income increases. Regarding overall 
progressivity, the results vary according to whether or not taxpayers report business 
income. For taxpayers reporting business income, the current income tax system is the 
most progressive one and both flat tax proposals are partially regressive. For taxpayers 
reporting no business income, the Armey-Shelby-Craig proposal is generally the most 
progressive tax system. For both groups o f taxpayers, both flat tax proposals are less 
effective than status quo in moderating before-tax income inequality. Replacing the 
current income tax system with either flat tax proposal will result in an after-tax income 
distribution which is more unequal than status quo.
Feenberg et al. (1997)
Feenberg et al. (1997) evaluate a tax reform that replaces the federal income tax 
(and payroll tax) with a national retail sales tax under both the annual income and total 
consumption as lifetime income approaches. Four possible retail sales taxes are 
considered: one without any exemptions, one with an exemption for food, one with an 
exemption for food, medical services, and housing, and one providing cash assistance to 
reduce the average tax burden on low income households.
A data file is generated by combining data from Statistics o f Income Public Use 
Individual Tax File (the Tax File) with data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
the National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES), and the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CES). First, use CPS data to add information on nonfiling households to the Tax 
File. Second, impute consumption expenditures to all households in the Tax File-CPS file 
by developing a synthetic match with the CES. Third, augment the CES-based
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information on consumption with additional data on medical expenditures from the 
NMES. Fourth, impute corporate income tax payments to households in the Tax File-CPS 
data file. Fifth, impute estate and gift tax liability to the households in the resulting data 
base. Last, data from the CPS is used to allocate labor income within households between 
men and women so that payroll tax liabilities can be calculated.
Feenberg et al. find that switching from the current income tax system to a 
national retail sales tax without direct transfers to low-income households can 
substantially alter the distribution o f tax burden. When households are ranked by their 
total consumption spending, the burden o f the retail sales tax is either proportional to 
consumption outlays, or rises as a share o f  outlays when the retail sales tax plan is 
coupled with a “demogrant” proposal. Under the annual income approach, the authors 
find that the tax burden on high income households is generally lower under the retail 
sales tax than under the income tax.
M etcalf (1997)
M etcalf (1997) uses data from the 1994 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) to 
measure the lifetime incidence o f a shift from the current income tax to a National Retail 
Sales Tax. Unlike Feenberg et al. (1997), M etcalf argues that current consumption may 
not be a very good proxy for lifetime income. The current consumption approach 
assumes that consumption is roughly constant over the lifetime time. However, 
“consumption exhibits the same kind o f “hump” that income does over the lifetime” 
(Metcalf, 1997). Using the income profiles constructed in Caspersen and M etcalf (1994), 
M etcalf computes the lifetime income as the present discounted value o f  the stream of 
inheritances (and gifts) received plus earned income and transfers.
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M etcalf finds that the distribution o f the tax reform depends in important ways on 
the measure o f  household well-being. If annual income is used to rank households, the 
tax reform looks very regressive. When lifetime income is used to rank households, the 
tax reform continues to look regressive though much less regressive than when the annual 
income approach is used. The author also considers various ways to add progressivity to 
the new tax system. If a universal rebate tied to poverty thresholds is coupled with the 
national sales tax, the system looks nearly as progressive as the current income tax 
system when households are ranked by lifetime income. A rebate o f  the employer and 
employee portions o f the payroll tax is also considered. Because the rebate is targeted 
towards workers, it is not as effective at mitigating the regressivity o f  the sales tax as is 
the universal rebate.
Kuang et al. (2011)
Kuang et al. (2011) examine the distribution impacts of the FairTax Plan, as well 
as the current federal tax system it intends to replace, under both annual income and 
lifetime income approaches. The FairTax plan (H. R. 25 / S. 1025) is a comprehensive 
proposal that replaces the existing federal personal income, corporate income, estate and 
gift, capital gains, alternative minimum, social security, Medicare, and self-employment 
taxes with a national retail sales tax (NRST). The primary database used in the study is 
the 2005 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) interview data. The lifetime equivalent 
income is estimated from a Panel Study o f Income Dynamics (PSID) tracked over 1968- 
2005. Kuang et al. apply the first order autoregressive AR (1) exact maximum likelihood 
method used by Maxwell (2003) to estimate the lifetime income.
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The global measures o f progressivity consistently find that the current federal tax 
system is more progressive than the FairTax Plan under both the annual income and 
lifetime income approaches. While the FairTax Plan is found to be much less regressive 
under the lifetime income approach, it is still not comparable to the current federal tax 
system from the aspect o f progressivity.
Toder and Rosenberg (2010)
Toder and Rosenberg (2010) examine the effects o f imposing a value-added tax 
(VAT) in the United States to replace payroll taxes or corporate income taxes. The report 
provides estimates o f the distributional effects by income group of substituting a VAT for 
cuts in employer contributions to Social Security taxes, the corporate income tax, and a 
combination o f the two taxes. The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation 
Model (TPC model) is used to calculate tax liabilities for a representative sample of 
households under current law and under alternative tax rules. The TPC microsimulation 
model disaggregates consumption into twenty-two different categories. Seventeen core 
non-health categories are derived from the Bureau o f Labor Statistics’ Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CES) and calibrated to NIPA aggregates. Four categories o f health 
expenditure are based on data from the National Flealth Expenditure Account (NHEA). 
Data on new housing purchases are imputed from the American Flousing Survey.
Toder and Rosenberg find that the distributional burden o f a VAT is roughly 
proportional at the bottom of the income distribution but regressive at the top, largely 
because a VAT effectively exempts income from new saving from taxation. Exempting 
housing, food consumed at home, and medical services from a VAT make it slightly 
progressive at the bottom of the income distribution. A refundable tax credit, however,
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would be much more effective than selective exemptions in relieving low-income 
taxpayers o f the burden o f a VAT. Substituting a VAT for payroll taxes makes the tax 
system more progressive, while substituting a VAT for the corporate income tax makes it 
less progressive. If the VAT combined with a refundable credit substitutes for corporate 
revenue, however, the distributional effect is bi-modal -  taxpayers at the very bottom and 
top of the income distribution benefit and taxpayers in the middle pay more.
VAT Related Literature
Ballard et al. (1987)
Ballard et al. (1987) seek to learn more about VATs o f various sorts, by 
performing simulations with a computational general equilibrium model o f the United 
States economy and tax system. One o f the questions to be addressed is how regressive is 
the flat rate VAT, and how much o f that regressivity is alleviated by the exemptions and 
rate differentials. Nineteen producer-goods industries that use capital and labor in 
constant elasticity o f substitution value-added functions are modeled. The data for the 
model are derived from five major sources: 1976 Survey o f  Current Business, the Bureau 
o f Economic Analysis Input Output Matrix, unpublished worksheets o f  the U.S. 
Commerce Department’s National Income Division, the U.S. Labor Department’s 1973 
Consumer Expenditure Survey, and the U.S. Treasury Department’s Merged Tax Files. 
Households are differentiated only by income.
This study finds that rate differentiation does indeed produce a less regressive 
distribution o f welfare gains and losses than those o f a flat VAT. Overall, the VAT is still 
a regressive tax-policy change.
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Brashares et al. (1988)
Brashares et al. (1988) evaluate the distributional implications o f  a value-added 
tax by using an ability-to-pay income measure and suggest alternative ways o f reducing 
the regressivity o f  a value-added tax, including limiting the absolute burden o f the tax on 
the lowest income groups. The data base used in this analysis was generated by the Office 
o f Tax Analysis (OTA) within the U.S. Department o f the Treasury.
This analysis o f the distributional aspects o f  a federal value-added tax considers 
several policy alternatives for alleviating the burden of the tax on low income groups. 
The authors conclude that the regressivity o f  a value-added tax is not an incurable flaw 
and suggest that policy makers should deal with the problem by providing either 
refundable income tax credits or direct payments to lower income groups. An important 
conclusion is that the burden o f a value-added tax on lower income groups can be 
reduced dramatically without imposing unnecessary efficiency or compliance costs or 
requiring unreasonably high tax rates to raise the desired level of revenue.
M etcalf (1994)
Using annual income before tax for the annual measure and current consumption 
as a measure o f lifetime income, M etcalf (1994) analyzes the steady-state distribution of 
tax burdens o f a value-added tax (VAT) in the United States. M etcalf considers the 
distribution o f a 5% value-added tax introduced as an additional tax with no change in 
government expenditures, using data from the 1990 Consumer Expenditure Survey. The 
burden o f a VAT is assumed to be borne by consumers and the tax burden is computed as 
the statutory rate multiplied by the dollar amount o f  consumption. Taxes are measured at 
the household level. M etcalf uses annual income before tax for the annual measure and
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current consumption as a measure o f lifetime income. The distributional effects o f  a VAT 
with zero rating on food, shelter, and medical care and a $ 1,000 household credit are also 
analyzed.
In contrast to an annual snapshot perspective, M etcalf finds that a VAT on total 
expenditures would be proportional over the lifetime approach. Various modifications to 
the VAT (zero rating necessities or lump-sum household rebates) would increase the 
progressivity o f the tax, substantially.
Caspersen and M etcalf (1994)
Caspersen and M etcalf (1994) analyze the distributional effects o f  a proposed 
value-added tax in the U.S. under both annual and lifetime measures. Different from 
M etcalf (1994), lifetime income is estimated using data from both the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CES) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The authors 
compare measures o f the distribution of a VAT using two lifetime income measures 
drawn from the PSID to an annual income measure, as well as a measure o f current 
consumption. It is an absolute incidence analysis by imposing a 5% VAT over the current 
federal tax system.
Caspersen and M etcalf find that a broad-based VAT would be only modestly 
regressive using two different measures o f lifetime income, while a VAT looks quite 
regressive using annual income to measure economic well-being. Using current 
consumption as a proxy for lifetime income makes a  VAT proportional. And adjustments 
such as zero rating would be effective at further reducing a VAT’s regressivity.
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Selected Literature on International VAT Study
Jenkins et al. (2006)
Jenkins et al. (2006) evaluate the tax incidence o f the current VAT in the 
Dominican Republic by using the 1998 Household Expenditure and Income Survey data. 
The data set covers 2,042 goods and services purchased by households o f different 
income and consumption levels. Annual household expenditure instead o f annual income 
is employed as the base for measuring the distributional burden of the VAT.
The results o f the study show that the burden o f the current VAT in the 
Dominican Republic is progressive over all the quintiles of household expenditure. 
Furthermore, if  the base o f the VAT is made comprehensive, the estimated incidence of 
the burden o f the VAT is still progressive over all the quintiles of household expenditure.
Mushi (2009)
Mushi (2009) compares the annual vs. the lifetime perspective o f  the Value-added 
Tax (VAT) using the Tanzania Household Budget Survey o f 2000/2001. The impact of 
exemptions on both government revenue and distribution o f  the tax burden is examined. 
This study applies Caspersen and M etcalfs (1994) method to estimate lifetime income. 
Also, it uses the bootstrap methodology developed by Anderson et al. (2003) to compare 
the VAT with previous sales tax.
Results show that when annual income is used to measure well-being, the VAT 
looks very regressive, while using “lifetime income” makes the VAT proportional. With 
lifetime income as a measure o f ability to pay, incorporating exemptions into the analysis 
makes the VAT slightly progressive while several alternatives to exemptions could make 
the VAT more progressive and improve revenue performance. The distributional
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characteristics of exempted items show that unprocessed food, public transport and 
petroleum products are mostly consumed by the relatively poor. On the other hand, the 
rich consume postal supplies, books, newspapers, and others. Comparing VAT and the 
previous sales tax shows the VAT to be less progressive, even though it is not regressive.
Leahy et al. (2011)
Leahy et al. (2011) examine the distributional effects of value added tax in Ireland 
across income deciles, household size and household composition. Using the 2004/2005 
Household Budget Survey, Leahy et al. assess the amount o f  VAT that households pay as 
a proportion o f weekly disposable income. VAT payments are measured by equivalised 
income decile, households o f different composition and different household sizes. The 
impact o f changing the VAT rate on certain groups o f items and the associated change in 
revenue is estimated with the use o f a micro-simulation model.
The general pattern o f results show that those hardest hit are households in the 
first income decile, households in rural areas, six person households, and households 
containing a single adult with children.
Annual vs. Lifetime Income Approaches to 
Tax Incidence
The approach dividing households into different groups based on their annual 
income was very popular in the distributional analysis (e.g., Pechman and Okner, 1974; 
Musgrave et al., 1974). However, researchers gradually believe a single year cross- 
sectional distributional analysis may not capture the income distributions accurately (e.g., 
Poterba, 1989, Fullerton and Rogers, 1993). People normally start their career with low 
earnings, increase to their peak in the middle year ages, and then decrease when they
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retire. As discussed in Walls and Handon (1999), "Most people tend to earn their highest 
incomes around middle age and their lowest incomes when they are young or old. 
Grouping people by annual income using cross-section data will lead to some young and 
old people in the lower income groups who may not belong there on the basis o f  lifetime 
income. Likewise, higher income groups will include some middle-aged people who may 
belong in a lower category if grouped by lifetime income. Moreover, differences in 
annual income are often the result o f transitory components that should have smaller 
effects on consumption than differences in permanent income.” Because o f the limitation 
o f the annual income approach, lifetime equivalent income is estimated and 
recommended to measure the taxpayer’s economic well-being by economists. Many 
researchers have applied lifetime income approach in tax incidence research (e.g., 
Poterba, 1989; Feenberg et al. 1997; Metcalf, 1994; Caspersen and Metcalf, 1994; 
Maxwell, 2003; Kuang et al., 2011).
As discussed in Friedman’s (1957) Permanent Income Flypothesis (PIH), people 
tend to make consumption decisions based on an unobservable measure o f  permanent 
income. If the purpose o f a distributional analysis is to group and rank people by a 
measure o f their economic welfare, permanent income is probably a better measure than 
annual income (Metcalf, 1994).
As a result, several studies use current consumptions as a proxy for lifetime 
income (e.g., Poterba, 1989; Metcalf, 1993). M etcalf (1997), however, argues that using 
annual total consumption as a proxy for lifetime income is not as ideal as expected. 
Consumption might actually follow annual income in contrast to what the life-cycle or 
permanent income models would suggest, if  capital market is imperfect and there are
constraints on the amounts that individuals can borrow and lend (W alls and Hanson, 
1999). In this case, annual consumptions could misrepresent an individual’s lifetime 
well-being and misrepresent the incidence o f any given tax (Zeldes, 1989). For that 
reason, lifetime income estimates based on longitudinal data are applied (e.g., Fullerton 
and Rogers, 1993; Caspersen and Metcalf, 1994; Maxwell, 2003; Kuang et al., 2011)
Annual Income Approach
Pechman and Okner (1974)
The most cited tax incidence study applying an annual income approach is 
Pechman and Okner (1974). In this study, a representative sample o f  72,000 individuals 
and families is analyzed by using the database o f the 1967 Survey o f Economic 
Opportunity and the IRS file o f individual income tax returns for 1966. They use the 
adjusted family income, which includes wage supplements, accrued capital gains, and 
imputed rent, to group households into different income groups.
There are three basic variants in the assumptions in the study and the major 
differences among the sets relate to the incidence o f the corporation, property, and 
payroll taxes. In variantl, payroll taxes on both employers and employees are assumed to 
be borne by employees. The corporation income tax and the property tax on 
improvements are regarded as taxes on all property income. In variant two, the 
corporation income tax is allocated to stockholders in proportion to the dividends they 
received. And the treatment o f the payroll tax levied on employers in variant 2b is 
different from variant 1. H alf o f the employer tax is assumed to be shifted to consumers. 
Variant three presents several compromised among the views as to tax incidence 
represented in the other variants. For each combination o f assumptions, Perchman and
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Okner calculate the effective tax rate on each household. The authors find that the overall 
U.S. tax system is roughly proportional over the middle eight deciles. And the individual 
income tax is progressive over virtually the entire income scale, but it becomes regressive 
at the very top. Sales and excise taxes are regressive throughout the entire income scale. 
Furthermore, payroll taxes are progressive at the lower end o f  the income scale and then 
become regressive. Perchman and Okner list two explanations for this pattern: 1) a large 
proportion o f income received by very low-income units is not subject to payroll taxes; 
and (2) many low-income workers are in jobs that are not covered by the employment tax 
system.
Lifetime Income Approach
Poterba (1989)
Using current consumption as a proxy for lifetime income, Poterba (1989) 
investigates the distributional burden of excise taxes on gasoline, tobacco, and alcohol. 
Provided households adhere to the basic tenets o f  the lifecycle-permanent income 
hypothesis by setting consumption in relation to lifetime resources rather than current 
income, Poterba notes that total expenditure (consumption) provides a better measure of 
long-term household well-being than annual income. The 1984 Consumer Expenditure 
Survey o f Bureau o f Labor Statistics is used to estimate the excise taxes.
Under the annual income approach, expenditures on each good as a share o f  pre­
tax income support the general view that excise taxes are regressive. Low income 
households spend a much higher fraction o f their income on these commodities than do 
higher-income households. Pursuant to the total expenditures approach, gasoline and 
motor oil expenditures account for 6.0% o f  total outlays for the lowest consumption
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quintile, slightly less than the shares for the three middle quintiles o f the consumption 
distribution. The divergence across different parts o f the consumption distribution is 
much smaller than the variation in spending as a share o f income. Alcohol expenditures 
display a similar compression.
Fullerton and Rogers (1993)
Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the lifetime 
income, Fullerton and Rogers (1993) conduct an extensively study o f  lifetime incidence 
in the U.S. tax system. They construct a measure o f lifetime income by estimating age- 
income profile for different demographic groups and use it to impute a stream o f wage 
rates from which their lifetime income can be constructed. An 18-year span o f data from 
the Panel Study o f Income Dynamics (PSID) is used to estimate the lifetime income. 
Next, they categorize households based on lifetime income and use a computable general 
equilibrium model to analyze several different taxes. The general equilibrium approach to 
tax analysis accounts for behavioral effects and excess burdens caused by taxes. It can 
capture the important influences o f taxes on diverse household choices about labor 
supply, savings, and the consumption of different commodities. Fullerton and Rogers find 
that the system o f federal, state, and local sales and excise taxes in the United States is 
roughly as regressive in a life-cycle perspective as in an annual perspective.
Caspersen and M etcalf (1994)
Caspersen and M etcalf (1994) analyze the distributional effects o f  a proposed 
value-added tax in the U.S. under both annual and lifetime measures. Lifetime income is 
estimated using data from both the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) and the Panel 
Study o f Income Dynamics (PSID). The authors compare measures o f  the distribution of
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a VAT using two lifetime income measures drawn from the PSID to an annual income 
measure, as well as a measure o f current consumption.
The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, use the PSID to estimate age-income 
profiles for households. The regression includes demographic variables on the household 
that are common to both the PSID and the CES. Both fixed effects model and OLS 
regression models are applied in the analysis. As explained by the author, all time- 
invariant information is lost in the fixed effects model and there is no way to recover the 
fixed effects when moving from the PSID to the CES. Second, take the estimated 
coefficients from this regression and apply them to households in the CES to generate 
estimates o f lifetime income for these households. Also, the authors felt that the use of 
two data sets was necessary due to the lack o f appropriate expenditure data in the PSID. 
Last, compute a VAT tax liability in the CES and carry out the distributional analysis 
using the lifetime income measure. The distributional impact o f  zero rating food, 
housing, and medical expenditures is also considered.
Caspersen and M etcalf find that a broad-based VAT would be only modestly 
regressive using two different measures o f lifetime income, while a VAT looks quite 
regressive using annual income to measure economic well-being. By using current 
consumption as a proxy for lifetime income, it makes a VAT proportional. Also, 
adjustments such as zero rating would be effective at further reducing a V A T’s 
regressivity.
Maxwell (2003)
Maxwell (2003) uses 1970-1993 longitudinal data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics to estimate household lifetime income profiles that are used to
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determine the incidence for 1995 Consumer Expenditure Survey households. Instead of 
using fixed effects model to estimate age-income profile, Maxwell applies the first order 
AR(1) exact maximum likelihood model to estimate the age-income profile. Maxwell 
notes three shortcomings when using a fixed-effects estimator: 1) the data is 
autoregressive o f order one; 2) first differencing or pseudo-differencing the data or 
including a lagged dependent variable results in an inconsistent estimator using a fixed- 
effects estimator (Keane and Runkle, 1992); and 3) because fixed effects models 
difference out the means, all time invariant information such as sex and race is lost. 
Maxwell notes that a fixed-effects model is unbiased, but cannot be applied to the CES 
sample.
Income in both the PSID and CES samples is defined as household labor income 
plus transfers. Capital income is excluded in calculating total income. Economic and 
demographic regressors are limited to those also available in the CES. Parameter 
estimates from the AR(1) exact maximum likelihood model are used to predict 
households for the CES sample. By using age, a two-part income profile is generated for 
each household. The 1995 present value o f each household’s lifetime real income stream 
was determined by adding the two profiles. Lifetime income estimates were then 
converted to annuity equivalents. The lifetime equivalent income is computed as a 
weighted average o f two annuity equivalents over 61 possible ages from 20 to 80.
Consistent with the traditional view o f  the sales tax, Oklahoma’s state sales tax is 
regressive using annual income. From a lifetime income perspective, the sales tax is 
considerably less regressive and roughly proportional over the first three lifetime income 
quintiles. By exempting food from the sales tax base, it reduces the regressivity o f  the
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sales tax regardless o f which income concept is used. The lifetime income approach 
shows that food exemption actually makes the state sales tax progressive over the first 
three lifetime income quintiles.
Contrasting Related Literature to the Current Study
This study differs from previous literature in several ways. First, comparing with 
prior studies in distributional analysis o f the current federal tax system, this study uses 
the most recent data to analyze the progressivity and trend o f tax incidence by the annual 
income and lifetime income approaches. And statistical inferences, such as bootstrap 
methodology are applied to assess the progressivity o f  the system. Prior studies observe 
the decrease o f the progressivity level o f the current federal tax system by using average 
tax rates and/or suits index. The problem with the point estimators, such as suits index, is 
that the changes in the index might be due to sampling variation or measurement errors. 
Second, with respect to the VAT, the current study is a differential tax incidence analysis 
o f replacing current federal tax system with the VAT, while the prior studies (e.g., 
Brashares et al., 1988; Metcalf, 1994; Caspersen and Metcalf, 1994) are an absolute tax 
incidence analysis. Also, comparing with prior VAT analysis, the methodologies in this 
study have been improved as illustrated below:
i) Applying both the annual income and lifetime income approaches for the tax 
incidence analysis. As described in the literature review of annual income vs. 
lifetime income approaches, annual income approach is criticized as not an 
accurate measure o f  economic welfare.
ii) Comparing prior studies using lifetime income approach, the current study is 
different in the following ways: a) a much longer time period to estimate lifetime
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equivalent income (1968-2009) than Caspersen and M etcalf (1994) did (1968- 
1988). This should more accurately capture the income lifecycle effects. Fullerton 
and Rogers (1991) state that the lifetime tax incidence analysis requires data over 
longer time periods, because the results critically depend on the shape o f  the 
whole lifetime earnings profile; b) applying the AR(1) exact maximum likelihood 
model instead of OLS or a fixed-effects model to estimate income in the Panel 
Study o f Income Dynamics data. Fixed effects methods offer few benefits for 
estimating the effects o f variables that do not change over time, such as race and 
sex (e.g., Allison 2010). And when the data is first order autoregressive, the fixed 
effects model will produce an inconsistent estimator (Keane and Runkle, 1992);
iii) Comparing the current federal tax system with the proposed VAT system to 
better understand the distributional effects o f  both tax systems;
iv) Employing multiple global progressivity measures augment the validity o f the 
results and applying statistical inference, such as the bootstrap method, to analyze 
the distributional effects o f the different tax incidents.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Overview
In this chapter, a detailed discussion o f the research design and methodology is 
provided. First, the research questions are restated. Second, the databases used in this 
study are described. Third, measures o f tax incidence are discussed. Fourth, computations 
o f current federal tax system are illustrated. Fifth, computations o f VAT are stated. Sixth, 
estimating the VAT tax rate is considered. Last, measures of tax progressivity and 
bootstrap methodology are discussed.
Research Questions
As discussed in Chapter one, the following research questions are postulated to 
gauge the distributional effects on the current federal tax system and the potential 
distributional impacts o f adopting the Value-Added Tax (VAT).
1. Is the current federal tax system progressive or regressive, under both annual 
income and lifetime income approaches?
2. Is the current federal tax system more or less progressive than before, under both 
annual income and lifetime income approaches?
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3. Is the VAT regressive or progressive under the annual income and lifetime 
income approaches? How much o f that regressivity is alleviated by the zero-rating 
or universal rebate?
4. Is the VAT more or less progressive than the current federal tax system under 
both the annual income and lifetime income approach?
5. Is there any significant difference in the progressivity level o f the VAT under 
annual income and lifetime income approaches?
6. Will zero-rating or a rebate system significantly change the progressivity level o f 
the VAT under annual income and lifetime income approaches?
7. Are the VAT’s distributional effects significantly different among various age 
groups?
8. Are the VAT’s distributional effects significantly different between rural and 
urban areas?
Several global indices are calculated to answer the above questions. Also, 
statistical inferences are applied to test the significance o f questions 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
Data Sources
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES)
The primary data sample for this study consists o f the households surveyed in the 
2009 Consumer Expenditure Survey Microdata Files (CES). It is the most comprehensive 
source o f expenditure data. It consists o f two surveys, the Interview Survey and the Diary 
Survey. The Interview Survey is designed to capture large purchases, such as spending on 
rental property and vehicles and those that occur on a regular basis such as rent or 
utilities. It collects data on up to 95% o f total household expenditures. The Diary Survey
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is meant to capture small frequently purchased item. The Interview Survey collects data 
on about 95% o f total household expenditures. For this study, households from the 
Interview Survey data are used. The 2009 CES interviews households during all four 
quarters o f 2009 as well as the first quarter o f  2010. New households enter the sample 
every quarter and depart after their fifth interview. Families interviewed in a given 
quarter are asked about consumption over the last three months. Because families may be 
interviewed at any date within the quarter, data from the previous three-month period can 
be included in the current quarter.
As discussed in Kuang et al. (2011), the CES microdata file is utilized in the 
current study for several reasons. First, it is recognized as providing the most extensive 
coverage o f expenditures among the leading U.S. micro data sets (e.g., Soulelers 1999), 
which allows us to reasonably approximate the amount o f taxable consumption for each 
household. Second, compared with tax return data, CES data capture information for both 
filers and non-filers, and hence, strengthens the validity o f  the distributional analysis. 
Next, although CES income data has been questioned for underreporting at the low end 
and top coding at the high end, Branch (1994) finds that CES income figures are 
generally consistent with other income reports.
Panel Study o f Income Dynamics (PSID)
Panel Study o f Income Dynamics (PSID) data for the years 1968-2009 is used to 
estimate household lifetime income profiles that are used to predict lifetime income for 
2009 Consumer Expenditure Survey households. The PSID is a longitudinal survey o f a 
nationally representative sample o f nearly 9,000 U.S. families, 1968-2009, conducted by 
the Survey Research Center in the Institute for Social Research at the University of
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Michigan. The first sample was collected in 1968 and these households were 
reinterviewed in subsequent years, from which panel data have been compiled. The PSID 
interviewed and reinterviewed individuals from families in the core sample every year, 
including people that were “split o f f ’ from their original families to form new families 
and people born into these families. The survey was conducted annually until 1997 and 
biennially thereafter. A sample o f 441 immigrant families was added in 1997 to represent 
the change o f the population construct. Over time, the sample size has grown from 4,800 
families to 8,690 families in 2009. PSID is the only publicly available database that 
contains longitudinal annual income data.
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Caspersen and Metcalf, 1994; Maxewell, 
2003; Kuang et al., 2011), PSID households are selected for the current study only if  they 
meet the following three criteria: (1) participated in all annual surveys from 1968-2009; 
(2) headed by individuals aged 18 to 90 years; and (3) no missing data1. After applying 
these three criteria, the final sample includes 505 households tracked over a 42 years 
period (36 years o f  records and 18,180 observations)2.
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which began in 1996, is a set of 
large-scale surveys of families and individuals, their medical providers (doctors, 
hospitals, pharmacies, etc.), and employers across the United States. It provides detailed 
information about personal and family level health care spending where the total medical
1 Missing information for demographic variables such as race, gender, and education are imputed if  there is 
consistent information in the year before and after.
2 To address the potential survival bias, the larger sample size from PSID data with shorted time period (20 
and 30 years) is also analyzed in the sensitivity analysis section.
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expenditure variable includes both out-of-pocket spending and third-party payments. The 
CES only records out-of-pocket spending and does not provide information for third- 
party payments made by insurance companies, Medicare, and Medicaid. Moreover, this 
out-of-pocket health care spending can often be negative if the household has received a 
refund from an insurance company for medical spending in the current survey period. 
Therefore, the MEPS Household Component (MEPS-HC) 2009 Consolidated Data File is 
used to predict the total medical spending for the 2009 CES households in the current 
study.
Measurements of Tax Incidence
As discussed in Fullerton and Rogers (1995), the most common approach in 
distributional analysis begins by dividing all households into groups based on some 
measure o f  their current annual economic income. Pechman and Okner (1974) provide 
one o f the most cited tax incidence study using the annual income approach. Taxpayers, 
however, tend to consume based on permanent income or earnings over their life-cycle 
(Friedman, 1957; Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Walls and Hanson, 1999). As a result, 
distributional analyses based on the annual income approach may cause the biased 
results.
Poterba (1989, 1991) has proposed using annual total consumption expenditures 
as a proxy for lifetime income, arguing that since consumption tends to be smoothed over 
the life-cycle, it is a more accurate estimate o f true lifetime well-being. M etcalf (1997), 
however, argues that current consumption may not be a very good proxy for lifetime 
income. The current consumption approach assumes that consumption is roughly
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constant over the lifetime time. However, consumption exhibits the same king o f “hump” 
that income does over the lifetime.
Fullerton and Rogers (1991 and 1993) estimate lifetime income in a large scale 
multigeneration computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework. The authors use the 
PSID longitudinal data to estimate a wage-income by regressing an individual’s wage 
rates as a function of age, age square, age cube, and various demographic variables. The 
results o f  this regression describe how a person’s earnings potential changes over time as 
a consequence o f age and the other factors. Once these profiles are determined, each 
person in the data set can be assigned a measure o f  his or her respective lifetime income. 
This is calculated by summing up the discounted values o f  the areas under the estimated 
age-wage profiles for each person. Once individuals are categorized by the present value 
o f lifetime wage potential, Fullerton and Rogers then proceed to re-estimate profiles for 
each group and calculate tax incidence estimates based on the age-income profiles and 
the lifetime income measurements. Fullerton and Rogers look at the lifetime tax burden 
relative to lifetime income.
“While the approach used by Fullerton and Rogers is appealing on many grounds, 
it is computationally intensive and does not provide all the information that policymakers 
care about” (M etcalf 1997). Accordingly, Casperson and M etcalf (1994) use the PSID to 
estimate the age-income profiles for households, and then, the coefficient estimates from 
these regressions are applied to households in the CES to generate estimates o f lifetime 
income for these households. As explained in their paper, the use o f  both PSID and CES 
datasets are necessary due to the lack o f appropriate expenditure data in the panel data set 
used in the first step. However, there are possibly correlated individual effects when
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combining information from the two datasets. So Casperson and M etcalf apply the fixed 
effects model in the income regression. Ignoring the individual effects is problematic for 
two reasons: (1) if  these individual effects are correlated with explanatory variables, the 
coefficient estimates from a regression without fixed effects will be biased and 
inconsistent; and (2) we will lose important variation in lifetime income resulting from 
cross-sectional variation in the individual affects. Casperson and M etcalf looks at annual 
tax burdens relative to lifetime income.
Most recently, Maxwell (2003) challenges the fixed effect models used by 
Casperson and M etcalf (1994) for estimating age-income profile. Maxwell lists three 
shortcoming of fixed effects model: 1) the data is autoregressive o f order one; 2) first 
differencing or pseudo-differencing the data or including a lagged dependent variable 
results in an inconsistent estimator using a fixed-effects estimator (Keane & Runkle, 
1992); and 3) because fixed effects models difference out the means, all time invariant 
information such as sex and race is lost. Maxwell notes that a fixed-effects model is 
unbiased, but cannot be applied to the CES sample. The first order AR(1) exact 
maximum likelihood model is applied in Maxwell ‘s study. Kuang et al. (2011) find that 
the AR(1) exact maximum likelihood model is a better fit for the CES sample data. This 
study uses the Maxwell (2003)'s method to estimate age-income profiles and calculate 
the lifetime income. The detailed procedures to calculate the lifetime income are 
provided as follows:
First, estimating an Income-Age Profile Using PSID Panel Data following 
Maxwell (2003)!s method.
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The estimated model is,
REALINCit =  a +  p i  * AGEit +  p 2 * AGESQit +  p 3 * AGECUBit +  p 4 * UNEMPit +  p 5
* NOTMARit +  p 6 * FMHDit +  p 7 * NWHDit +  p 8 * NEURBit +  p 9
* M W URBj(. +  P 10 * SURBjt +  P n  * W URBjt 4- p i2 * SHit +  p i3  * HGit 
+  P14 * SCit +  p 15 * CDjt +  p i6  * PCjt +  p 17 * T I M E , t
+  eit (3.1)
where:
R EA LJN C : Real total family income, which include taxable income, transfer income, 
and social security income for the head, wife, and other family members. 
Income values from 1968-2007 are inflated to 2008 dollars using the GNP 
deflator;
AGE: Age of the household head;
AGESQ: Age of the household head squared;
AGECUB: Age of the household head cubed;
UNEMP: UNEMP=1 if the head o f a household is unemployed, otherwise 
UNEMP=0;
NOTMAR: NOTM AR=l if the household head is not married, otherwise 
NOTMAR=0;
FMHD: FMHD=1 if the head o f a household is female, otherwise FMHD=0;
NWHD: NWHD=T if  the head o f a household is not white, otherwise NWHD=0;
N E U R B : NE_URB=1 if the household resides in the Northeast urban area, 
otherwise NE URB=0;
M W U R B : MW_URB=1 if the household resides in the Midwest urban area, 
otherwise MW_URB=0;3
S U R B : S URB=1 if  the household resides in the South urban area, otherwise 
SJURB=0;
W URB: W URB^l if the household resides in the West urban area, otherwise 
W URB=0;
3 The definition o f  North central in PSID is equivalent to M idwest in CES.
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SH: SH=1 if the household head's education level is 9-11 grades, otherwise
SH=0;
HG: HG=1 if  the household head's education level is 12 grades (completed
high school), otherwise HG=0;
SG: SC=1 if  the household head attends college without a degree, otherwise
SC=0;
CD: CD=1 if  the household head has a bachelor degree, otherwise CD=0;
PC: PC=1 if the household head has an advanced degree, otherwise PC =0;
TIME: indicator for the year, 1 for 1968, 2 for 1969, ... , 42 for 2009.
Next, the estimated coefficients from Equation 3.1 are applied to predict 
household income for the CES sample. A household is assumed to be an income- 
generating entity from the time the head is 18 years old until age 90. Similar to previous 
studies (e.g., Metcalf, 1997; Kuang et al., 2011), workers are assumed to be continually 
employed until age 65 at which point they retire. Following Maxwell’s (2003) approach, 
a two-part income profile is generated for each household. (1) Profile one begins from the 
2009 age of the household head to age 90; and (2) Profile two begins from age 18 to the 
2009 age o f the household head. Profile two is brought forward to 2009 as a future value, 
while profile one is brought to 2009 as a present value. Then, lifetime income estimates 
are converted to annuity equivalents assuming a 4% real rate o f  interest.4 An annuity 
equivalent for profile one is calculated according to the annuity formula for present value, 
and the annuity equivalent for profile two is calculated using the annuity formula for 
future value. Also, a lifetime equivalent income is calculated as the weighted average of 
the two annuities and 2009 predicted real income for every household.
4 Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Fullerton and Rogers, 1993; Caspersen and M etcalf, 1994; 
M axwell, 2003; Kuang et al., 2011), the discount rate is assumed to remain constant at 4% over time.
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Computation of Current Federal Taxes
To analyze the equity o f  the current federal tax system, the five major current 
taxes (individual income tax, corporate income tax, payroll tax, estate and gift taxes, and 
excise tax) are computed as follows:
Individual Income Tax and Payroll Tax 
Households in CES report the federal individual income tax, payroll tax and 
excise tax. Both employee and employer portions o f  payroll taxes are distributed to each 
household assuming an inelastic labor supply. But the assumption o f elastic labor supply, 
which means consumers bear only the employee portion o f  payroll tax, is also applied as 
an alternative analysis.
Corporate Income Tax 
Similar to Kuang et al. (2011), corporate income tax is imputed by two methods. 
Corporate income tax is first imputed according to the Feldstein’s (1988) approach which 
assumes that corporate taxes are all borne by owners o f capital and are distributed to 
households, an approach which has been widely used in previous tax research (e.g., 
Feenberg et a l . 1997; M etcalf 1997; M etcalf 1999; Kuang et al. 2011). This methodology 
is shown as follows:
First, total capital income (K) which is defined as the sum o f corporate profits (C), 
net interest received by household (I), and rental income (R) is calculated. Second, the 
average tax rate on capital income and profits to the dividends ratio is calculated. 
Corporate tax liabilities (T) come from the NIPA tables. Personal dividends (D) are 
calculated from the NIPA tables. The formula for attributing corporate tax liability is
CORPTAXi = n  * YiDIVi + y x * INTt + * RENT{ (3.2)
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where: CORPTAXj denotes corporate income tax attributed to household i;
DIVj denotes dividends income for household i;
INTj denotes interest income for household i;
RENTj denotes rental income for household i;
Prior tax incidence research also applies alternative incidence assumptions for the 
imputation o f the corporate income following the CBO method (e.g., Gale et al., 1996; 
Metcalf, 1999; Kuang et al., 2011. A recent CBO report (Harris, 2012) allocates 75% of 
the federal corporate income tax to capital income and 25% to labor income for 2009 
data. Following Kuang et al. (2011), the procedure for this approach first allocates 75% 
o f the corporate tax to salary income and the remaining 25% is distributed to Feldstein’s 
(1988) method as discussed earlier.
Estate and Gift Taxes
Estate and gift tax is distributed following the methodology used in Feenberg et 
al. (1997) and Kuang et al. (2011). The detailed methods used in the current study are 
explained below:
First, Capital income (CAP) is defined as the sum o f  dividends, interest incomes, 
and rental income received by a household based on available information in the CES 
data, which is the same definition used for corporate income tax distribution.
Second, the capital income threshold is set as $75,000 due to the increase o f  the 
estate tax exemption amount (estate tax exemption amount in 2009 is $3,500,000) and the 
decrease o f the nominal interest rates o f  30-year Treasury Bonds5. To illustrate, a
5 Feenberg et al. (1997) allocates the burden o f  estate and gift taxes in proportion to each household’s share 
o f  capital income valued in excess o f  $30,000 and limits the imputation to households with som eone over 
the age o f  65.
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household would have to have held approximately 1,840,000 in 30-year Treasury Bonds 
with a nominal interest rate o f 4.08% in 2009 to generate this $75,000 flow o f capital 
income. Since most households with this level o f  financial assets are also homeowners, 
their taxable estate would be greater than the financial asset holdings and hence, approach 
the $3,500,000 estate tax exemption.
Third, since the sample size o f CES households is much smaller than the one used 
in Feenberg et al. (1997), the aggregate amount o f  federal estate and gift taxes will be 
deflated using the ratio below:
Qx =  C E SC A P /to ta l c a p ita l incom e(K )  (3.3)
where CESCAP denotes the sum of capital income for all the CES households. K is the 
same total capita income used for corporate income tax distribution, which are calculated 
using aggregate data from NIPA tables and Flow o f Funds, etc.
Last, without age information in the tax return, Feenberg et al. (1997) use the 
arbitrary cutoff o f 65 which assumes that the mortality risk is zero for those under age 65 
and positive but equal for all households with someone over age 65. The current study 
uses the age-specific mortality rates from the National Center for Health Statistics (see 
Table 3.1) to project the probability o f  death, but limits the estate and gift tax imputation 
to households with someone over age 55, when the death rate is above the national 
average.
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Table 3.1
U.S. Death Rates per 100,000 Population by Age Groups, 2007
Age Groups (j) Death Rates (dj)
1 Under 1 year 684.5
2 1 -4 years 28.6
3 5-14 years 15.3
4 15-24 years 79.9
5 25-34 years 104.9
6 35-44 years 184.4
7 45-54 years 420.9
8 55-64 years 877.7
9 65-74 years 2011.3
10 75-84 years 5011.6
11 85 years and over 12946.5
All Ages Average 803.6
Source: National Vital Statistics Reports, May 20, 2010
available at http://www. cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_19.pdf
Specifically, two new variables are constructed for each CES household.
CAP75K = 0 if CAP<$75,000
= CAP - $75,000 if  CAP>$75,000
DRATE = 0 if both the household head and his/her spouse are under age 55
= dj if  the age o f a household head or his/her spouse, whoever is older, falls
into age group j (j>=8)-
This approach assumes that: First, the burden of estate and gift taxes falls on the
decedent; second, taxes on accumulated wealth are taxes on the stock o f capital held by
the taxpayers and therefore can be allocated according to capital income; third, expected
estate and gift tax payments for a household can be approximated based on age, age-
specific death rates, and capital income.
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Therefore, the estate and gift tax burden for the CES households is imputed using 
the following equation:
r r ' T A V  D R A T E i * C A P 7 5 K i ccnr/’r/iv t ' l  a \E G T A X i = -   -------------   * di * F E D E G T A X  (3.4)
1 ' Z D R A T E i * C A P 7 S K i 1 v '
where EGTAXj denotes the estate and gift tax distributed for household I; FEDEGTAX is 
the NIPA federal receipts from estate and gift taxes; as defined previously, DRATEj is 
adjusted death rate for household I; CAP75Kj is the amount o f capital income in excess of 
$75,000 for household I; and 0j is the deflator.
Excise Tax
The three major components o f  excise taxes are on gasoline, tobacco, and 
alcohol.6 In this study, the excise tax for each household is estimated based on their 
reported gasoline, tobacco, and alcohol expenditures in 2009 CES survey. The excise tax 
rates on gasoline, tobacco, and alcohol are estimated by using the NIPA aggregated data.
Computation of VAT
In this study, both the broad-based tax base and narrow-based tax base are 
applied. The broad-tax base for VAT in the absence o f zero-rating, exemption, and rebate 
is the total consumption (See Table 3.2).
6 Diesel fuel and air transport taxes are excluded from this study.
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Table 3.2
Poverty Thresholds for 2009
Family Size Poverty Threshold
unrelated individual under age 65 $11,161
Unrelated individual 65 and over $10,289
2 persons, householder under age 65 $14,437
2 persons, householder 65 and over $12,984
3 persons $17,102
4 persons $21,947
5 persons $25,956
6 persons $29,351
7 persons $33,410
8 persons $37,088
9 persons $44,188
Source: Annual Statistical Supplement: Social Security Bulletin available at
htt p:/Z\\\vw. ssa.gov/policv/docs/statcomDs/siwplement/2010/3e.pdf.
To address the regressivity o f the VAT, two narrow-based tax bases, a zero rating 
on food, housing, and health expenditures and universal rebates to households equal or 
lower than the poverty threshold, are applied. Following Burton and Mastromarco (1996) 
and M etcalf (1997), the universal household rebate would equal the tax rate times the 
poverty threshold for a given family size. Poverty thresholds for 2009 ranged from an 
elderly unrelated individual to a family size o f nine (see Table 3.2).
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Estimating the VAT Tax Rate
In this section, the calculations o f the VAT tax rate that would raise the same 
amount o f revenue as the current federal tax system is presented. Following Feenberg et 
al. (1997), the estimates using National Income and Product Account (NIPA) data for 
calendar year 2009 is applied. The personal income tax, estate and gift taxes, corporate 
profits taxes, and payroll taxes are obtained from NIPA. Next, the VAT tax base can be 
estimated using the NIPA concept o f personal consumption expenditures (PCE). Last, 
several important adjustments to this consumption are applied following Feenberg et al. 
(1997): (1) adjusting PCE for indirect taxes; (2) Owner-occupied housing in the VAT 
base; and (3) other adjustments. The VAT rate equals the adjusted tax base divided by the 
required revenue under the current federal tax system.
Measures of Tax Progressivity
Local indices o f progressivity, such as average tax rate (ATR), are the simplest 
way to assess the progressivity level o f tax incidence. The ATR for an income group is 
computed as its tax liability divided by a relevant measure o f its income. An ATR that 
rises over a range of income is said to be progressive in that range, an ATR that declines 
is regressive, and an ATR that is steady is proportional. Local indices o f progressivity can 
rank a given type o f tax or the total tax system over a given range o f  income, but because 
progressivity can vary with income level, a global progressivity index is need to 
characterize the tax or tax system across the entire income scale (Kesselman and Cheung, 
2004). Hence, a global index is usually needed to compare the progressivity o f taxes 
across time or policy changes. Global indices o f  progressivity offer a compact and
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informative way to measure the impacts o f taxes on the distribution o f incomes 
(Kesselman and Cheung, 2004).
Various global indexes o f tax progressivity have been developed in the economics 
literature (e.g., Kakwani, 1977; Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Suits, 1977; Pfahler, 
1983). Since different indexes bring to bear different features and limitations regarding 
progressivity (Seetharaman and Iyer 1995), a reasonably way to study the actual 
distribution o f taxes is to use multiple measures. This insures robustness o f the results to 
the choice o f the index and also fortifies the rigor and relevance o f the analysis (Iyer et al. 
1996). In the distributional analysis research, global indices, such as Suits Index and 
Kakwani’s Index, are widely used in assessing the progressivity. Accordingly, in this 
study, these two indices, Suits (1977) index and Kakwani’s (1977) index, are used to 
measure global progressivity.
Prior research on tax incidence mainly uses the calculated indices to measure the 
progressivity and/or compare the difference between indices. However, it is inadequate to 
rely only on summary indices (such as Suits index and Kakwani index) when addressing 
vertical equity issues (Iyer and Reckers, 2011). Such indices only provide a point 
estimator and cannot assess whether the changes in the index are in fact statistically 
significant (Anderson et al., 2003). Small changes may lead to false conclusions, 
particularly where small sample sizes are involved. Small changes in progressivity 
measured over two time periods or between tax regimes may be caused by unobserved 
confounding variables. Thus, without a statistical analysis, the results drawn based only 
on descriptive statistics might lead to wrong. There are generally two inference methods 
for inequality and progressivity indices, asymptotic and bootstrap inference methods.
55
Prior studies show that the bootstrap method appears to perform better than the 
asymptotic method (e.g., Mills and Zandvakilli, 1997; Biewen, 2002; Andres and 
Calonge, 2006). In this study, the Bootstrap methodology developed by Efron and 
Tibshirani (1991) and Anderson et al. (2003) is used to estimate confidence intervals for 
differences in Suits indices. The Suits and Kakwani’s indices and the bootstrap method 
are discussed in order.
Suits Index
Suits (1977) proposed a progressivity index which relates the cumulative percent 
o f total income, on the x axis, to the cumulative percent o f  total taxes, on the y axis (see 
Figure 3.1). The curve relating the cumulative percents o f  total income and total taxes 
may be called the tax curve (Line C or D). The suits index (S) is defined by the ratio of 
the area between the diagonal and the tax curve to the total area under the diagonal. It 
may be represented as:
S  = ( K -  L ) / K  (3.5)
where S = the Suits index; K = the total area below the diagonal line; L = the total area 
under the tax curve. For a proportional tax, where L=K, the value o f the Suits index will 
equal zero. For a progressive tax as indicated by curve OCB, where L<K, the value o f  the 
Suits index will be positive. Foe a regressive tax as indicated by curve ODB, where L>K 
the value o f the Suits index will be negative.
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Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Suits, 1977; Caspersen and Metcalf, 1994; 
Iyer et al., 1996; Maxewell, 2003; Kuang et al., 2011), the Suits index is calculated by the 
following formula:
■s = 1 -  2 /„* T(y)dy  = 1 -  Z?.,(l/2)[r(yi) +  U -^OKy, -  y , - J  (3.6)
where y and T(y) denote the cumulative percentage o f income and tax, i represents one to 
ten deciles o f the taxpayer income.
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Figure 3.1 The Suits Index
Kakwani’s Index
Kakwani (1977) proposes a progressivity index which relates the cumulative 
proportion o f income and taxes, on the y axis, to the cumulative proportion o f  income 
recipients arrayed by the sizes o f  their incomes, on the x axis. A formal definition of 
Kakwani's index (K) is given by (Seetharaman, 1994; Creedy, 1999):
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K =  Ct - G x (3.7)
where Ct is the concentration index o f tax and Gx is the Gini coefficient o f pre-tax 
income.
If a tax system is proportional, the concentration curve of taxation and the Lorenz 
curve o f pre-tax income coincide, and therefore Ct = Gx, and K=0. The maximum and 
minimum values o f K are +1 and -2, respectively. Positive values o f  K indicate 
progressivity and negative values indicate regressivity.
Following Creedy (1999), the Gini coefficient (Gx) is calculated as:
where x  denotes the pre-tax income, x  denotes the arithmetic mean, and N denotes the 
number o f families. Ct is calculated using a similar method.
The bootstrap method is first introduced by Efron (1979). As discussed in Efron 
and Tibshirani (1993), one o f the three basic questions statistical theory attempts to 
answer is “How accurate are my data summaries?” For the current study, the question is 
how accurate is the Suits index, and some other indices, used in measuring the overall 
progressivity o f the tax system? And how confident that the difference o f Suits index for 
two tax systems or one system over the different time is in fact statistically significant? 
As a point estimator without any information on standard deviation, however, the Index 
provides researchers with no confidence that the index value is not due to sampling 
variation or sampling errors. Although the bootstrap method has been applied in many 
areas since Efron introduced in 1979, it has been rarely discussed and/or applied in tax 
policy analysis other than Anderson et al. (2003). Anderson et al., based on bootstrap-t
(3.8)
The Bootstrap Methodology
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confidence interval discussed in Efron and Tibshirani (1993), introduce the method to 
estimate confidence intervals for differences in Suits Indices. "Bootstrap-t” approach 
estimates the distribution o f the Suits index directly from the data. In essence, it builds a 
table that is appropriate for the data set at hand. Next, this table is used to construct a 
confidence interval in exactly the same way that the normal and t tables are used. The 
bootstrap table is built by generating 1,000 bootstrap samples, and then computing the 
bootstrap version o f Suits index for each sample. The bootstrap table consists o f  the 
percentiles o f these Suits index values (Efron and Tibshirani 1993, p l60). The detailed 
procedures for constructing bootstrap-t confidence interval are discussed in Anderson et 
al. (2003) and in Appendix A.7
As discussed in Chapter 14 o f Efron and Tibshirani (1993), bootstrap-t confidence 
intervals have good theoretical coverage probabilities, but tend to be erratic sometimes in 
actual practice. So an improved version o f the percentile method called BCa, the 
abbreviation standing for bias-corrected and accelerated, is also used in the current
o
study. The BCa method automatically corrects for bias in the plug-in estimate, which is 
one o f its advantages over the bootstrap-t and the percentile methods.
Andres and Calonge (2006) apply asymptotic and bootstrap inference methods for 
a set o f non-linear inequality and progressivity indices and find that bootstrap methods 
appear to be favorable as far as inference issues are concerned. As a result, both 
bootstrap-t method and bootstrap BCa method are applied in the current study.
7 Based on the Fortran codes provided by Dr. Roy, the current study uses Matlab software to run the 
bootstrap-t confidence intervals.
8 Bootstrap BCa method is applied under SAS environment.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Previous chapters contain: (1) a discussion o f  the VAT and the need for further 
research; (2) a review o f the pertinent distribution effects and consumption tax research 
that has a direct influence upon the current research, and (3) development o f  the research 
methodology used in the current study. This chapter presents the results o f  the empirical 
analysis. Data selection procedures and summary statistics are presented first, followed 
by a discussion o f the results pertaining to each o f the research questions presented in 
Chapter 3.
Data Selection and Imputations
The primary data source for the analysis is the 2009 Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CES). Several adjustments are made to improve the consumption and tax 
information in the CES. First, a representative quarter data is selected to do the analysis. 
Second, the medical related expenditures for the CES households are replaced with the 
forecasted total medical spending using 2009 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 
data. Third, corporate income tax, excise tax, as well as estate and gift taxes are imputed 
to every CES household to approximate the current federal tax burdens. Fourth, broad- 
based and narrow-based VAT tax rates are estimated to generate the same revenue as the
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current federal tax system. Fifth, lifetime income is estimated for every CES household 
using data from the 1968-2009 Panel Study o f  Income Dynamics.
Data Selection
In the CES interview survey, each household is interviewed every three months 
over five calendar quarters. In the initial interview, information is collected on 
demographic and family characteristics and on expenditure information used to prevent 
duplicate reporting in subsequent interviews. All valid expenditure and income 
information are collected in the following four quarters’ interviews. Families interviewed 
in a given quarter are asked about consumption information over the last three months 
and income information over the last twelve months. Because families may be 
interviewed at any date within the quarter, a portion o f the consumption data collected 
can be from previous quarter and the remaining from the current quarter. In 2009 CES 
database, there are totally 2,617 households participated in all four valid quarters’ survey. 
In each quarter, there are about 7,000 households interviewed.
Follow Kuang et al. (2011) approach, a representative quarter data is selected to 
do the analysis. Specifically, a quarter is selected that is the best representation o f an 
“average” consumption quarter. This approach can reasonably reduce the seasonal 
volatility in consumption data while retaining a relatively large sample size. For this 
reason, the fourth quarter o f 2009 is selected as the representative quarter because its total 
consumption is closest to the average consumption per quarter. The initial size o f the 
sample for the fourth quarter o f 2009 is 7,104 households. Two sample selection criteria 
are applied. First, only those households headed by persons aged 18 to 90 and for which
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there are no missing data are selected9. Second, only those households with valid data for 
the study are selected10. The above sample selection process resulted in a final sample of 
6,184 households for year 2009. The quarterly consumption data is then multiplied by 
four to compute an estimated amount o f annual consumption for each o f the households.
To compare the progressivity o f the current tax system over time, 2005 CES data 
was selected. Following the same procedure illustrated above, the final sample selected 
for year 2005 is 6,597.
Estimated Total Family Medical Expenditure
Like the National Retail Sales Tax (NRST), total medical expenditure is taxable 
under the board-based VAT. But the CES only records out-of-pocket spending and does 
not provide information for third-party payments made by insurance companies, 
Medicare, and Medicaid. Moreover, this out-of-pocket health care spending can often be 
negative if the household has received a refund from an insurance company for medical 
spending in the current survey period. The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 
provides detailed information about personal and family level health care spending where 
the total medical expenditure variable includes both out-of-pocket spending and third- 
party payments. Therefore, MEPS Household Component (MEPS-HC) 2009 
Consolidated Data File is used to predict the total medical spending for the 2009 CES 
households in the current study. After deleting the observations with inapplicable values
9 As discussed in Chapter 3, household’s head is the reference person in CES data except that the reference 
person is married female. In that case, the household’s head is the spouse o f  the reference person to be 
consistent with that o f  PSID data.
10 CES codes missing values as (1) a valid blank; that is, a blank field where a response is not anticipated; 
(2) a blank resulting from an invalid nonresponse; that is, a nonresponse that is not consistent with other 
data reported by the CU; or (3) a blank resulting from a “don’t know,” refusal, or other type o f  
nonresponse. The observations with (2) and/or (3) m issing values are eliminated.
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for several variables such as age and family size, the sample size for MEPS-HC 2009 is 
35,671 individuals from 13,317 households. Following the methodology used by M etcalf 
(1997) and Feenberg et al. (1997), total family health care expenditure is regressed on 
family size, family income, number o f family members who are over the age o f 64, and 
number o f children under the age o f 18. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the descriptive 
statistics o f the variables and the estimated coefficients for total family medical 
expenditures using MEPS-HC 2009 data. All the coefficients are highly significant 
(p<.001) with expected sign.
Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics fo r  MEP-HC 2009 Data
Variables N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Family Total Health Care Expenditure 13317 9068 17721
Family Size 13317 2.63 1.58
Family Total Income 13317 50385 48164
Number o f  family members over 64 13317 0.28 0.57
Number o f family members under 18 13317 0.078 1.17
Table 4.2
Total Family Health Care Expenditure Forecast Models 
Variables Model P-value
Intercept 4664 <.0001
Family Size 1156 <.0001
Family Total Income 0.011 0.0016
Number o f family members over 64 4996 <.0001
Number o f family members under 18 -726 0.0039
Note: The dependent variable is the family total health care expenditure.
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The estimated coefficients o f the model in Table 4.2 are then used to forecast total 
family medical spending in the CES, which only reports out-of-pocket medical spending. 
The medical related spending for CES households are replaced with the forecasted total 
medical spending amount. The average reported medical related spending for the CES 
households is $4,387 and the forecasted average family medical spending is $9,833. The 
Pearson correlation coefficient for the CES reported medical spending and the estimated 
medical spending is 0.3084 (p<0.001), which indicates total family medical spending is 
reasonably estimated and highly correlated with the original reported out-of-pocket 
spending.
Imputation o f Corporate Income Tax 
Feldstein’s (1988) Approach
Similar to Kuang et al. (2011), corporate income tax is imputed by two methods. 
Corporate income tax is first imputed according to the Feldstein’s (1988) approach which 
assumes that corporate taxes are fully borne by owners o f capital and are distributed to 
households, an approach which has been widely used by previous tax researchers (e.g., 
Feenberg et al . 1997; M etcalf 1997; M etcalf 1999; Kuang et al. 2011). This methodology 
is depicted as follows:
First, calculating total capital income (K), which is defined as the sum of 
corporate profits (C), net interest received by household (I), and rental income (R). Table 
4.3 presents the procedure and results for this calculation. The total capital income 
amounts to $1,308.09 billion in 2009. The calculation procedures for three real interest 
adjustors are further detailed in Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6.
Table 4.3
Calculation o f  Total Capital Income (K) fo r  2009
Unit: billion dollars
NIP A corporate profits (1) 1,258.00
Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) profits (2) ( 4 7 . 5 0 )
NIPA corporate profits excluding FRB profits (3)=(l)-(2) 1,210.70
Corporate sector credit market instrument liabilities (4) 6963.90
2009 inflation rate based on the CPI (5) 2.70%
Decrease in corporate debt value resulting from inflation (6)=(4)*(5) 188.03
Interest income received by pension funds (7) 111.6
Pension funds real interest adjuster (8) 35.01%
Real interest earned by pension funds (9)=(7)*(8) 39.07
Total pretax corporate profits (C): (3)+(6)+(9) 1,437.79
Interest received by households from NIPA (10) 1222.30
Household interest income real interest adjuster (11) -46.08%
Real interest income received by households (12)=(10)*(11) ( 5 0 5 . 2 5 )
Personal interest expenses (excluding mortgage interest) from NIPA (13) 216.80
Personal interest expenses real interest adjuster (14) 73.59%
Real personal interest expenses (15)=(13)*(14) (  1 5 0 . 5 5 )
Net real interest income received by households (I): (12)-(15) (403.7(1)
Rental income 274.00
Total capital income (K=C+I+R) 1,308.09
Source: National Income Product Account (http://www.bea.gov) 
and Flow o f  Funds (http://ffaser.stlouisfed.org)
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Table 4.4
Pension Funds Nominal Interest Rate (p) and Real Interest Rate (y) Calculation
Holding A m ounta Percentage Interest R ateb Interest Rate Category
Time Deposits, etc. 125.3 10.1% 0.1% Assumed based on various rates
Money Funds 96.4 7.7% 0.9% 6-month CDs
Governmental Bonds 579.8 46.6% 3.3% 10-year Treasury Constant Maturities
Corporate Bonds 442.9 35.6% 7.3% Corporate Baa Bonds
Nominal interest Rate Weighed by Holdings (p) 4.2%
Inflation Rate (7t) 2.7%
Real Interest Rate: y=(l + p)/(l+ 7t)-l 1.5%
Adjuster to convert nominal interest into real interest (y/p) 35.0%
Source: a. Flow o f  Funds (http://fraser.stlouisfed.org)
b. Federal Reserve Bank (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hl5/)
OSLA
Table 4.5
Household Nominal Interest Rate (p) and Real Interest Rate (y) Calculation
Holding Am ounta Percentage Interest R ateb Interest Rate Category
Time Deposits, etc. 6581.9 60.8% 0.1% Assumed based on various rates
Money Funds 1313 12.1% 0.9% 6-month CDs
Governmental Bonds 852.9 7.9% 3.3% 10-year Treasury Constant Maturities
Corporate Bonds 2081 19.2% 7.3% Corporate Baa Bonds
Nominal interest Rate Weighed by Holdings (p) 1.8%
Inflation Rate (ra) 2.7%
Real Interest Rate: y=(l + p)/(l+ ji)-1 -0.8%
Adjuster to convert nominal interest into real interest (y/p) -46.1%
Source: a. Flow o f  Funds (http://ffaser.stlouisfed.org)
b. Federal Reserve Bank (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hl5/)
Osas
Table 4.6
Personal Interest Expenses Nominal Interest Rate (p) and Real Interest Rate (y) Calculation
Holding Amount a Percentage Interest Rate b Interest Rate Category
Consumer credit 2478.9 67.1% 13.90% Credit card rates in FRB
Misc. Debt 1214.3 32.9% 5.25% Prime Rate+2%
Nominal interest Rate Weighed by Holdings (p) 11.1 %
Inflation Rate (n) 2.70%
Real Interest Rate: y=(l + p)/(l+ 7t)-l 8.1%
Adjuster to convert nominal interest into real interest (y/p)__________________ 73.6%
Source: a. Flow o f  Funds (http://ffaser.stlouisfed.org)
b. Federal Reserve Bank (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hl5/)
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The data used is for 2009 and is collected from the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA), Flow o f Funds, and Federal Reserve Bank. The average tax rate on 
capital income and profits to the dividends ratio is calculated. Corporate tax liabilities (T) 
come from the NIPA tables and equal $254.90 billion in 2009. Personal dividends (D) 
calculated from the NIPA tables are $697.40 billion. As indicated in Table 4.7, the 
average tax rate (yl) on capital income is 0.19, the ratio o f  corporate tax collections to 
capital income. The ratio o f pretax corporate profits to dividends (y2) equals 2.06. As a 
result, the corporate tax liability per dollar o f dividends distributed equals 0.39. The 
formula for attributing corporate tax liability is
CORPTAXi = 0.39 * DIVi + 0.19INTi + 0.19RENTi (4.1)
Table 4.7
Average Tax Rate on Capital Income (yi) and Profits to Dividends Ration (yi)
NIPA corporate income taxes (T) 254.90
Total capital income (K) 1,308.09
Average tax rate on capital income (yi=T/K) 0.19
Total pretax corporate profits (C) 1437.79
Personal dividends (D) 697.40
Profits to dividends ratio (Y2=C/D)______________________________ 2.06
As discussed in Feldstein (1988), what matters for the purpose o f tax distribution 
is not the interest and dividends that individuals report but the actual amount o f interest 
and dividends that they receive. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Metcalf, 1997; 
Kuang et al., 2011), the current study uses these estimates as adjusters for underreporting 
that Feldstein uses for dividends (.71) and interest income (.82).
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Thus, the formula for attributing corporate tax liability evolves as:
CORPTAXi = 0.39 * DIVi/0.71 + 0.19 * INTi/0.82 + 0.19RENTi (4.2)
Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) Approach
The second approach assumes that corporate taxes are borne both by owners of 
capital and by labor. The 2012 CBO report allocates 75% o f the federal corporate income 
tax to capital income and 25% to labor income for 2009 year data. Similarly to Kuang et
al. (2011), the procedure for this approach is as follows: First, calculate the average
corporate income tax rate on salary income. NIPA wage and salary disbursement for 
private industries equals 5,095.1 billion in 2009. Assuming 75% o f the 254.9 billion, i.e., 
191.18 billion, corporate income taxes are born by all the salary income, the average 
corporate income tax rate on salary is 0.038. Second, the remaining 25% o f the corporate 
income taxes are then distributed using the Feldstein (1988) methodology. As indicated 
in Table 4.8, the average tax rate on capital income equals 0.05. The profits to dividends 
ratio equals 2.06. Thus, the corporate tax liability per dollar o f dividends distributed 
equals 0.103.
Table 4.8
Average Tax Rate on Capital Income (y t), Profits to Dividends Ralio(y2). and Average 
Tax Rate on Salary Income(y3): CBO Approach
25% of NIPA corporate income taxes ( Ti ) 63.73
Total capital income ( K ) 1308.09
Average tax rate on capital income ( y 1 = Ti / K ) 0.05
Total pretax corporate profits ( C ) 1437.79
Personal dividends ( D ) 697.4
Profits to dividends ratio ( y2 =C I D )  2.06
75% of NIPA corporate income taxes ( T2 > 191.18
NIPA wage and salary disbursements for private industries ( S ) 5095.1
Average tax rate on salary income ( y 3 = T2 / S )________________________________0.038
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Therefore, the formula for attributing the corporate tax liability according to the 2012 
report is
COPR = 0.103*DIV + 0.05 *INT+0.05*RENT+0.038* SAL. (4.3)
After adjusting for underreporting, the formula for attributing the corporate tax liability is 
COPR = 0.145*DIV + 0.06*INT+0.05*RENT+0.038*SAL. (4.4)
Imputation o f Estate and Gift Taxes
Estate and gift tax is distributed following the methodology used in Feenberg et 
al. (1997) and Kuang et al. (2011). The detailed methods used in the current study are 
explained herein.
First, Capital income (CAP) is defined as the sum o f  dividends, interest incomes, 
and rental income received by a household based on available information in the CES 
data, which is the same definition used for corporate income tax distribution.
Second, the capital income threshold is set as $75,000 due to the increase o f  the 
estate tax exemption amount (estate tax exemption amount in 2009 is $3,500,000) and the 
decrease o f the nominal interest rates o f  30-year Treasury Bonds11. To illustrate, a 
household would have to have held approximately 1,840,000 in 30-year Treasury Bonds 
with a nominal interest rate o f 4.08% in 2009 to generate this $75,000 flow o f capital 
income. Since most households with this level o f financial assets are also homeowners, 
their taxable estate would be greater than the financial asset holdings and hence, approach 
the $3,500,000 estate tax exemptions.
11 Feenberg et al. (1997) allocates the burden o f  estate and gift taxes in proportion to each household’s 
share o f  capital income valued in excess o f  $30,000 and limits the imputation to households with som eone 
over the age o f  65.
71
Third, since the sample size o f CES households is much smaller than the one used 
in Feenberg et al. (1997), the aggregate amount o f  federal estate and gift taxes will be 
deflated using the ratio below:
6j = CESCAP/total capital income (K) (4.5)
where CESCAP denotes the sum o f capital income for all the CES households. K is the 
same total capital income used for corporate income tax distribution, which are calculated 
using aggregate data from NIPA tables and Flow o f Funds, etc.
Last, without age information in the tax return, Feenberg et al. (1997) use the 
arbitrary cutoff o f  65 which assumes that the mortality risk is zero for those under age 65 
and positive but equal for all households with someone over age 65. The current study 
uses the age-specific mortality rates from the National Center for Flealth Statistics (see 
Table 4.9) to project the probability o f death, but limits the estate and gift tax imputation 
to households with someone over age 55, if  the death rate is above the national average.
Table 4.9
U.S. Death Rates per 100,000 Population by Age Groups, 2007
Age Groups (j) Death Rates (dj)
1 Under 1 year 684.5
2 1 -4 years 28.6
3 5-14 years 15.3
4 15-24 years 79.9
5 25-34 years 104.9
6 35-44 years 184.4
7 45-54 years 420.9
8 55-64 years 877.7
9 65-74 years 2011.3
10 75-84 years 5011.6
11 85 years and over 12946.5
All Ages Average 803.6
Source: National Vital Statistics Reports, May 20, 2010 
http://www. cdc.gov/nchs/ciata/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58 19.pdf
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Specifically, two new variables are constructed for each CES household.
CAP75K = 0 if  C AP<$75,000
= CAP - $75,000 if  CAP>$75,000
DRATE = 0 if  both the household head and his/her spouse are under age 55 
= dj if  the age o f a household head or his/her spouse, whoever is older, falls 
into age group j (j>=8).
This approach assumes that: First, the burden o f estate and gift taxes falls on the 
decedent; second, taxes on accumulated wealth are taxes on the stock o f capital held by 
the taxpayers and, therefore, can be allocated according to capital income; third, expected 
estate and gift tax payments for a household can be approximated based on age, age- 
specific death rates, and capital income.
As a result, the estate and gift taxes burden for the CES households is imputed 
using the following equation:
EG TAX, = (DRATEi * CAP75Kt * d, * FEDEGTAX)/(EDRA TE, * CAP75K,) (4.6) 
where EGTAXj denotes the estate and gift tax distributed for household I; FEDEGTAX is 
the NIPA federal receipts from estate and gift taxes; as defined previously, DRATEi is 
adjusted death rate for household I; CAP75Kj is the amount o f  capital income in excess o f 
$75,000 for household I; and Oj is the deflator.
Imputation o f Excise Taxes
The three major components o f excise taxes are on gasoline, tobacco, and
1 ”7alcohol . In this study, the excise tax for each household is estimated based on their 
reported gasoline, tobacco, and alcohol expenditures in the 2009 CES survey. The excise
12 Diesel fuel and air transport taxes are excluded from this study.
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tax rates on gasoline, tobacco, and alcohol are estimated by using the NIPA aggregated 
data. Specifically, the NIPA reported the consumptions and excise taxes for each o f them. 
The detailed calculation is illustrated in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10
Estimated Average Tax Rate on Gasoline, Alcohol and Tobacco (billions)
Consumption Excise Tax Estimated Tax Rate
Gasoline 278.7 20.4 7.3%
Alcohol 99.5 8.6 8.6%
Tobacco 87.9 16.3 18.5%
Note: All consumption and tax data are from 2009 NIPA database.
VAT Tax Rate
In this study, the VAT tax rate is calculated based on the assumption that the VAT 
will generate the same revenue as the current federal tax system. The total federal 
revenue for federal income tax, payroll tax, estate and gift taxes, and excise tax for year 
2009 is calculated as shown in Table 4.11.
Table 4.11
The Federal Tax Revenue in Year 2009 (billions)
Category Revenue
Personal income tax 857.0
Estate and gift taxes 23.482
Corporate profits taxes 153.0
Total Social Insurance and Retirement Receipts 890.917
Exercise taxes 45.3
Total $1,969,699
(Source: National Income Product Account (http://www.bea.govV>
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The VAT base can be estimated using the National Income Accounts concept of 
personal consumption expenditures from NIPA Table 2.4 as a starting point, following 
the method used by Feenberg et al. (1997). Total personal consumption expenditures 
equaled $9,845.9 billion in 2009. Several adjustments to the consumption flow are shown 
as follows:
1. Adjusting PCE for indirect taxes. Although NIPA personal consumption 
expenditure (PCE) tables didn’t list the indirect taxes, all PCE transactions are 
valued at market prices, including sales and excise taxes (NIPA handbook chapter 
5). The taxes that are paid at the retail level include state and local general sales 
taxes ($281.8 billions), specialized state and local excise taxes on gasoline, 
alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and public utilities ($85.5 billion), and specialized 
federal excise taxes on gasoline, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and air transport 
($58.9 billion). The unspecified category o f “other” federal, state, and local excise 
taxes ($41.1 billion) is also assumed to be paid at the retail level. The total 
adjustment to PCE for these indirect taxes is $467.3 billion.
2. Adjusting PCE for owner-occupied housing. NIPA PCE table includes equivalent 
“rental income” for owner-occupied housing, which is not observed in a market 
transaction and difficult to tax. Thus, subtract imputed rent from PCE, and add to 
it the value o f owner-occupied housing purchase. In 2009, the imputed rental o f 
owner-occupied nonfarm housing (NIPA Table 2.4.5) is 1,202.3 billion. The 
analogous imputation for farm housing was 19.6 billion. NIPA Table 5.4.5. 
reports purchases o f  new single-family permanent site structures o f  $105.3 billion, 
purchase o f manufactured homes o f  3.5 billion, and total improvements to
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residential property o f 151.9 billion. The purchases o f single-family homes are 
assumed to represent purchases o f owner-occupied homes for this part o f  the 
calculation.
Improvements to existing structures would also be taxed under the 
prepayment analysis. We allocate improvements between single-family homes 
and multifamily structures in proportion to their shares o f  new permanent-site 
investment. New multifamily residential investment was 28.5 in 2009 (NIPA 
Table 5.3.5). This implies that 105.3/(105.3+28.5), or 0.787, times the value of 
total improvements can be considered as additions to the stock o f owner-occupied 
real estate, which implies estimated improvements to single-family structures of 
119.5 (0.787 x 151.9) billion.
3. NIPA imputes the difference between income and outlays o f  banks, credit 
agencies, and investment companies to the household sector as implicit services 
o f financial intermediates. This component o f  personal consumption expenditures 
would not be taxed under some versions o f  a value-added tax. This imputed 
interest flow equals 234.7 billion for 2009 (NIPA Table 7.11). This amount is 
subtracted from PCE in estimating the value-added tax base.
4. In addition, several additional sub-categories o f consumption are likely to be 
excluded from the value-added tax base because they are difficult to measure or 
administratively difficult to tax. These include foreign travel (107.1 billion), 
spending by U.S. residents in other nations (7.8 billion), and food produced and 
consumed on farms (0.3 billion). Expenditures in the United States by
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nonresidents should be added back to get the net foreign travel o f  (-19.4 billion) 
as those expenditures by nonresidents are taxed in the U.S.
The VAT rate equals required revenue ($1,969,699) divided by the tax base 
($8,161.6) calculated in Table 4.12. This translates into a value-added tax rate o f 24.2 
percent to replace the current federal taxes.
The narrow-based value-added tax excludes food, rent, and health care from the 
broad base. Table 4.13 shows the calculation o f narrow value-added tax base.
Table 4.12
Adjustments to Personal Consumption Expenditures to Estimate the Broad-Based Value- 
Added Tax Base (billions)
Total personal consumption 
expenditures
Adjustment for indirect taxes
State and local general sales taxes 
Specialized state and local excise taxes on gasoline, 
alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and public utilities
Specialized federal excise taxes on gasoline, alcoholic 
beverages, tobacco, and public utilities
"other" federal, state, and local excise taxes
Adjustment for owner-occupied housing 
Purchases o f new single-family homes 
Purchases o f new mobile homes 
Improvements to single-family homes 
Imputed rental o f owner-occupied nonfarm housing 
Rental value on farm housing
Adjustment for imputed financial services
Adjustment for "difficult to tax" items 
Net Foreign travel
Spending by U.S. residents in other nations 
Food produced and consumed on farms
9,845.9
(281.8)
(85.5)
(58.9)
(41.1) (467.3)
105.3
3.5
119.5
(1,202.3)
(19.6) (993.6)
(234.7)
19.4
(7.8)
(0.3) 11.3
Value-added tax base (Broad-Based) 8,161.6
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Table 4.13
Adjustments to Personal Consumption Expenditures to Estimate the Narrow-Based  
Value-Added Tax Base (billions)
Total personal consumption
expenditures 9,845.9
Adjustment for indirect taxes
State and local general sales taxes (281.8)
Specialized state and local excise taxes on gasoline, 
alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and public utilities (85.5)
Specialized federal excise taxes on gasoline, alcoholic 
beverages, tobacco, and public utilities (58.9)
"other" federal, state, and local excise taxes  (41.1) (467.3)
Adjustment for owner-occupied housing
Purchases o f new single-family homes 105.3
Purchases o f new mobile homes 3.5
Improvements to single-family homes 119.5
Imputed rental o f owner-occupied nonfarm housing (1,202.3)
Rental o f tenant-occupied nonfarm housing (353.1)
Rental value on farm housing ________ (19.6) (993.6)
Adjustment for imputed financial services (234.7)
Adjustment for food and nonalcoholic beverages (642.4)
Adjustment for health care (1601.6)
Adjustment for "difficult to tax" items
Net Foreign travel 19.4
Spending by U.S. residents in other nations (7.8)
Food produced and consumed on farms (0.3) 11.3
Narrow-based value-added tax base ___________   5,917.6
The VAT rate equals required revenue ($1,969,699) divided by the tax base 
($5,917.6). This translates into a narrow-based value-added tax rate o f  33.2% to replace 
the current federal taxes.
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Measuring Lifetime Income 
Following the method used in Maxwell (2003) and Kuang et al. (2011), lifetime
income is estimated by the following two steps.
First, income-age profiles were constructed in the PSID by using the first order
autoregressive AR(1) exact maximum likelihood method (Maxwell, 2003)13:
REALINCjt =  a  +  * AGEit +  p 2 * AGESQit +  p 3 * AGECUBit +  p 4 * UNEMPit +  p 5
* NOTMARit +  p 6 * FMHDjt +  p 7 * NWHDit + p 8 * NEURBjt +  (39
* MWURBjt +  p i0  * SURBit +  p x i * WURBjt -1- p 12 * SHit +  p 13 * HGit 
+  p 14 * SCit +  p 15
* CDit +  P 16 * PCit +  p 17 * TIMEit +  € it (4.8)
where:
REAL INC: Real total family income, which include taxable income, transfer income,
and social security income for the head, wife, and other family members. 
Income values from 1968-2007 are inflated to 2008 dollar using the GNP 
deflator;
AGE: Age o f the household head;
AGESQ: Age o f the household head squared;
AGECUB: Age o f the household head cubed;
UNEMP: UNEMP=1 if the head o f a household is unemployed, otherwise
UNEMP=0;
NOTMAR: NOTMAR=l if  the household head is not married, otherwise
NOTMAR=0;
13 Casperson and M etcalf (1994) use the fixed effects regression model to estimate age-incom e profile by 
PSID data. Then, they use the estimated coefficients from the regressions to predict household income for 
the CES sample households and calculate an estimate o f  lifetime income. M axwell (2003) and Kuang et al. 
(2011) apply a similar approach to estimate the lifetime income for CES households by using the first order 
autoregressive AR(1) exact maximum likelihood method. They argue that fixed effects m odels lose som e 
information on the time invariant variables, while A R (1) exact maximum likelihood model does a better 
job o f  forecasting CES sample. Accordingly, the AR(1) exact maximum likelihood method is applied in 
this study to estimate the lifetime income for the CES sample households.
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FMHD: FMHD=1 if  the head o f a household is female, otherwise FMFID=0;
NWHD: NWHD=1 if  the head o f a household is not white, otherwise NWF1D=0;
N E JJR B : NE_URB=1 if the household resides in the Northeast urban area, 
otherwise NE_URB=0;
MW URB: MW_URB=1 if the household resides in the Midwest urban area, 
otherwise MW_URB=0;14
S URB: S URB=1 if  the household resides in the South urban area, otherwise 
S_URB=0;
W U R B : W URB=1 if the household resides in the West urban area, otherwise 
W U R B -0 ;
SH: SH=1 if the household head's education level is 9-11 grades, otherwise 
SH=0;
HG: HG=1 if  the household head's education level is 12 grades (completed 
high school), otherwise FIG=0;
SG: SC=1 if the household head attends college without a degree, otherwise 
SC=0;
CD: CD=1 if the household head has a bachelor degree, otherwise CD=0;
PC: PC=1 if the household head has an advanced degree, otherwise PC =0;
TIME: indicator for the year, 1 for 1968, 2 for 1969, ... , 42 for 2009.
The data is autoregressive o f order one. The Durbin-Watson statistic equals 
0.6289, and the rest for positive autocorrelation o f the errors is highly significant 
(p<0.0001). Thus, an exact maximum likelihood estimator is used to remove the AR(1) 
process. After the correction, the Durbin-Watson statistic equals 2.2628. Estimates of 
Equation 4.7 are presented in Table 4.14.
14 The definition o f  North central in PSID is equivalent to M idwest in CES.
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Table 4.14
AR(1) Exact Maximum Likelihood Estimate o f  PSID Income Equation
Parameter
Predicted
Sign Estimate
Standard
Error t statistic p value
C 101,904 30,667 -3.32 0.0009
AGE + 5,912 1,884 3.14 0.0017
AGESQ - -63.85 37.26 -1.71 0.0866
AGECUB ? 0.10 0.23 0.41 0.6782
UNEMP - -10,333 1,828 -5.65 <0001
NOTMAR - -23,461 2,592 -9.05 <.0001
FMHD - -16,948 5,490 -3.09 0.0020
NWHD - -6,532 3,975 -1.64 0.1004
N E JJR B + 9,108 3,670 2.48 0.0131
M W U R B + 4,728 3,183 1.49 0.1375
S U R B + 3,689 3,046 1.21 0.2259
W U R B + 20,742 3,650 5.68 <.0001
SH + 8,072 4,937 1.63 0.1021
HG + 13,727 5,046 2.90 <0001
SC + 30,915 5,220 6.13 <.0001
CD + 51,767 5,780 9.92 <.0001
PC + 61,229 187 10.59 <.0001
TIME + 839 188.1 4.49 <.0001
RHO 0.69 0.005 128.91 <.0001
Note:
Dependent variable: Real total family income 
Number o f  observations: 18,180 
n=505 households k=36 years 
R-square=.5634 Durbin-W atson=2.2628 
Rho (autocorrelation coefficient)=.6920
All the estimates have the expected signs. Income initially rises with age and then 
falls in later years. Nonwhite or female-headed households earn less than white or male­
headed households. Household income for a married couple is higher than the income of 
a single-headed household. Residents o f  urban areas have higher incomes with 
particularly higher levels in the west and northeast. Income rises with the increase of
education level, with a particularly large increase for the completion o f a college degree. 
All o f the coefficients, except age cubed, the Midwest-urban, and the South-urban 
dummies, are significant at the 0.05 level with the exception o f age squared and the 
education dummy for some high school, which are significant at the 0.1 level.
Next, the estimated coefficients from these regressions are applied to households 
in the CES to calculate an estimate o f lifetime income. Lifetime income is defined as the 
present value o f total family income over the adult life o f the household head and 
depends only on the demographic variables associated with each family. A household is 
assumed to be an income-generating entity from the time the head is 18 years old until 
age 90. Workers are continually employed until age 65, at which point they retire.
Following M axwell’s (2003) approach, a two-part income profile is generated for 
each household. (1) Profile one begins from the 2009 age o f the household head to age 
90; and (2) Profile two begins from age 18 to the 2009 age o f  the household head. Profile 
two is brought forward to 2009 as a future value, while profile one is brought to 2009 as 
a present value. Then, convert lifetime income estimates to annuity equivalents assuming 
a 4% real rate o f  interest. An annuity equivalent for profile one is calculated according to 
the annuity formula for present value, and the annuity equivalent for profile two is 
calculated using the annuity formula for future value.
The 2009 present value o f each household’s lifetime real income stream was 
determined by adding the two profiles. Lifetime income estimates were then converted to 
annuity equivalents. An annuity equivalent is an amount, if  received each year over the 
household’s lifetime, which would result in the present value o f total lifetime income 
estimated above.
Annuity Equivalent (profile 1) =  FVSUM/{[(1 +  r )m — 1 ]/r}  (4.9)
Annuity Equivalent (profile 2) =  PVSUM/{[1 — (1 + r)~ n) ] / r )  (4.10)
where FVSUM and PVSUM are the sum o f future values over age-income profile one 
and the sum o f present values over profile two, respectively, and where r=real discount 
rate, n=90 - 2009 age of the household head, m=2009 age o f the household head - 18.
This study computes lifetime equivalent income as a weighted average of 
Equations 3.2 and 3.3 over 73 possible ages from 18 to 90:
1) when 18<age<90
Lifetime Equivalent Income = (n/73) X AnnuityEquivalent (profile 2) +
(1/73) X 2009Predicted Real Income + (m/73) X 
AnnuityEquivalent (profile 1)
2) when age = 90
Lifetime Equivalent Income =(1/73) X 2009Predicted Real Income + (m/73) X
AnnuityEquivalent (profile 1)
3) when age = 18
Lifetime Equivalent Income = (n/73) X AnnuityEquivalent (profile 2) +
(1/73) X 2009Predicted Real Income
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Results for Research Questions One and Two
Distributional Analysis under Annual Income Approach 
Average Tax Rate
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 present the average tax burdens and the average tax rates for 
the current federal tax systems. As discussed in the data selection section, one quarter’s 
data is selected to analyze the change o f the progressivity of the current federal tax 
system. As a result, the fourth quarter o f year 2009 data is selected to calculate all federal 
taxes. The final sample size is 6,184 and it is divided into ten deciles based on the annual 
pre-tax income. The current federal tax system includes individual income tax (PIT), 
imputed corporate income tax (CIT), payroll taxes (PPT), imputed excise tax (ET), and 
imputed estate and gift taxes (EGT). As discussed in Chapter 3, imputed corporate 
income taxes are calculated based on two approaches.
Table 4.15
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Burdens fo r  Annual Income Deciles -  Year 2009
Income Decile
Income Range 
($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CIT1 CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <11.0 4,857 -184 341 0 121 21 84 300 363
2 11.0-19.1 14,230 -155 810 0 148 44 200 847 1,004
3 19.1-27.0 22,144 -305 1,770 0 199 114 456 1,777 2,120
4 27.0-35.6 29,988 -263 2,875 0 209 140 710 2,961 3,531
5 35.6-45.8 39,178 7 4,367 0 228 331 1,103 4,932 5,705
6 45.8-57.9 50,002 366 6,108 0 257 239 1,487 6,970 8,217
7 57.9-73.4 63,415 982 8,364 0 285 247 2,060 9,879 11,692
8 73.4-96.1 81,841 1283 10,765 0 331 359 2,663 12,737 15,041
9 96.1-135.0 110,151 3226 14,767 147 341 1,444 3,937 19,926 22,419
10 135.0-583.0 197,416 8463 21,708 131 354 2,400 7,073 33,057 37,729
Sample Mean 61,338 1,343 7,188 28 247 534 1,978 9,340 10,784
oo
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Table 4.16
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Rate fo r  Annual Income Deciles -  Year 2009
Decile
Income Range 
($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CIT1 CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <11.0 4,857 -3.79% 7.02% 0.00% 2.50% 0.44% 1.74% 6.17% 7.47%
2 11.0-19.1 14,230 -1.09% 5.69% 0.00% 1.04% 0.31% 1.41% 5.95% 7.05%
3 19.1-27.0 22,144 -1.38% 7.99% 0.00% 0.90% 0.51% 2.06% 8.03% 9.57%
4 27.0-35.6 29,988 -0.88% 9.59% 0.00% 0.70% 0.47% 2.37% 9.87% 11.77%
5 35.6-45.8 39,178 0.02% 11.15% 0.00% 0.58% 0.84% 2.82% 12.59% 14.56%
6 45.8-57.9 50,002 0.73% 12.22% 0.00% 0.51% 0.48% 2.97% 13.94% 16.43%
7 57.9-73.4 63,415 1.55% 13.19% 0.00% 0.45% 0.39% 3.25% 15.58% 18.44%
8 73.4-96.1 81,841 1.57% 13.15% 0.00% 0.40% 0.44% 3.25% 15.56% 18.38%
9 96.1-135.0 110,151 2.93% 13.41% 0.13% 0.31% 1.31% 3.57% 18.09% 20.35%
10 135.0-583.0 197,416 4.29% 11.00% 0.07% 0.18% 1.22% 3.58% 16.74% 19.11%
Sample Mean 61,338 2.19% 11.72% 0.05% 0.40% 0.87% 3.22% 15.23% 17.58%
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The first imputed corporate income tax burden (CIT1) is based on the Feldstein 
(1988) approach which allocates the entire economic burden of the corporate income tax 
to owners o f capital income. The second imputed corporate income tax burden (CIT2) is 
based on the CBO (2012) report which allocates 75% of the federal corporate income tax 
to capital income and 25% to labor income. The two sets o f total current federal taxes 
(CFT1 and CFT2) differ only in the corporate income tax.
As expected, the average federal individual income tax (PIT) rates generally 
increase as household income increases. Specifically, the lowest four groups o f 
household income, on average, paid no federal individual income tax and even received 
some tax credits from the federal government. It is consistent with the CBO (2012) report 
that the families with annual income less than $45,000, on average, have negative or zero 
federal income tax in year 2009. Overall, the average federal individual income tax rate is 
decreased when comparing 2009 and 2005 data (2.19% vs. 3.10%). As discussed in CBO 
(2012), the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act o f 2009 (ARRA, Public Law 111- 
5) made several changes that lowered individual income taxes in 2009. The largest tax 
provision was the Making Work Pay credit, a refundable credit of up to $400 for a single 
worker or $800 for a married couple. Other provisions o f ARRA increased the exemption 
for the alternative minimum tax, provided special additional payments for Social Security 
beneficiaries, lowered the threshold for the refundable child tax credit, created the 
American Opportunity Tax Credit (a new credit for college expenses), expanded the 
earned income tax credit, and exempted some unemployment compensation from 
individual income taxes.
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Consistent with prior research (e.g.. Porta, 1991), average excise tax (ET) rates 
decrease as household income increases. Specifically, excise tax for the lowest income 
group is about 2.5% of its pre-tax income, comparing to 0.18% in the highest income 
group. Different from what that expected, the payroll tax (PPT) rate is not flat over all 
groups. Actually, the first four groups have the lowest payroll tax rates and the highest 
income group has a lower payroll tax rate than the middle five groups. The main reasons 
for the phenomena included 1) the unemployed and/or retired families are more likely to 
be grouped in the lowest four groups as their annual incomes are low. Those families 
with zero payroll taxes drive the average payroll tax rate down for lower income groups. 
At the same time, the highest group in the sample has a lower rate than the middle five 
income groups. One o f the reasons is that more o f the earnings from those households are 
above the maximum income subject to Social Security taxes. Another reason is that the 
majority o f their incomes are not from salaries, but capital gains and dividends, which is 
not subject to Social Security tax. For that reason, Tables 4.17 and 4.18 were created to 
show the tax incidence only for those households that paid payroll taxes in the last 12 
months (defined as working families). The average payroll tax rate is roughly flat for all 
groups except group ten. It is consistent with the theory that the majority o f  the richest 
families’ incomes are not from salaries, but capital gains and dividends. And the total 
federal tax paid by the lowest working families group is about 11.21% for CFT1 and 
14.33% for CFT2, which is much higher than the lowest income group in the whole 
sample.
Table 4.17
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Burdens fo r  Annual Income Deciles -  Year 2009 Working Families
Income
Decile
Income 
R ange($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CIT1 CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <17.0 8,930 -415 1,251 0 157 7 286 1,001 1,280
2 17.0-26.7 22,251 -320 2,900 0 232 49 701 2,861 3,514
3 26.7-35.7 31,506 -254 4,048 0 231 82 985 4,108 5,010
4 35.7-45.1 40,452 85 5,522 0 240 92 1,300 5,938 7,146
5 45.1-55.4 50,162 417 6,819 0 269 93 1,615 7,599 9,120
6 55.4-68.0 61,309 829 8,504 0 295 121 2,028 9,749 11,656
7 68.0-83.9 75,174 1,442 10,323 0 320 223 2,533 12,307 14,618
8 83.9-105.8 94,160 2,011 13,307 0 307 217 3,230 15,842 18,856
9 105.8-150.0 123,763 4,228 16,998 5 374 626 4,324 22,231 25,928
10 150.0-582.2 213,569 9,417 22,827 105 362 2,159 7,588 34,870 40,298
Sample Mean 72,115 1,743 9,249 11 279 367 2,459 11,649 13,741
00o©
Table 4.18
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Rates fo r  Annual Income Deciles -  Year 2009 Working Families
Decile
Income 
Range ($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CIT1 CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <17.0 8,930 -4.65% 14.01% 0.00% 1.76% 0.08% 3.21% 11.21% 14.33%
2 17.0-26.7 22,251 -1.44% 13.03% 0.00% 1.04% 0.22% 3.15% 12.86% 15.79%
3 26.7-35.7 31,506 -0.80% 12.85% 0.00% 0.73% 0.26% 3.13% 13.04% 15.90%
4 35.7-45.1 40,452 0.21% 13.65% 0.00% 0.59% 0.23% 3.21% 14.68% 17.67%
5 45.1-55.4 50,162 0.83% 13.59% 0.00% 0.54% 0.19% 3.22% 15.15% 18.18%
6 55.4-68.0 61,309 1.35% 13.87% 0.00% 0.48% 0.20% 3.31% 15.90% 19.01%
7 68.0-83.9 75,174 1.92% 13.73% 0.00% 0.43% 0.30% 3.37% 16.37% 19.45%
8 83.9-105.8 94,160 2.14% 14.13% 0.00% 0.33% 0.23% 3.43% 16.82% 20.03%
9 105.8-150.0 123,763 3.42% 13.73% 0.00% 0.30% 0.51% 3.49% 17.96% 20.95%
10 150.0-582.2 213,569 4.41% 10.69% 0.05% 0.17% 1.01% 3.55% 16.33% 18.87%
Sample Mean 72,115 2.42% 12.83% 0.02% 0.39% 0.37% 3.41% 16.15% 19.05%
00o
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Overall, the average tax burden and tax rates for the overall current federal taxes 
increase as household incomes increase for all income groups, except for the highest 
income group. And for the working families sample, although the tax rate is more flat 
than it is under the full sample, the average tax burden and tax rates for the overall 
current federal taxes increase as household incomes increase for all income groups, 
except for the highest income group.
To analyze the change of the progressivity level o f  the current federal tax system, 
the average tax burdens and the average tax rates for the current federal tax systems in 
year 2005 are presented in Tables 4.19 and 4.20. Average tax rates are lower in year 2009 
than the tax rates in year 2005 for all groups. Also Tables 4.21 and 4.22 presents average 
tax burdens and the average tax rates for the working families under the current federal 
tax systems in year 2005.
Table 4.19
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Burdens fo r Annual Income Deciles -  Year 2005
Income
Decile
Income
Range
($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CIT1 CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <10.0 5,374 -92 297 0 110 57 112 372 428
2 10.0-17.0 13,302 -117 742 0 139 123 258 886 1,021
3 17.0-25.0 21,096 295 1,699 0 179 175 580 2,348 2,754
4 25.0-33.5 29,048 239 3,004 0 230 230 993 3,703 4,466
5 33.5-42.3 37,591 553 4,411 0 260 313 1,463 5,537 6,687
6 42.3-54.0 47,911 1,131 6,127 0 282 349 2,001 7,888 9,541
7 54.0-68.7 60,697 1,397 8,117 0 319 392 2,627 10,226 12,460
8 68.7-88.0 77,695 2,439 10,457 2 364 632 3,486 13,894 16,749
9 88.0-120.0 101,687 3,257 13,535 44 396 1,219 4,672 18,490 21,943
10 120.0-602.0 196,732 9,212 18,771 355 443 4,762 9,462 33,865 38,565
Sample Mean 59,125 1,831 6,719 40 272 825 2,566 9,687 11,428
Table 4.20
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Rate fo r  Annual Income Deciles -  Year 2005
Decile
Income 
R ange($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CIT1 CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <10.0 5,374 -1.71% 5.53% 0.00% 2.05% 1.06% 2.08% 6.92% 7.96%
2 10.0-17.0 13,302 -0.88% 5.58% 0.00% 1.04% 0.92% 1.94% 6.66% 7.68%
3 17.0-25.0 21,096 1.40% 8.05% 0.00% 0.85% 0.83% 2.75% 11.13% 13.05%
4 25.0-33.5 29,048 0.82% 10.34% 0.00% 0.79% 0.79% 3.42% 12.75% 15.37%
5 33.5-42.3 37,591 1.47% 11.73% 0.00% 0.69% 0.83% 3.89% 14.73% 17.79%
6 42.3-54.0 47,911 2.36% 12.79% 0.00% 0.59% 0.73% 4.18% 16.46% 19.91%
7 54.0-68.7 60,697 2.30% 13.37% 0.00% 0.53% 0.65% 4.33% 16.85% 20.53%
8 68.7-88.0 77,695 3.14% 13.46% 0.00% 0.47% 0.81% 4.49% 17.88% 21.56%
9 88.0-120 101,687 3.20% 13.31% 0.04% 0.39% 1.20% 4.59% 18.18% 21.58%
10 120.0-602.0 196,732 4.68% 9.54% 0.18% 0.23% 2.42% 4.81% 17.21% 19.60%
Sample Mean 59,125 3.10% 11.36% 0.07% 0.46% 1.40% 4.34% 16.38% 19.33%
Table 4.21
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Burdens fo r Annual Income Deciles -  Year 2005 Working Family
Income
Decile
Income
Range
($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CIT1 CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <15.6 8,788 -244 1,128 0 161 23 349 1,067 1,393
2 15.6-26.0 21,494 52 2,837 0 207 63 913 3,159 4,008
3 26.0-34.8 30,497 155 4,093 0 252 93 1,284 4,593 5,784
4 34.8-43.0 38,459 757 5,202 0 271 119 1,640 6,349 7,869
5 43.0-52.9 47,762 1,032 6,784 0 282 66 2,127 8,165 10,226
6 52.9-64.1 58,519 1,453 8,225 0 329 131 2,611 10,139 12,619
7 64.1-79.4 71,642 1,873 10,141 0 341 373 3,263 12,728 15,618
8 79.4-98.4 87,952
111,71
2,642 12,101 9 401 649 4,020 15,803 19,174
9 98.4-130.5 3
215,16
4,347 15,162 4 403 852 5,145 20,768 25,062
10 130.5-602.0 5 9,904 19,555 174 448 4,275 10,087 34,355 40,167
Sample Mean 69,216 2,198 8,525 19 310 665 3,145 11,716 14196
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Table 4.22
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Rate fo r  Annual Income Deciles -  Year 2005 Working Family
Decile
Income 
Range($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CIT1 CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <11.0 8788 -2.78% 12.83% 0.00% 1.83% 0.26% 3.97% 12.14% 15.85%
2 11.0-19.1 21494 0.24% 13.20% 0.00% 0.96% 0.29% 4.25% 14.70% 18.65%
3 19.1-27.0 30497 0.51% 13.42% 0.00% 0.83% 0.31% 4.21% 15.06% 18.97%
4 27.0-35.6 38459 1.97% 13.53% 0.00% 0.71% 0.31% 4.26% 16.51% 20.46%
5 35.6-45.8 47762 2.16% 14.20% 0.00% 0.59% 0.14% 4.45% 17.09% 21.41%
6 45.8-57.9 58519 2.48% 14.06% 0.00% 0.56% 0.22% 4.46% 17.33% 21.56%
7 57.9-73.4 71642 2.61% 14.16% 0.00% 0.48% 0.52% 4.55% 17.77% 21.80%
8 73.4-96.1 87952 3.00% 13.76% 0.01% 0.46% 0.74% 4.57% 17.97% 21.80%
9 96.1-135.0 111713 3.89% 13.57% 0.00% 0.36% 0.76% 4.61% 18.59% 22.43%
10 135.0-583.0 215165 4.60% 9.09% 0.08% 0.21% 1.99% 4.69% 15.97% 18.67%
Sample Mean 69,216 3.05% 11.82% 0.03% 0.43% 0.92% 4.36% 16.25% 19.69%
Notes PIT: Federal Individual Income
PPT: Payroll Tax (both employer and employee portion)Tax 
EGT: Imputed Estate and Gift Taxes 
ET: Imputed Excise Tax
CIT1: Imputed Corporate Income Tax (Feldstein Approach)
CIT2: Imputed Corporate Income Tax (CBO Approach)
CFT1: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT1=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT1) 
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT2)
4^
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Figure 4.1 provides a graphic representation of the tax trend under the current 
federal tax system as a whole and its components for the year 2009. The federal 
individual income tax (PIT) roughly has an increasing trend. The payroll tax (PPT) has a 
straight increasing line between decile two and decile nine. Both types o f  corporate tax 
(CIT1 and CIT2) shows slightly increasing trend and excise tax (ET) has an obvious 
decreasing trend.
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Figure 4.1 Average Tax Rates fo r  the Current Federal Taxes: Annual Income Approach
Overall, the average tax rates for the total current federal taxes (CFT1 and CFT2) 
increase as household incomes increase, indicating that the current federal tax system is 
progressive for the full sample and the sub-sample in working families. Also, the average 
tax rates are lower in 2009 than in 2005 for all income groups, especially the lowest 
income groups.
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Global Measures of Progressivity
Global progressivity indices, such as Suits index and Kakwanis’ index, are used to 
measure the overall progressivity o f the taxes across the entire income scale.
First, the Suits Indices for the current federal tax system under the annual income 
approach are illustrated in Table 4.23. A Suits index between zero and one indicates 
progressivity, while a Suits index between minus one and zero indicates regressivity. For 
the full sample, all the Suits index values are between zero and one except the one for the 
excise tax, indicating the progressivity o f these taxes. The Suits index for the overall 
current tax system (0.0831 and 0.0743) shows the current federal tax system as a whole is 
progressive in year 2009. For the subsample with working families, the total current 
federal tax system still shows progressivity (0.0291 and 0.0182) even though the payroll 
tax is regressive (-0.0527).
Table 4.23
Suits Index under Annual Income Approach
Tax System
Full Sample 
2009
Subsample
2009
Full Sample 
2005
Subsample
2005
PIT 0.4688 0.4374 0.2555 0.2340
PPT 0.0073 -0.0527 -0.0346 -0.0924
EGT 0.4880 0.7958 0.6498 0.7527
ET -0.3177 -0.3133 -0.2871 -0.2894
CITl 0.2319 0.3900 0.2909 0.4408
CIT2 0.0754 0.0219 0.0685 0.0193
CFT1 0.0831 0.0291 0.0431 -0.0043
CFT2 0.0743 0.0182 0.0310 -0.0199
Notes: PIT: Federal Individual Income Tax
PPT: Payroll Tax (both employer and em ployee portion)
EGT: Imputed Estate and Gift Taxes 
ET: Imputed Excise Tax
CITl: Imputed Corporate Income Tax (Feldstein Approach)
CIT1: Imputed Corporate Income Tax (CBO Approach)
CFT1: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT1=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT1) 
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT2)
97
To compare the change o f the progressivity level over time, 2005 and 2009 CES 
interview survey data is applied. Table 4.23 shows the Suits index for year 2009 and year 
2005 for both full sample and subsample with working families. The suits index values 
are much higher in year 2009 than the values in 2005 (0.0831 vs. 0.0431; 0.0743 vs. 
0.0310). It indicates that the Federal tax system has become more progressive based on 
years 2005 and 2009 sample data, contrary to Picketty and Saez (2007)’s finding that the 
Federal tax system became less progressive between 1964 and 2004. The reasons that the 
progressivity level increases over years 2005 and 2009 include the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act o f 2009 (ARRA, Public Law 111-5), which made several changes 
that lowered individual income taxes in 2009. The largest tax provision was the Making 
Work Pay credit, a refundable credit o f  up to $400 for a single worker or $800 for a 
married couple. Other provisions o f ARRA increased the exemption for the alternative 
minimum tax, provided special additional payments for Social Security beneficiaries, 
lowered the threshold for the refundable child tax credit, created the American 
Opportunity Tax Credit (a new credit for college expenses), expanded the earned income 
tax credit, and exempted some unemployment compensation from individual income 
taxes (GAO, 2012). It is even surprising that in year 2005, the Suits index for the 
subsample with working families is negative (-0.0043 and -0.0199), which indicates 
regressivity. As discussed in previous chapters, the Suits index is a point estimator and 
may be biased due to sampling variations. As a result, the bootstrap method is also 
applied to confirm the findings.
Second, Kakwanis’ indices for the current federal tax system under the annual 
income approach are illustrated in Table 4.24. Similarly to Suits index, positive values of
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Kakwanis" index indicate progressivity and negative values indicate regressivity. 
Consistent with the findings under Suits index, Kakwani’s indices are positive for all 
samples and years other than year 2005 subsample with working families.
Table 4.24
Kakwani's Index under Annual Income Approaches
Full Sample Subsample Full Sample Subsample
Tax System 2009 2009 2005 2005
CFT1 0.0826 0.0330 0.0539 0.0080
CFT2 0.0764 0.0242 0.0466 -0.0044
Bootstrap Analysis Results
The Suits indices calculated above are point estimators and it may be biased due 
to sampling variations. To test the statistical validity o f Suits indices and the differences 
o f Suits indices, the bootstrap methods introduced by Efron and Tibshirani (1993) and 
discussed in Anderson et al. (2003) are applied to construct the Suits index confidence 
interval. Specially, bootstrap-t confidence intervals and bootstrap-BCa confidence 
intervals are constructed. Table 4.25 summarizes the Suits index 95% confidence 
intervals for the current federal tax system under the bootstrap-BCa approach. First, both 
95% lower limit and upper limit are positive for CFT1 and CFT2 for both years 2005 and 
2009, which confirms that the current federal tax system is progressive. Second, for the 
subsample with working families, year 2009 confidence intervals show progressivity 
while year 2005 confidence intervals present the current tax system as proportional 
(CFT1) or regressive (CFT2). It is an interesting finding that in year 2005, the current 
federal tax system is not progressive when only considering the families that paid payroll 
taxes. Third, the comparison o f the progressivity level between the two years shows that
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the current federal tax system is statistically more progressive in year 2009 than in year 
2005. It is another interesting finding contrary to prior research that the progressivity 
level o f the current federal tax system is decreasing.
Table 4.25
Bootstrap-BCa Confidence Intervals fo r  Suits Index under Annual Income Approach
Suits
index
Standard
Error
Confidenc 
e Level
Lower
limit
Upper
limit
CFT1 2009 0.0831 0.0074 95% 0.0693 0.0977
C F T 22009 0.0743 0.0065 95% 0.0626 0.0870
CFT1 _2009_subsample 0.0291 0.0076 95% 0.0139 0.0437
CFT2 _2009_subsample 0.0182 0.0064 95% 0.0059 0.0313
CFT1 2005 0.0431 0.0093 95% 0.0257 0.0604
CFT2 2005 0.0310 0.0070 95% 0.0179 0.0438
CFT1 _2005_subsample -0.0043 0.0091 95% -0.0198 0.0139
CFT2 2005 subsample -0.0199 0.0067 95% -0.0317 -0.0074
CFT1 2009 vs. 2005 0.0400 0.0121 95% 0.0177 0.0647
CFT2 2009 vs. 2005 
CFT1 2009 vs.
0.0434 0.0095 95% 0.0269 0.0636
2005 subsample 
CFT2 2009 vs.
0.0335 0.0119 95% 0.0088 0.0569
2005_subsample 0.0382 0.0093 95% 0.0188 0.0571
Table 4.26 presents the bootstrap-t confidence intervals for Suits index. The 
results are consistent with the results by using bootstrap BCa confidence intervals. In 
sum, the current Federal tax system is progressive and the progressivity is significantly 
increased over years 2005 and 2009 under the annual income approach. And for the 
working families, the current federal tax system is not progressive but proportional (or 
even regressive) in 2005.
1 0 0
Table 4.26
Bootstrap-t Confidence Intervals fo r  Suits Index under Annual Income Approach
Suits index
Standard
Error
Confidence
Level
Lower
limit
Upper
limit
CFT1 2009 0.0831 0.0071 95% 0.0682 0.0974
CFT2 2009 0.0743 0.0067 95% 0.0605 0.0883
CFT1 _2009_subsample 0.0291 0.0079 95% 0.0130 0.0457
CFT2 _2009_subsample 0.0182 0.0064 95% 0.0048 0.0308
CFT1 2005 0.0431 0.0091 95% 0.0248 0.0615
CFT2 2005 0.0310 0.0068 95% 0.0180 0.0439
CFT1 _2005_subsample -0.0043 0.0092 95% -0.0225 0.0157
CFT2 _2005_subsample -0.0199 0.0068 95% -0.0327 -0.0057
CFT1_2009 vs. 2005 0.0399 0.0119 95% 0.0168 0.0644
CFT2 2009 vs. 2005 0.0433 0.0096 95% 0.0245 0.0619
Distributional Analysis under Lifetime Income Approach 
Average Tax Rate
Tables 4.27 and 4.28 present the average tax burdens and the average tax rates for 
the current Federal tax systems under the lifetime income approach. Similar to the 
distribution on annual income approach, the average Federal tax rate generally increases 
as household income increases, except for the lowest income group. It can be best 
explained by noting that most o f the working families are in their peak income-earning 
period in year 2009.
Tables 4.29-4.34 show the working families’ average tax burdens and the average 
tax rates for the current federal tax systems under the lifetime income approach. It shows 
that the average tax rates decrease as income increases in the first three deciles. Then it 
floats between 14% and 16% in the next five deciles.
Table 4.27
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Burdens for Lifetime Income Deciles -  Year 2009
Income Decile
Income Range Average 
($000) Income PIT PPT EGT ET CITl CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <21.8 10,692 -207 1,683 25 150 294 471 1,945 2,122
2 21.8-35.4 29,725 71 2,725 33 196 316 713 3,341 3,738
3 35.4-47.5 41,255 75 4,104 0 232 152 1,013 4,564 5,424
4 47.5-56.6 52,532 520 4,327 6 216 386 1,122 5,453 6,189
5 56.6-63.3 59,781 559 6,456 6 268 237 1,641 7,527 8,931
6 63.3-71.9 67,218 786 7,474 8 292 393 1,920 8,953 10,480
7 71.9-81.0 76,532 1,455 8,070 36 276 508 2,189 10,344 12,025
8 81.0-94.3 86,193 2,004 9,912 51 288 617 2,652 12,873 14,907
9 94.3-106.2 100,768 3,493 11,981 72 291 1,201 3,484 17,038 19,321
10 106.2-132.3 116,340 4,673 15,148 40 267 1,239 4,577 21,367 24,705
Sample Mean 64,103 1,343 7,188 28 247 534 1,978 9,340 10,784
o
Table 4.28
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Rate fo r  Lifetime Income Deciles -  Year 2009
Decile
Income Range 
($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CITl CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <21.8 10,692 -1.94% 15.74% 0.24% 1.41% 2.75% 4.40% 18.19% 19.85%
2 21.8-35.4 29,725 0.24% 9.17% 0.11% 0.66% 1.06% 2.40% 11.24% 12.57%
3 35.4-47.5 41,255 0.18% 9.95% 0.00% 0.56% 0.37% 2.46% 11.06% 13.15%
4 47.5-56.6 52,532 0.99% 8.24% 0.01% 0.41% 0.73% 2.14% 10.38% 11.78%
5 56.6-63.3 59,781 0.94% 10.80% 0.01% 0.45% 0.40% 2.74% 12.59% 14.94%
6 63.3-71.9 67,218 1.17% 11.12% 0.01% 0.43% 0.58% 2.86% 13.32% 15.59%
7 71.9-81.0 76,532 1.90% 10.54% 0.05% 0.36% 0.66% 2.86% 13.52% 15.71%
8 81.0-94.3 86,193 2.33% 11.50% 0.06% 0.33% 0.72% 3.08% 14.93% 17.30%
9 94.3-106.2 100,768 3.47% 11.89% 0.07% 0.29% 1.19% 3.46% 16.91% 19.17%
10 106.2-132.3 116,340 4.02% 13.02% 0.03% 0.23% 1.07% 3.93% 18.37% 21.24%
Sample Mean 64,103 2.10% 11.21% 0.04% 0.39% 0.83% 3.09% 14.57% 16.82%
Table 4.29
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Burdens fo r  Lifetime Income Deciles -  Year 2009 Working Families
Income
Decile
Income 
R ange($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CITl CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <31.6 19,474 -188 3,941 0 240 83 951 4,076 4,945
2 31.6-42.4 37,294 107 5,455 0 247 52 1,287 5,860 7,096
3 42.4-55.0 49,833 455 5,766 4.9 251 225 1,418 6,702 7,895
4 55.0-61.2 58,327 900 7,238 2.2 280 165 1,823 8,585 10,243
5 61.2-68.2 64,544 956 8,916 2.6 311 345 2,247 10,532 12,433
6 68.2-76.9 73,089 1,353 8,475 9.8 288 239 2,163 10,365 12,289
7 76.9-83.9 80,823 1,697 10,822 4.8 307 377 2,811 13,207 15,640
8 83.9-99.0 91,484 2,710 11,265 24.0 296 534 3,039 14,830 17,334
9 99.0-109.9 103,808 4,388 14,522 53.7 295 986 4,170 20,245 23,430
10 109.9-132.3 118,053 5,052 16,089 8.3 272 660 4,676 22,081 26,097
Sample Mean 69,675 1,743 9,249 11 279 367 2,459 11,649 13,741
Table 4.30
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Rates fo r  Lifetime Income Deciles -  Year 2009 Working Families
Decile
Income Range 
($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CITl CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <31.6 19,474 -0.97% 20.24% 0.00% 1.23% 0.42% 4.88% 20.93% 25.39%
2 31.6-42.4 37,294 0.29% 14.63% 0.00% 0.66% 0.14% 3.45% 15.71% 19.03%
3 42.4-55.0 49,833 0.91% 11.57% 0.01% 0.50% 0.45% 2.85% 13.45% 15.84%
4 55.0-61.2 58,327 1.54% 12.41% 0.00% 0.48% 0.28% 3.13% 14.72% 17.56%
5 61.2-68.2 64,544 1.48% 13.81% 0.00% 0.48% 0.53% 3.48% 16.32% 19.26%
6 68.2-76.9 73,089 1.85% 11.60% 0.01% 0.39% 0.33% 2.96% 14.18% 16.81%
7 76.9-83.9 80,823 2.10% 13.39% 0.01% 0.38% 0.47% 3.48% 16.34% 19.35%
8 83.9-99.0 91,484 2.96% 12.31% 0.03% 0.32% 0.58% 3.32% 16.21% 18.95%
9 99.0-109.9 103,808 4.23% 13.99% 0.05% 0.28% 0.95% 4.02% 19.50% 22.57%
10 109.9-132.3 118,053 4.28% 13.63% 0.01% 0.23% 0.56% 3.96% 18.70% 22.11%
Sample Mean 69,675 2.42% 2.50% 13.27% 0.02% 0.40% 0.53% 3.53% 16.72%
Table 4.31
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Burdens fo r  Lifetime Income Deciles -  Year 2005
Income
Decile
Income Range 
($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CITl CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <20.8 9510 51 981 0 110 202 372 1344 1514
2 20.8-34.8 28406 199 2720 18 178 362 950 3493 4081
3 34.8-44.6 39582 457 3622 0 217 307 1196 4603 5492
4 44.6-53.2 48594 718 4011 10 245 650 1438 5643 6431
5 53.2-61.0 56897 1019 5945 1 287 312 1909 7566 9163
6 61.0-67.6 64646 2080 7190 9 318 500 2462 10104 12066
7 67.6-76.5 72415 1698 7836 170 317 1385 2941 11560 13116
8 76.5-86.7 81513 2953 9373 12 325 1031 3534 13705 16207
9 86.7-100.2 92558 3091 10767 129 351 1748 4470 16204 18926
10 100.2-113.2 105628 6048 14744 51 376 1754 6393 23020 27659
Sample Mean 59,977 1,831 6,719 40 272 825 2,566 9,687 11,428
Table 4.32
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Rate fo r Lifetime Income Deciles -  Year 2005
Decile
Income 
Range ($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CIT1 CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <20.8 9510 0.54% 10.32% 0.00% 1.15% 2.12% 3.91% 14.13% 15.92%
2 20.8-34.8 28406 0.70% 9.58% 0.06% 0.63% 1.27% 3.34% 12.30% 14.37%
3 34.8-44.6 39582 1.15% 9.15% 0.00% 0.55% 0.78% 3.02% 11.63% 13.88%
4 44.6-53.2 48594 1.48% 8.25% 0.02% 0.50% 1.34% 2.96% 11.61% 13.23%
5 53.2-61.0 56897 1.79% 10.45% 0.00% 0.50% 0.55% 3.36% 13.30% 16.10%
6 61.0-67.6 64646 3.22% 11.12% 0.01% 0.49% 0.77% 3.81% 15.63% 18.67%
7 67.6-76.5 72415 2.34% 10.82% 0.23% 0.44% 1.91% 4.06% 15.96% 18.11%
8 76.5-86.7 81513 3.62% 11.50% 0.01% 0.40% 1.27% 4.34% 16.81% 19.88%
9 86.7-100.2 92558 3.34% 11.63% 0.14% 0.38% 1.89% 4.83% 17.51% 20.45%
10 100.2-113.2 105628 5.73% 13.96% 0.05% 0.36% 1.66% 6.05% 21.79% 26.19%
Sample Mean 59,977 3.10% 2.86% 10.48% 0.06% 0.42% 1.29% 4.00% 15.11%
Table 4.33
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Burdens fo r  Lifetime Income Deciles -  Year 2005 Working Family
Income
Decile
Income 
R ange($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CIT1 CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <35.4 21,605 100 3,930 0 203 60 1,249 4,293 5,482
2 35.4-46.8 38,064 612 4,775 0 229 260 1,510 5,876 7,126
3 46.8-59.5 48,023 969 5,390 3 282 293 1,803 6,937 8,448
4 59.5-66.0 56,233 1,078 6,571 1 295 212 2,049 8,156 9,994
5 66.0-72.9 63,557 2,082 8,190 0 339 173 2,657 10,784 13,269
6 72.9-81.6 69,712 1,975 8,468 13 327 626 2,887 11,409 13,670
7 81.6-88.5 77,576 2,045 9,346 19 331 616 3,389 12,358 15,131
8 88.5-103.9 85,712 3,123 10,767 0 346 694 3,873 14,928 18,108
9 103.9-114.6 96,481 4,135 12,792 85 363 1,691 5,438 19,065 22,813
10 114.6-137.0 106,857 5,870 15,035 65 380 2,025 6,598 23,375 27,948
Sample Mean 66,379 2,198 8,525 19 310 665 3,145 11,716 14,196
Table 4.34
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Rate fo r  Lifetime Income Deciles -  Year 2005 Working Family
Decile
Income 
Range ($000)
Average
Income PIT PPT EGT ET CITl CIT2 CFT1 CFT2
1 <35.4 21,605 0.46% 18.19% 0.00% 0.94% 0.28% 5.78% 19.87% 25.37%
2 35.4-46.8 38,064 1.61% 12.55% 0.00% 0.60% 0.68% 3.97% 15.44% 18.72%
3 46.8-59.5 48,023 2.02% 11.22% 0.01% 0.59% 0.61% 3.76% 14.45% 17.59%
4 59.5-66.0 56,233 1.92% 11.69% 0.00% 0.52% 0.38% 3.64% 14.50% 17.77%
5 66.0-72.9 63,557 3.28% 12.89% 0.00% 0.53% 0.27% 4.18% 16.97% 20.88%
6 72.9-81.6 69,712 2.83% 12.15% 0.02% 0.47% 0.90% 4.14% 16.37% 19.61%
7 81.6-88.5 77,576 2.64% 12.05% 0.02% 0.43% 0.79% 4.37% 15.93% 19.50%
8 88.5-103.9 85,712 3.64% 12.56% 0.00% 0.40% 0.81% 4.52% 17.42% 21.13%
9 103.9-114.6 96,481 4.29% 13.26% 0.09% 0.38% 1.75% 5.64% 19.76% 23.65%
10 114.6-137.0 106,857 5.49% 14.07% 0.06% 0.36% 1.89% 6.17% 21.88% 26.15%
Sample Mean 66,379 3.05% 3.15% 12.24% 0.03% 0.44% 0.95% 4.51% 16.82%
Notes: PIT: Federal Individual Income Tax
PPT: Payroll Tax (both employer and employee portion)
EGT: Imputed Estate and Gift Taxes 
ET: Imputed Excise Tax
CIT1: Imputed Corporate Income Tax (Feldstein Approach)
CITl: Imputed Corporate Income Tax (CBO Approach)
CFT1: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT1 =PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT 1) 
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT2)
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And it increases to about 19% in the last two deciles. It shows a different trend 
when comparing it to the annual income approach. Under the annual income approach, 
working families whose incomes are between 4th deciles and 9th deciles pay the highest 
rates o f tax.
A graphic presentation o f the average tax rates under the lifetime income 
approach is shown in Figure 4.2. Most o f  the tax distributions under the lifetime income 
approach appear to be flatter than those under annual income approach other than payroll 
tax (PPT) distribution. Overall, the US federal tax system is still progressive based on the 
average tax rate distribution analysis.
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Figure 4.2 Average Tax Rates fo r  the Current Federal Taxes: Lifetime Income Approach
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Global Measures of Progressivity
First, the Suits indices for the current federal tax system under the lifetime income 
approach are illustrated in Table 4.35. The Suits index for overall current tax system 
(0.0951 and 0.0940) shows the current federal tax system as a whole is progressive. For 
the subsample only with working families, the total current federal tax system still shows 
progressivity (0.0479 and 0.0434) and the payroll tax shows regressivity (-0.0011).
Table 4.35
Suits Index under Lifetime Income Approach
Tax System Total Sample 
2009
Subsample
2009
Total Sample 
2005
Subsample
2005
PIT 0.3811 0.3226 0.2707 0.2190
PPT 0.0523 -0.0011 0.0754 0.0152
EGT 0.0088 0.2212 0.0928 0.3634
ET -0.1968 -0.2093 -0.1129 -0.1267
CITl 0.0866 0.1580 0.1315 0.2857
CIT2 0.0872 0.0393 0.1308 0.0854
CFT1 0.0951 0.0479 0.1122 0.0657
CFT2 0.0940 0.0434 0.1150 0.0598
Notes: PIT: Federal Individual Income Tax
PPT: Payroll Tax (both em ployer and em ployee portion)
EGT: Imputed Estate and Gift Taxes 
ET: Imputed Excise Tax
CITl: Imputed Corporate Income Tax (Feldstein Approach)
CIT2: Imputed Corporate Income Tax (CBO Approach)
CFT1: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT1=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT1) 
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT2)
Table 4.35 also shows the Suits index for year 2005 under the lifetime income 
approach. Different from the annual income approach, the Suits index values in 2009 are 
lower than the index values in 2005 (0.0951 vs. 0.1122; 0.0940 vs. 0.1150). Both 2005 
and 2009’s suits index values under the lifetime income approach are greater than its 
Suits index values under the annual income approach. For the subsample with working
I l l
families, both years 2005 and 2009 shows progressivity under the lifetime income 
approach.
Second, the Kakwanis’ indices for the current federal tax system, under the 
lifetime income approach, are illustrated in Table 4.36. Consistent with the findings 
under Suits index, Kakwani’s indices are positive for all samples, indicating 
progressivity.
Table 4.36
K akw ani’s Index under Lifetime Income Approaches
Full Sample Subsample Full Sample Subsample
Tax System 2009 2009 2005 2005
CFT1 0.0780 0.0383 0.0938 0.0546
CFT2 0.0778 0.0338 0.0961 0.0490
Bootstrap Analysis Results
Table 4.37 summarizes the Suits index 95% confidence intervals for the federal 
tax system under the lifetime income approach. First, both 95% lower limit and upper 
limit are positive for CFT1 and CFT2 in years 2005 and 2009, which confirms that the 
current federal tax system is progressive. Second, for the subsample with working 
families, unlike the annual income approach, both 2005 and 2009 confidence intervals 
show progressivity. Third, there is no significant difference in the progressivity level 
between 2005 and 2009.
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Table 4.37
Bootstrap-BCa Confidence Intervals fo r  Suits Index under Lifetime Income Approach
Suits
index
Standard
Error
Confiden 
ce Level
Lower
limit
Upper
limit
CFT1 2009 0.0951 0.0093 95% 0.0763 0.1131
C F T 22009 0.0940 0.0084 95% 0.0777 0.1101
CFT1 _2009_subsample 0.0479 0.0090 95% 0.0301 0.0653
CFT2 _2009_subsample 0.0434 0.0081 95% 0.0281 0.0595
CFT1 2005 0.1122 0.0094 95% 0.0919 0.1314
CFT2 2005 0.1150 0.0078 95% 0.0987 0.1308
CFT1 2005 subsample 0.0479 0.0090 95% 0.0301 0.0653
CFT2 _2005_subsample 0.0434 0.0081 95% 0.0281 0.0595
CFT 1 2009 vs. 2005 -0.0172 0.0133 95% -0.0452 0.0086
CFT2 2009 vs. 2005 -0.0211 0.0115 95% -0.0447 0.0005
CFT1 2009 vs. 
2005 subsample
-0.0180 0.0129 95% -0.0450 0.0070
CFT2_2009 vs. 
2005_subsample
-0.0165 0.0112 95% -0.0398 0.0050
Table 4.38 presents the bootstrap-t confidence intervals for Suits index. The 
results are consistent with the results when using bootstrap BCa confidence intervals. 
Therefore, the current federal tax system is progressive and the progressivity is 
significantly increased over years 2005 and 2009 under the annual income approach.
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Table 4.38
Bootstrap-t Confidence Intervals fo r  Suits Index under Lifetime Income Approach
Suits
index
Standard
Error
Confidenc 
e Level
Lower
limit
Upper
limit
CFT1 2009 0.0951 0.0094 95% 0.0951 0.1149
CFT2 2009 0.0940 0.0084 95% 0.0777 0.1105
CFT1 _2009_subsample 0.0477 0.0089 95% 0.0308 0.0672
CFT2 _2009_subsample 0.0432 0.0081 95% 0.0283 0.0603
CFT1 _2005 0.1122 0.0099 95% 0.0916 0.1333
CFT2 2005 0.1150 0.0081 95% 0.0994 0.1326
CFT1 _2005_subsample 0.0657 0.0094 95% 0.0480 0.0859
CFT2 _2005_subsample 0.0597 0.0078 95% 0.0435 0.0759
CFT1 2009 vs. 2005 -0.0172 0.0136 95% -0.0465 0.0116
CFT2 2009 vs. 2005 -0.0211 0.0113 95% -0.0445 0.0005
Results for Research Questions Three to Six
Distributional Analysis under Annual Income Approach 
Average Tax Rate
Tables 4.39 and 4.40 present the average tax burdens and the average tax rates for 
the current federal tax systems and the alternative value-added tax system based on 2009 
CES data. The current federal tax system includes individual income tax (PIT), imputed 
corporate income tax (CITl or CIT2), payroll taxes (PPT), imputed excise tax (ET), and 
imputed estate and gift taxes (EGT). The alternative value-added tax system includes 
broad-based VAT (VAT1), narrow-based VAT (VAT2 and VAT3), and the combination 
of VAT and PIT (VAT4). Specifically, VAT1 base is illustrated in Table 4.12. The VAT2 
base excludes food, rent and medical expenses from VAT1 base. And VAT3 modifies 
VAT1 by a uniform rebate for each household. VAT4 is a combination o f VAT with
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uniform rebate and PIT. The tax rate for each alternative tax system is a revenue-neutral 
rate, which means equal tax revenue will be generated under the alternative tax systems. 
As explained before, the revenue-neutral tax rate is 24.2% for VAT1, 33.3% for VAT2, 
31% for VAT3, and 18% for VAT4.15
As shown in Table 4.40, the average tax rates for the current federal tax system 
generally increase as household income increases. On the other hand, the average tax 
rates for the alternative value-added tax systems decrease as household income increases. 
Specifically, the first eight income deciles witness a tax increase from the current federal 
tax system to the alternative value-added tax systems (VAT1, VAT2 and VAT3), and the 
highest two income deciles experience a tax decrease under alternative tax systems. Even 
the partial substitution o f the current federal tax system with the alternative value-added 
tax system (VAT4) still see a tax increase for the lowest five income deciles and a tax 
decrease for the highest five income deciles.
Figure 4.3 shows the graphical trend o f the average tax rates for both tax systems. 
The current federal tax systems (CFT1 and CFT2) have increasing trends while the 
alternative value-added tax systems (VAT1, VAT2, VAT3 and VAT4) have decreasing 
trends, especially a sharp decrease from income decile one to income decile 2.
15 Tax rate for VAT3 is estimated based on the CES sample data. To generate equal revenue with the 
current federal tax system , 33% tax rate should be applied to VA T with uniform family rebate. Tax rate for 
VAT 4 is based on the calculation o f  V A T 1 and VAT3. Because the personal incom e tax is kept in VAT4, 
the total revenue generated from VAT is the difference between the total revenue generated from the 
current federal tax system  and the personal income tax. As a result, the tax rate for V A T4 is about 18% to 
generate equal revenue.
Table 4.39
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Burdens fo r  Annual Income Deciles
Income
Decile
Income 
Range 
($ '000)
Average
Income CFT1 CFT2 VAT1 VAT2 VAT3 VAT4
Change 
in Taxi
Change 
in Tax2
Change 
in Tax3
Change 
in Tax4
1 <10.4 4,857 300 363 5,971 3,343 3,577 1,893 5,671 3,043 3,277 1,593
2 10.4-18.1 14,230 847 1,004 6,726 3,620 4,460 2,431 5,879 2,773 3,613 1,584
3 18.1-25.7 22,144 1,777 2,120 7,729 4,628 5,354 2,804 5,952 2,851 3,577 1,027
4 25.7-34.5 29,988 2,961 3,531 9,027 6,338 6,789 3,683 6,065 3,377 3,828 722
5 34.5-44.5 39,178 4,932 5,705 10,449 7,967 8,567 4,981 5,517 3,034 3,634 49
6 44.5-56.0 50,002 6,970 8,217 12,025 9,773 10,313 6,354 5,055 2,804 3,344 -616
7 56.0-71.0 63,415 9,879 11,692 12,836 11,163 11,118 7,457 2,957 1,284 1,239 -2.422
8 71.0-93.5 81,841 12,737 15,041 15,549 14,444 14,555 9,734 2,812 1,707 1,818 -3,003
9 93.5-131.8 110,151 19,933 22,426 18,586 18,280 18,202 13,778 -1,347 -1,653 -1,731 -6,155
10 131.8-58.3 197,416 33,063 37,736 27,815 29,769 29,856 25,798 -5,249 -3,294 -3,208 -7,265
Sample Mean 61,338 9,342 10,785 12,673 10,935 11,285 7,897 3,331 1,593 1,943 -1,445
Notes: CFT1: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT1=P1T+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT1)
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+C1T2)
V A T1: Value-Added Tax (Total current consumption)
VAT2: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Zero-rating on food, rent, and medical expenses) 
VAT3: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Uniform Rebate)
VAT4: Combination o f  Value-Added Tax with Federal Individual Income Tax
Change in Taxi = VAT1 -C F T 1
Change in Tax2 = VAT2 -  CFT1
Change in Tax3 = VAT3 -  CFT1
Change in Tax4 = VAT4 -  CFT1
Table 4.40
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Rate fo r  Annual Income Deciles
Income
Decile
Income 
Range 
($ '000)
Average
Income CFT1 CFT2 VAT1 VAT2 VAT3 VAT4
Change 
in Ratel
Change 
in Rate2
Change 
in Rate3
Change 
in Rate4
1 <10.4 4,857 6.17% 7.47% 122.92% 68.82% 73.65% 38.98% 116.75% 62.64% 67.47% 32.80%
2 10.4-18.1 14,230 5.95% 7.05% 47.27% 25.44% 31.34% 17.09% 41.31% 19.48% 25.39% 11.13%
3 18.1-25.7 22,144 8.03% 9.57% 34.90% 20.90% 24.18% 12.66% 26.88% 12.87% 16.15% 4.64%
4 25.7-34.5 29,988 9.87% 11.77% 30.10% 21.14% 22.64% 12.28% 20.23% 11.26% 12.76% 2.41%
5 34.5-44.5 39,178 12.59% 14.56% 26.67% 20.34% 21.87% 12.71% 14.08% 7.75% 9.28% 0.12%
6 44.5-56.0 50,002 13.94% 16.43% 24.05% 19.55% 20.63% 12.71% 10.11% 5.61% 6.69% -1.23%
7 56.0-71.0 63,415 15.58% 18.44% 20.24% 17.60% 17.53% 11.76% 4.66% 2.03% 1.95% -3.82%
8 71.0-93.5 81,841 15.56% 18.38% 19.00% 17.65% 17.78% 11.89% 3.44% 2.09% 2.22% -3.67%
9 93.5-131.8 110,151 18.10% 20.36% 16.87% 16.60% 16.52% 12.51% -1.22% -1.50% -1.57% -5.59%
10 131.8-58.3 197,416 16.75% 19.11% 14.09% 15.08% 15.12% 13.07% -2.66% -1.67% -1.62% -3.68%
Sample Mean 61,338 15.23% 17.58% 20.66% 17.83% 18.40% 12.87% 5.43% 2.60% 3.17% -2.36%
Notes: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT1=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+C1T1)
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=P1T+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT2)
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT2)
VA T1: Value-Added Tax (Total current consumption)
VAT2: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Zero-rating on food, rent, and medical expenses) 
VAT3: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Uniform Rebate)
VAT4: Combination o f  Value-Added Tax with Federal Individual Income Tax 
Change in Taxi = VAT1 -  CFT1 
Change in Tax2 = VAT2 -  CFT1 
Change in Tax3 = VAT3 -  CFT1 
____________ Change in Tax4 = VAT4 -  CFT1______________________________________________________
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Figure 4.3 Average Tax Rates fo r  the CFT and VAT: Annual Income Approach
Overall, when compared to the progressive current federal tax systems, the 
alternative value-added tax system appears to be regressive, under both the broad-based 
and narrow-based VATs. The tax system with the combination o f narrow-based tax and 
federal personal income tax also appears to be regressive.
Global Indices of Progressivity
Global progressivity indices, such as Suits index and Kakwanis’ index, are also 
used to measure the overall progressivity o f the taxes across the entire income scale under 
the annual income approach.
First, the Suits Curves for the tax systems under the annual income approach are 
illustrated in Figure 4.4. The curves for CFT1 and CFT2 almost overlap each other and 
both lie under the diagonal lines. It confirms that the current federal tax system is 
progressive under annual income approach. The curves for VAT1, VAT2 and VAT3 lie 
above the diagonal line, which mean that alternative tax systems are regressive. The
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curve for VAT4 is very close to the diagonal line and the first 50 percentile lie a little 
above the diagonal line and the rest 50 percentile lie slightly below the diagonal line. So 
it is hard to determine whether VAT4 is progressive or not from the curve.
100
20
Diagonal
VAT2
40 60 80
Cumulative Percentage of Income
100
■ CFT1 
VAT3
•CFT2 
• V A T4
VAT1
Figure 4.4 Suits Curves o f 2009 C F T and  VAT: Annual Income
Second, the Suits indices for the tax systems under the annual income approach 
and lifetime income approach are illustrated in Table 4.41. A Suits index between zero 
and one indicates progressivity, while a Suits index between minus one and zero indicates 
regressivity. The Suits index values for the current federal tax system (0.0831 and 
0.0744) indicate the progressivity o f  these tax systems, while the Suits index values for 
alternative value-added tax systems (-0.2052 for VAT1, -0.0917 for VAT2, -0.1128 for 
VAT3, and -0.0093 for VAT4) indicate the regressivity o f  these tax systems under the 
annual income approach. It confirms the findings by using average tax rates and Suits 
curves, except for VAT4. Although the Suits index for VAT4 is negative, it is very close
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to zero (-0.0093). A bootstrap statistical method will be applied to test whether it is 
significant from zero.
Table 4.41
Comparisons o f  Suits Index
Tax System Annual Income Lifetime Income
CFT1 0.0831 0.1117
CFT2 0.0744 0.1107
VAT1 -0.2052 -0.0471
VAT2 -0.0917 0.0421
VAT3 -0.1128 0.0241
VAT4 -0.0093 0.0879
Note: CFT1: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT1=P1T+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT1)
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=P1T+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT2)
V A T 1: Broad-based Value-Added Tax (Total current consumption)
VAT2: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Zero-rating on food, rent, and 
medical expenses)
VAT3: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Uniform Rebate)
VAT4: Combination o f  Value-Added Tax with Federal Individual Income Tax
Last, the Kakwani’s indices for the current federal tax system and alternative tax 
systems under the annual income approach are illustrated in Table 4.42. Consistent with 
the findings under Suits index, Kakwani’s indices are positive for the current federal tax 
system and negative for the alternative value-added tax systems.
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Table 4.42
Comparisons o f  Kakwani ’s Index
Tax System Annual Income Lifetime Income
CFT1 0.0827 0.0957
CFT2 0.0764 0.0955
VAT1 -0.2011 -0.0568
VAT2 -0.0896 0.0276
VAT3 -0.1119 0.0103
VAT4 -0.0252 0.0683
Note: C FT1: Total Current Federal Taxes (C F T 1 =PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT 1)
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT2)
VAT1: Broad-based Value-Added Tax (Total current consumption)
VAT2: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Zero-rating on food, rent, and 
medical expenses)
VAT3: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Uniform Rebate)
VAT4: Combination o f  Value-Added Tax with Federal Individual Income Tax
Bootstrap Analysis Results
Tables 4.43 and 4.44 summarize the Suits index 95% confidence intervals for the 
current federal tax system and alternative value-added tax systems under the annual 
income approach. First, both 95% lower limit and upper limit are positive for CFT1 and 
CFT2, which confirms that the current federal tax system is progressive. Second, the 
confidence intervals for VAT1, VAT2 and VAT3 show that the Suits indices are 
significantly below zero and VAT1, VAT2 and VAT3 are regressive under the annual 
income approach. Third, the 95% confidence interval for VAT4 (-0.0294 to 0,0126) 
resolves the question raised by Suits curve and Suits index and shows that Suits index for 
VAT4 is not significantly different from zero. Thus, VAT4 is proportional under annual 
income approach. Last, Tables 4.43 and 4.44 show that narrow-based VATs significantly 
alleviate the regressivity o f the VAT and the current federal tax system is significantly 
more progressive than alternative VAT (both broad-based and narrow-based VATs) and 
the tax system with the combination o f narrow-based tax and federal personal income tax.
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Table 4.43
Bootstrap-BCa Confidence Intervals fo r  Suits Index under Annual Income Approach
Suits
index
Standard
Error
Confidence
Level
Lower
limit
Upper
limit
CFT1 0.0831 0.0074 95% 0.0696 0.0973
CFT2 0.0744 0.0065 95% 0.0628 0.0871
VAT1 -0.2052 0.0069 95% -0.2169 -0.1878
VAT2 -0.0917 0.0094 95% -0.1073 -0.0680
VAT3 -0.1128 0.0090 95% -0.1278 -0.0892
VAT4 -0.0093 0.0108 95% -0.0281 0.0152
VAT1 vs. VAT2 -0.1135 0.0033 95% -0.1206 -0.1079
VAT1 vs. VAT3 -0.0924 0.0027 95% -0.0981 -0.0878
VAT2 vs. VAT3 0.0211 0.0020 95% 0.0174 0.0250
CFT1 vs. VAT4 0.0837 0.0084 95% 0.0642 0.0990
Table 4.44
Bootstrap-t Confidence Intervals fo r  Suits Index under Annual Income Approach
Suits
index
Standard
Error
Confidence
Level
Lower
limit
Upper
limit
CFT1 0.0831 0.0074 95% 0.0675 0.0976
CFT2 0.0744 0.0065 95% 0.0623 0.0888
VAT1 -0.2052 0.0069 95% -0.2173 -0.1897
VAT2 -0.0917 0.0095 95% -0.1084 -0.0685
VAT3 -0.1128 0.0089 95% -0.1278 -0.0912
VAT4 -0.0093 0.0106 95% -0.0294 0.0126
VAT1 vs. VAT2 -0.1135 0.0114 95% -0.1377 -0.0930
VAT1 vs. VAT3 -0.0924 0.0114 95% -0.1159 -0.0703
VAT2 vs. VAT3 0.0211 0.0129 95% -0.0048 0.0475
CFT1 vs. VAT4 0.0837 0.0129 95% 0.0564 0.1093
1 2 2
Distributional Analysis under Lifetime Income Approach 
Average Tax Rate
Tables 4.45 and 4.46 present the average tax burdens and the average tax rates for 
the current federal tax systems and the alternative value-added tax system under the 
lifetime income approach. The average tax rates for the federal tax system generally 
increase as household income increases except for decile 1. Comparing with the average 
tax rates under the annual income approach, the average tax rates for the federal tax 
system under lifetime income approach are higher for low income deciles and about the 
same for the high income deciles. It makes the tax liabilities more equally distributed 
across the income deciles. The average tax rates for VAT1 decrease with a flatter rate 
compared to those under the annual income approach and increase for the last three 
deciles. The average tax rates for VAT2, VAT3 and VAT4 decrease for the first four 
deciles and increase for the rest o f  the income deciles. And the average tax rates are much 
lower for the first five income deciles under the lifetime income approach than under the 
annual income approach.
A graphic presentation o f the trend o f the average tax rates for both tax systems 
under the lifetime income approach is shown in Figure 4.5. The current federal tax 
system (CFT1 and CFT2) displays a flatter increase in average tax rates under the 
lifetime income than those under the annual income approach. VAT1 has a decreasing 
trend in average tax rates but is flatter than it is under the annual income approach. 
VAT2, VAT3, and VAT4 show a decreasing trend in the first five deciles and an 
increasing trend for the next five deciles.
Table 4.45
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Burdens fo r Lifetime Income Deciles
Income
Decile
Income 
Range 
($ ’000)
Average
Income CFTI CFT2 VAT1 VAT2 VAT3 VAT4
Change 
in Taxi
Change 
in Tax2
Change 
in Tax3
Change 
in Tax4
1 <26.0 14,763 1,964 2,140 7,031 4,015 4,634 2,471 5,067 2,051 2,670 507
2 26.0-39.6 33,778 3,335 3,746 7,836 5,244 5,739 3,357 4,502 1,909 2,404 22
3 39.6-51.6 45,463 4,445 5,276 9,089 6,607 7,160 4,240 4,644 2,162 2,715 -205
4 51.6-60.9 56,695 5,564 6,323 9,715 7,134 7,695 5,012 4,151 1,570 2,131 -552
5 60.9-67.6 64,100 7,409 8,774 11,365 9,420 9,651 6,175 3,956 2,011 2,242 -1,233
6 67.6-76.2 71,513 9,003 10,561 12,261 10,299 10,348 6,771 3,258 1,296 1,345 -2,231
7 76.2-85.5 80,849 10,248 11,890 13,375 11,639 12,250 8,528 3,127 1,391 2,002 -1,719
8 85.5-98.5 90,525 12,971 15,038 15,100 13,847 14,034 10,210 2,130 876 1,064 -2,761
9 98.5-110.6 105,122 17,213 19,531 18,490 18,073 18,266 14,135 1,277 860 1,053 -3,078
10 110.6-136.7 120,735 21,251 24,559 22,460 23,057 23,007 18,014 1,209 1,806 1,756 -3,237
Sample Mean 68,361 9,342 10,785 12,673 10,935 11,285 7,897 3,331 1,593 1,943 -1,445
Notes: CFT1: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT1=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT1)
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=P1T+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT2)
VAT1: Value-Added Tax (Total current consumption)
VAT2: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Zero-rating on food, rent, and medical expenses) 
VATS: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Uniform Rebate)
VAT4: Combination o f  Value-Added Tax with Federal Individual Income Tax
Change in Taxi = VAT1 -  CFT1
Change in Tax2 = VAT2 -  CFT1
Change in Tax3 = VAT3 -  CFT1
Change in Tax4 = VAT4 -  CFTI
to
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Table 4.46
Distributional Analysis: Average Tax Rate fo r Lifetime Income Deciles
Income
Decile
Income 
Range 
(S ‘000)
Average
Income CFTI CFT2 VAT1 VAT2 VAT3 VAT4
Change in 
Ratel
Change in 
Rate2
Change in 
Rate3
Change 
in Rate4
1 <26.0 14,763 13.30% 14.50% 47.63% 27.20% 31.39% 16.74% 34.32% 13.89% 18.08% 3.43%
2 26.0-39.6 33,778 9.87% 11.09% 23.20% 15.53% 16.99% 9.94% 13.33% 5.65% 7.12% 0.07%
3 39.6-51.6 45,463 9.78% 11.60% 19.99% 14.53% 15.75% 9.33% 10.21% 4.75% 5.97% -0.45%
4 51.6-60.9 56,695 9.81% 11.15% 17.14% 12.58% 13.57% 8.84% 7.32% 2.77% 3.76% -0.97%
5 60.9-67.6 64,100 11.56% 13.69% 17.73% 14.70% 15.06% 9.63% 6.17% 3.14% 3.50% -1.92%
6 67.6-76.2 71,513 12.59% 14.77% 17.15% 14.40% 14.47% 9.47% 4.56% 1.81% 1.88% -3.12%
7 76.2-85.5 80,849 12.68% 14.71% 16.54% 14.40% 15.15% 10.55% 3.87% 1.72% 2.48% -2.13%
8 85.5-98.5 90,525 14.33% 16.61% 16.68% 15.30% 15.50% 11.28% 2.35% 0.97% 1.17% -3.05%
9
98.5-
110.6 105,122 16.37% 18.58% 17.59% 17.19% 17.38% 13.45% 1.21% 0.82% 1.00% -2.93%
10
110.6-
137 120,735 17.60% 20.34% 18.60% 19.10% 19.06% 14.92% 1.00% 1.50% 1.45% -2.68%
Sample
Mean 68,361 13.67% 15.78% 18.54% 16.00% 16.51% 11.55% 4.87% 2.33% 2.84% -2.11%
Notes: C FTI: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT1=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT1)
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=P1T+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT2)
VATT. Value-Added Tax (Total current consumption)
VAT2: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Zero-rating on food, rent, and medical expenses) 
VAT3: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Uniform Rebate)
VAT4: Combination o f  Value-Added Tax with Federal Individual Income Tax
Change in Taxi = VAT1 -  CFTI
Change in Tax2 = VAT2 -  CFTI
Change in Tax3 = VAT3 -  CFTI
Change in Tax4 = VAT4 -  CFTI
to4*.
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Figure 4.5 Average Tax Rates fo r  the CFT and VAT: Lifetime Income Approach
Overall, the current federal tax system appears to be progressive under both the 
annual income and the lifetime income approaches. On the other hand, the alternative 
value-added tax systems appears to be less regressive under the lifetime income approach 
than under the annual income approach but still less progressive than the current federal 
tax system.
Global Indices of Progressivity
First, the Suits curves for the tax systems under the lifetime income approach are 
illustrated in Figure 4.6. The curves for CFTI and CFT2 almost overlap each other and 
both lie under the diagonal lines. The curve for VAT1 lies above the diagonal line, which 
means that VAT1 is still regressive under lifetime income approach. The curves for 
VAT2, VAT3 and VAT4 are below the diagonal line, which means that the narrow-based 
VATs are progressive under the lifetime income approach. Although the curves for 
VAT2, VAT3 and VAT4 are below the diagonal line, they are still above the curves for
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CFTI and CFT2, which means that the current federal tax system is more progressive 
than the alternative tax system.
100
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Figure 4.6 Suits Curves o f 2009 C F Tand  VAT: Lifetime Income
Second, the Suits indices for the tax systems under the lifetime income approach 
are illustrated in Table 4.41. The Suits index values for the federal tax systems (0.1117 
and 0.1107) and the narrow-based value-added tax systems (0.0422 for VAT2, 0.0242 for 
VAT3, and 0.0881 for VAT4) show the progressivity o f these tax systems. The Suits 
index for broad-based value-added tax (-0.0470 for VAT1) indicates the regressivity of 
the VAT1, but it is less regressive than under annual income approach. And the federal 
tax system is more progressive than the narrow-based value-added tax system.
Last, Kakwani’s indices for the current federal tax system and alternative tax 
systems under the lifetime income approach are illustrated in Table 4.42. Consistent with 
the findings under Suits index, Kakwani’s indices are positive for the federal tax system
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and narrow-based value-added tax systems. The Kakwani’s index for the broad-based 
value-added tax system is negative.
Bootstrap Analysis Results
Tables 4.47 and 4.48 summarize the Suits index 95% confidence intervals for the 
current federal tax system and alternative value-added tax systems under the lifetime 
income approach. First, both the 95% lower limit and upper limit are positive for CFTI, 
CFT2, VAT2, VAT3 and VAT4, which confirms that the current federal tax system and 
the narrow-based value-added tax systems are progressive. Second, the confidence 
interval for VAT1 shows that the Suits index for the broad-based value-added tax 
(VAT1) is significantly below zero, which confirms that VAT1 is regressive. Last, Tables 
4.47 and 4.48 show that the current federal tax system is significantly more progressive 
than the narrow-based value-added tax systems.
Table 4.47
Bootstrap-BCa Confidence Intervals fo r  Suits Index under Lifetime Income Approach
Suits
index
Standard
Error
Confidence
Level
Lower
limit
Upper
limit
CFTI 0.1118 0.0092 95% 0.0943 0.1321
CFT2 0.1108 0.0083 95% 0.0944 0.1287
VAT1 -0.0470 0.0060 95% -0.0578 -0.0334
VAT2 0.0422 0.0083 95% 0.0272 0.0598
VAT3 0.0242 0.0080 95% 0.0101 0.0408
VAT4 0.0881 0.0104 95% 0.0689 0.1101
VAT1 vs. VAT3 -0.0712 0.0025 95% -0.0763 -0.0669
VAT2 vs. VAT3 0.0180 0.0020 95% 0.0141 0.0220
CFTI vs. VAT4 0.0227 0.0067 95% 0.0086 0.0352
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Table 4.48
Bootstrap-t Confidence Intervals fo r  Suits Index under Lifetime Income Approach
Suits
index
Standard
Error
Confidenc 
e Level
Lower
limit
Upper
limit
CFTI 0.1118 0.0092 95% 0.0943 0.1321
CFT2 0.1108 0.0083 95% 0.0944 0.1287
VAT1 -0.0470 0.0060 95% -0.0578 -0.0334
VAT2 0.0422 0.0083 95% 0.0272 0.0598
VAT3 0.0242 0.0080 95% 0.0101 0.0408
VAT4 0.0881 0.0104 95% 0.0689 0.1101
VAT1 vs. VAT3 -0.0712 0.0096 95% -0.0096 -0.0511
VAT2 vs. VAT3 0.0181 0.0119 95% -0.0080 0.0412
CFTI vs. VAT3 0.0877 0.0097 95% 0.0682 0.1068
CFTI vs. VAT4 0.0237 0.0141 95% -0.0052 0.0530
Overall, both the current federal tax system and narrow-based value-added tax 
systems are progressive, while broad-based value-added tax system is still regressive 
under the lifetime income approach. Also, the current federal tax system is more 
progressive than the narrow-based value-added tax system or the combination o f VAT 
and personal income tax system.
Research Questions Seven and Eight
Suits Index under Different Age Groups 
Hodge (2010) suggests that age should enter the discussion over tax policy as the 
data from the IRS provides insights on the composition o f tax filers by age and how much 
o f the nation’s tax burden they pay (see Table 4.49). And distributional effects of 
alternative tax system by age groups are also discussed in prior research (e.g., Gale et al.
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1996). As a result, the current study divides the original sample into five age groups: 
under 35, 35-45, 45-55, 55-65, and above 64 .16
Table 4.49
Total Income Tax Liability by Age Group: 2009
All
Returns
Percentage 
o f  All 
Returns in 
Age Group
Number o f 
Returns with 
Tax Liability
Share o f 
Total 
Taxes 
Paid
Non-
Payers
Percent of 
Age 
Group 
Non- 
Payers
All
returns 142,450,569 100% 90,660,104 100%
51,79
0,465 36%
Under 18 2,708,155 2% 759,997 0% 1,948,158 72%
18 under 
26 23,171,781 16% 11,093,216 2%
12,07
8,565 52%
26 under 
35 24,104,248 17% 13,824,211 9%
10,28
0,037 43%
35 under 
45 26,519,702 19% 16,606,019 21%
9,913,
683 37%
45 under 
55 26,272,336 18% 19,249,488 29%
7,022,
848 27%
55 under 
65 19,672,834 14% 15,598,055 23%
4,074,
779 21%
65 and 
over 20,001,512 14% 13,529,118 16%
6,472,
394 32%
Source: http://wwvv.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/Q8in37ag.xls
Table 4.50 shows the Suits index for the current federal tax systems and 
alternative value-added tax systems for each age group. The number o f  households in 
each age group is also displayed in Table 4.50. Households under the age o f 35 to 45 and 
45 to 55 have the smallest values o f Suits index for the current federal tax system, which
16 The households with the head aging 25 or less are 458 and the households with the head aging between  
26 and 24 are 967. To make each age group has roughly equal size o f  households, these two age groups are 
intentionally grouped together. A lso from table xxx, filers under the age o f  35 bear just 11 percent o f  the 
total tax burden and have the highest concentration o f  filers with no income tax liability.
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means they are less progressive than other age groups. Actually, the bootstrap confidence 
intervals for these two age groups show the current federal tax system is proportional, 
instead o f progressive, for age groups 35 to 45 and 45 to 55.
Table 4.50
Suits Index for Different Age Groups
Age Group Frequency Percentage
Suits index
CFTI CFT2 VAT1 VAT2 VAT3 VAT4
Under 35 1425 23.04% 0.0705 0.0585 -0.2395 -0.1271 -0.1270 0.0022
35 under 1114 18.01% 0.0106 0.0083 -0.1576 -0.0673 -0.0555 0.0362
45 under 1278 20.67% 0.0186 0.0133 -0.1639 -0.0804 -0.0758 0.0182
55 under 1047 16.93% 0.0488 0.0401 -0.1894 -0.1050 -0.0989 -
65 and over 1320 21.35% 0.3590 0.3382 -0.2277 -0.0825 -0.1567 -
Table 4.50 also shows that Suits indices for VAT1, VAT2 and VAT3 are smallest 
in age groups o f “Under 35” and “65 and over”, where those two groups have the highest 
Suits indices for the current federal tax systems. It means that households within age 
groups o f “Under 35” and “65 and over” will suffer most when transferring from the 
current federal tax system to the alternative value-added tax systems (both broad-based 
and narrow-based VATs). Tables 4.51 and 4.52 confirm that VAT for households within 
age groups o f “Under 35” and “65 and over” are significantly more regressive than other 
age groups.
Table 4.52 also shows that under age group “35 under 45”, there is no significant 
difference in progressivity level for the current federal tax system with the narrow-based 
value-added tax systems (VAT2 and VAT3). Furthermore, Table 4.53 shows that these
two age groups are significantly less progressive than other age groups in terms o f the 
progressivity o f  the current federal tax system.
Table 4.51
Bootstrap-BCa Confidence Intervals fo r  Suits Index under Different Age Groups
Age o f 
Household 
Head
Tax
System
Suits
index
Standard
Error
Confidence
Level
Lower
limit
Upper
limit
Under 35 CFT1 0.0705 0.0160 95% 0.0441 0.1096
CFT2 0.0585 0.0125 95% 0.0361 0.0888
VAT1 -0.2395 0.0104 95% -0.2620 -0.2216
VAT2 -0.1271 0.0144 95% -0.1584 -0.1019
VAT3 -0.1270 0.0139 95% -0.1564 -0.1021
VAT4 0.0022 0.0247 95% -0.0441 0.0579
35 under 45 CFT1 0.0106 0.0150 95% -0.0155 0.0425
CFT2 0.0084 0.0128 95% -0.0152 0.0367
VAT1 -0.1576 0.0197 95% -0.1823 -0.0956
VAT2 -0.0673 0.0260 95% -0.0999 0.0155
VAT3 -0.0555 0.0259 95% -0.0874 0.0269
VAT4 0.0362 0.0254 95% -0.0067 0.0925
45 under 55 CFT1 0.0186 0.0131 95% -0.0062 0.0459
CFT2 0.0133 0.0113 95% -0.0078 0.0366
VAT1 -0.1639 0.0104 95% -0.1845 -0.1428
VAT2 -0.0805 0.0136 95% -0.1053 -0.0530
VAT3 -0.0758 0.0139 95% -0.1005 -0.0500
VAT4 0.0182 0.0202 95% -0.0209 0.0604
55 under 65 CFT1 0.0488 0.0180 95% 0.0181 0.0858
CFT2 0.0401 0.0153 95% 0.0129 0.0700
VAT1 -0.1894 0.0148 95% -0.2160 -0.1570
VAT2 -0.1050 0.0187 95% -0.1384 -0.0665
VAT3 -0.0989 0.0184 95% -0.1321 -0.0588
VAT4 -0.0256 0.0223 95% -0.0645 0.0201
65 and over CFT1 0.3590 0.0231 95% 0.3164 0.4038
CFT2 0.3382 0.0260 95% 0.2992 0.4013
VAT1 -0.2277 0.0192 95% -0.2546 -0.1784
VAT2 -0.0825 0.0144 95% -0.1217 -0.0112
VAT3 -0.1567 0.0249 95% -0.1896 -0.0849
VAT4 -0.0874 0.0291 95% -0.1347 -0.0186
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Table 4.52
Bootstrap-BCa Confidence Intervals fo r  Suits Index Between Different Age Groups
Suits
index
Standard
Error
Confidence
Level
Lower
limit
Upper
limit
C F T 1 3 5  vs. CFT1 45 0.0599 0.0217 95% 0.0182 0.0990
C F T 1 3 5  vs. CFT1 65 0.0217 0.0240 95% -0.0231 0.0690
CFT1 35 vs. 
CFTl_above65
-0.2887 0.0067 95% -0.3433 -0.2359
VAT1 35 vs. 
VAT1 45
-0.0819 0.0213 95% -0.1375 -0.0499
VAT1 35 vs. 
VAT1 65
-0.0501 0.0173 95% -0.0846 -0.0164
VATI 35 vs. 
V A T labove65
-0.0118 0.0210 95% -0.0602 0.0214
VAT2 35 vs. 
VAT2 45
-0.0598 0.0288 95% -0.1307 -0.0160
VAT2 35 vs. 
VAT2 65
-0.0221 0.0234 95% -0.0664 0.0204
VAT2_35 vs. 
VAT2 above65
-0.0118 0.0210 95% -0.0602 0.0214
VAT2 45 vs. 
VAT2_55
0.0131 0.0292 95% -0.0282 0.0860
CFT2 45 vs. VAT2 45 0.0757 0.0302 95% -0.0150 0.1146
CFT2 45 vs. VAT3 45 0.0639 0.0301 95% -0.0239 0.1037
Table 4.53
Comparisons o f  Suits Index Between Urban and Rural Areas
Tax
System
Urban Area Rural Area
Annual
Income
Lifetime
Income
Annual
Income
Lifetime
Income
CFT1 0.0797 0.1153 0.1736 0.0473
CFT2 0.0723 0.1124 0.1234 0.0540
VAT1 -0.2026 -0.0439 -0.2630 -0.1368
VAT2 -0.0885 0.0456 -0.1692 -0.0653
VAT3 -0.1112 0.0262 -0.1606 -0.0766
VAT4 -0.0087 0.0919 -0.0017 -0.0345
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Overall, the progressivity levels o f both tax systems are significantly different 
among various age groups. Specifically, age groups “35 under 45” and “45 under 55” are 
significantly less progressive than the other age groups in terms o f progressivity level for 
the current federal tax system. That is, the current federal tax system for these two age 
groups is proportional. And age groups “Under 35” and “65 and over” are significantly 
more regressive than the other age groups in terms o f the progressivity level o f  VAT1. 
For VAT2 and VAT3, age groups “35 under 45” and “45 under 55” are significantly less 
regressive than the other age groups.
Suits Index Between Urban and Rural Areas
According to the 2010 Census data conducted by U.S. Census Bureau, there are 
249,253,271 people living in the urban areas o f the United States, representing 80.7% of 
the population. There are 59,492,276 people living in the rural areas or 19.3% o f the 
population. The components and level o f  household incomes are different between urban 
and rural areas. Therefore, it would be interesting to see whether the progressivity level 
of both tax systems would be different between urban areas and rural areas.
Table 4.54 gives the Suits index o f both systems in urban and rural areas. Rural 
areas have larger Suits index values than urban areas under the current federal tax system, 
which means the current federal tax system is more progressive in the rural areas than in 
the urban areas. On the other hand, the rural areas are more regressive than the urban 
areas under alternative value-added tax systems. This table also shows the bootstrap-BCa 
confidence intervals for the difference o f the Suits index between urban and rural areas. 
The confidence intervals indicate that the both tax systems are significantly different 
between urban and rural areas.
134
Table 4.54
Bootstrap-BCa Confidence Intervals for Suits Index Between Urban and Rural Areas
Suits
index
Standard
Error
Confidence
Level
Lower
limit
Upper
limit
Annual income approach
C FT 1 Urban vs. C FT 1 Rural -0.0942 0.0457 95% -0.1744 -0.0101
CFT2_Urban vs. CFT2 Rural -0.0514 0.0367 95% -0.1131 0.0196
VAT 1 Urban vs. VAT 1 Rural 0.0604 0.0252 95% 0.0154 0.1155
VAT2 Urban vs. VAT2 Rural 0.0806 0.0343 95% 0.0218 0.1504
VAT4_Urban vs. VAT4_Rural 0.0072 0.0535 95% -0.0829 0.1111
Lifetime income approach
CFT 1 Urban vs. CFT1 Rural 0.0795 0.0701 95% -0.0431 0.2064
CFT2_Urban vs. CFT2_Rural 0.0699 0.0564 95% -0.0141 0.1847
VAT 1 Urban vs. VATl_Rural 0.0930 0.0254 95% 0.0467 0.1439
VAT2_Urban vs. VAT2_Rural 0.1110 0.0391 95% 0.0382 0.1865
VAT3 Urban vs. VAT3_Rural 0.1026 0.0386 95% 0.0357 0.1788
VAT4 Urban vs. VAT4 Rural 0.1501 0.0709 95% 0.0505 0.2939
Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analyses are used to test the robustness o f  the results and conclusions 
o f  this study when its underlying assumptions or estimates are varied. These issues are 
addressed in turn.
First, instead o f using one quarter’s data to estimate one year’s expenditure, a 
sample with full four quarters’ expenditure data is used to test the distributional analysis 
o f  the federal tax system and the alternative value-added tax system.17 The Suits indices 
based on the full-year expenditure data is shown in Table 4.55. The results remain the 
same.
17 The CES sample with households participated in all four quarters' survey with no m issing data is 2,285.
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Table 4.55
Comparisons o f  Suits Index Based on All Four Quarters ’ Data
Tax System_______________ Annual Income___________ Lifetime Income
CFT1 0.0844 0.1198
CFT2 0.0746 0.1254
VAT1 -0.2100 -0.0425
VAT2 -0.1099 0.0402
VAT3 -0.1265 0.0240
VAT4 -0.0100 0.0986
Note: CFT1: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT1=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT1)
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT2)
V A T 1: Broad-based Value-Added Tax (Total current consumption)
VAT2: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Zero-rating on food, rent, and medical expenses) 
VAT3: Narrow-based Value-Added Tax (Uniform Rebate)
VAT4: Combination o f  Value-Added Tax with Federal Individual Income Tax
Second, the current study assumes that employees pay both the employees’ and 
employers’ portion o f payroll taxes under the current system. As discussed in Kuang et 
al. (2011), another reasonable assumption is that employees only pay their portion of 
payroll taxes. As a result, to test the robustness o f  the current study, payroll taxes that 
only include the employee portion o f payroll taxes are also calculated. Table 4.56 shows 
that Suits index values for CFT with only employee portion of payroll taxes included. 
The results are unchanged.
Table 4.56
Suits Index fo r  CFT with Only Employee Portion o f  Payroll Taxes Included
Tax System Annual Income Lifetime Income
CFT1 0.1275 0.1063
CFT2 0.1194 0.1131
Note: CFTT. Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT1=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT1)
CFT2: Total Current Federal Taxes (CFT2=PIT+PPT+EGT+ET+CIT2)
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Third, the current study assumes a 4% discount rate when estimating lifetime 
income for the CES sample. A discount rate is intended to approximate the marginal 
social rate o f time preference at which individuals are willing to trade off current for 
future consumption and is equal to the real after-tax savings rate (Maxwell 2003; Kuang 
et al., 2011). Since most estimates o f the marginal social rate o f time preference range 
from 0% to 4% (Maxwell 2003), sensitivity tests were performed based on different 
discount rates such as 1%, 2%, and 3%. The results are similar to the results with a 4% 
discount rate. As depicted in Table 4.57, the results are similar under different discount 
rates.
Table 4.57
Suits Index under Lifetime Income Estimated Using Different Discount Rates
Discount Rates CFT1 CFT2 VAT1 VAT2 VAT3 VAT4
1% 0.1201 0.1161 -0.0289 0.0562 0.0429 0.1045
2% 0.1187 0.1157 -0.0338 0.0527 0.0377 0.1000
3% 0.1158 0.1139 -0.0400 0.0479 0.0313 0.0944
4% 0.1117 0.1107 -0.0471 0.0421 0.0241 0.0879
Fourth, the age range for the household head selected for lifetime income 
estimation in both PSID and CES is from age 18 to age 90. Using different age range 
selections, such as 20-80 and 18-85, had a negligible impact on the annuity equivalent 
and regressivity estimates. As a result, the overall results and conclusions in the current 
study are left unchanged as illustrated in Table 4.58.
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Table 4.58
Suits Index under Lifetime Income Estimated Using Different Age Ranges
Age Range CFT1 CFT2 VAT1 VAT2 VAT3 VAT4
18-85 0.1079 0.1042 -0.0436 0.0407 0.0275 0.0913
20-80 0.1107 0.1066 -0.0342 0.0477 0.0348 0.0983
18-90 0.1117 0.1107 -0.0471 0.0421 0.0241 0.0879
Last, in the current study, 505 households were used from the PSID that
participated in all annual surveys from 1968 to 2009 to estimate lifetime income. To 
address the potential survivor bias issue, sensitivity tests were conducted on larger 
samples but covering fewer years (20 and 30 years) o f information for each household. 
Table 4.59 indicates that the findings still held when using 20 and 30 years PSID data to 
estimate the lifetime income.
Table 4.59
Suits Index under Lifetime Income Estimated Using Larger PSID Samples
PSID CFT1 CFT2 VAT1 VAT2 VAT3 VAT4
20 Years 0.1624 0.1658 -0.0224 0.0762 0.0512 0.1226
30 Years 0.1193 0.1226 -0.0597 0.0369 0.0145 0.0846
All Years 0.1117 0.1107 -0.0471 0.0421 0.0241 0.0879
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, a summary o f the previous chapters is outlined first. Then research 
findings on the distributional impact o f the current federal tax systems and the alternative 
value-added tax systems are presented. Next, in sequence, are policy implications, 
limitations o f the study, future research recommendations, and conclusions.
Summary of Previous Chapters
As discussed in Chapter 1, the growing public dissatisfaction with the current 
federal tax system and the ongoing national debt crisis are generating serious 
consideration o f alternative consumption tax systems, especially the value-added tax 
(VAT). A VAT is generally perceived as regressive as it is a tax on consumption rather 
than on income or investment (Hooper and Smith, 1997). The regressivity o f  a VAT 
compared with the income tax is the main obstacle to any adoption o f a VAT in the 
United States (Gravelle, 2011). Previous studies, however, show that when analyzed 
under a lifetime perspective the consumption tax system is much less regressive than it 
appears under an annual perspective (e.g., Poterba 1989; Fullerton and Rogers, 1993; 
Caspersen and Metcalf, 1994; Metcalf, 1997; Metcalf, 1999; Maxewell, 2003; Kuang et 
al., 2011). And recent empirical studies from international data show that the VAT may 
not be as regressive as originally thought, in fact, it can be progressive (e.g., Ebrill et al.
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2001; Jenkins et al., 2006; Bird and Gendron 2007; Mushi, 2009; Decoster et al. 2010). 
Therefore, a more accurate distributional analysis o f  the VAT is needed.
Chapter 2 reviews prior literature on tax incidence of the current federal tax 
system, tax incidence o f alternative tax systems, including value-added tax, and annual 
vs. lifetime income approaches to tax incidence. Also, the contrast between the related 
literature to the current study is provided at the end o f Chapter 2.
The research design and methodology used in this study are developed and 
outlined in Chapter 3. Specifically, 2009 Consumer Expenditure Survey data is the 
primary sample data applied in this study. Panel Study o f Income Dynamics (PSID) data 
for the years 1968-2009 is used to estimate household lifetime income profiles that are 
then used to predict lifetime income for the 2009 Consumer Expenditure Survey 
households. Tax liabilities are calculated for each sample household both under the 
current federal tax system and alternative value-added tax system, including the imputed 
corporate income tax, excise tax, and estate and gift taxes. Both local (average tax rate) 
and global progressivity measures (Suits and Kakwani indices) are applied to analyze the 
distributional effect o f both systems. Also, the bootstrap methodologies (bootstrap-t and 
bootstrap-BCa Confidence Intervals) are applied to statistically test the difference 
between the tax systems and progressivity level changes o f  the current federal tax system 
over time.
Chapter 4 presents an analysis o f the research results. Under the annual income 
approach, the federal tax system is progressive while the alternative value-added tax 
system (broad-based and narrow-based) is regressive. Under the lifetime income 
approach, both the federal tax system and the narrow-based value-added tax systems
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(zero rating on necessities and universal rebate) are progressive, while the broad-based 
value-added tax system is still regressive. But the current federal tax system is 
significantly more progressive than the narrow-based value-added tax systems and the 
combination of narrow-based value-added tax and personal income tax system.
This study also provides evidence that the progressivity levels o f  both tax systems 
are significantly different among different age groups. Specifically, households with 
heads between 35 and 55 are significantly less progressive than the other households in 
terms o f the progressivity level o f the current federal tax system. And households with 
heads below 35 and above 65 are significantly less regressive than the other households 
in terms o f the level o f progressivity o f the alternative value-added tax system.
Furthermore, the study shows that the progressivity level o f the current federal tax 
system is not decreasing, instead significantly increasing between years 2005 and 2009. 
The following section discusses the summary for each o f  the study’s eight research 
questions.
Summary of Research Findings
The following eight research questions are investigated in the current study:
1. Is the current federal tax system progressive or regressive, under both annual 
income and lifetime income approaches?
2. Is the current federal tax system more or less progressive than before, under both 
annual income and lifetime income approaches?
3. Is the VAT regressive or progressive under the annual income and lifetime 
income approaches? How much o f that regressivity is alleviated by the zero-rating 
or rebate?
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4. Is the VAT more or less progressive than the current federal tax system under 
both the annual income and lifetime income approach?
5. Is there any significant difference in the progressivity level o f the VAT under 
annual income and lifetime income approaches?
6. Will zero-rating or a rebate system significantly change the progressivity level of 
the VAT under annual income and lifetime income approaches?
7. Are the VAT’s distributional effects significantly different among various age 
groups?
8. Are the VAT’s distributional effects significantly different between rural and 
urban areas?
Both the Suits index and bootstrap confidence intervals show that the current 
federal tax system is significantly more progressive in 2009 than in 2005 under the 
annual income approach, which is contrary to prior studies that show the progressivity 
level o f the current federal tax system is decreasing (e.g., Picketty and Saez, 2007). The 
possible reasons that the progressivity level increases from 2005 to 2009 are that the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act o f  2009 (ARRA, Public Law 111-5) made 
several changes that lowered individual income taxes in 2009. There is no significant 
difference under the lifetime income approach. Also, the current federal tax system is less 
progressive for working families than for all o f the U.S. families in both years. In year 
2005, the current federal tax system is proportional (even regressive) for the working 
families under the annual income approach.
The broad-based value-added tax system is regressive under both annual and 
lifetime income approaches, although it is less regressive under the lifetime income
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approach. Narrow-based value-added tax systems (zero-rating and universal rebate) are 
still regressive under the annual income approach, while it is significantly less regressive 
than the broad-based value-added tax system. Under the lifetime income approach, the 
narrow-based value-added tax systems are progressive, and zero-rating VAT system is 
significantly more progressive than the universal rebate VAT system. The tax system that 
combines narrow-based VAT and federal personal income tax (VAT4) is proportional 
under the annual income approach and progressive under the lifetime income approach. 
However, the current federal tax system is significantly more progressive than the 
alternative value-added tax system (both broad-based VAT and narrow-based VAT) and 
VAT4 under both annual and lifetime income approaches.
The progressivity levels o f both tax systems are significantly different among 
different age groups. Specifically, the current federal tax system for households with 
heads between 35 and 55 is proportional, instead o f progressive, under the annual income 
approach. And households with heads aging below 35 and above 65 are significantly less 
regressive than the other households in terms o f the level o f  progressivity o f  alternative 
value-added tax system.
Policy Implications
“The United States is the only country in the developed world that does not 
impose a broad-based consumption tax” (Toder and Rosenberg, 2010). The main obstacle 
to any adoption o f a VAT in the United States is the regressivity o f  a VAT compared 
with the income tax (Gravelle, 2011). Previous studies, however, show that when 
analyzed under a lifetime perspective the consumption tax system is much less regressive 
than it appears under an annual perspective (e.g., Poterba 1989; Fullerton and Rogers,
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1993; Caspersen and Metcalf, 1994; Metcalf, 1997; Metcalf, 1999; Maxewell, 2003; 
Kuang et al., 2011). And recent empirical studies from international data show that the 
VAT may not be as regressive as originally thought, in fact, it can be progressive (e.g., 
Ebrill et al. 2001; Jenkins et al., 2006; Bird and Gendron 2007; Mushi, 2009; Decoster et 
al. 2010). As a result, this paper investigates the distributional effects o f  replacing the 
current federal tax system (CFT) with the alternative value-added tax system (VAT) 
under both annual and lifetime income measures.
The findings o f this paper have several important implications for tax policy 
makers, tax researchers, and the general public. First, there is no doubt that the current 
federal tax system is more progressive than the consumption tax systems, such as value- 
added tax system, under both the annual and lifetime income approaches. Even though 
the general public believes that the current federal tax system is not fair, or not as fair as 
it used to be, this study shows that the current federal tax system actually is significantly 
more progressive in 2009 than in 2005. As discussed in Slemrod (2006), taxpayers 
mistakenly believe that the distribution o f the burden o f  the existing income tax is 
regressive. Naturally, it is important to educate the general public on the progressivity of 
the current federal tax system.
Second, the findings that the federal tax system is proportional when only 
considering working families or families with heads between 35 and 55 years old indicate 
that the middle class in the U.S. has the heaviest tax burden. One focus o f  tax reform 
might be on the relief o f tax burdens o f the middle class.
Third, even though the alternative value-added tax is regressive, the modified 
value-added tax systems, such as zero-rating and universal rebates, significantly alleviate
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the regressivity o f the system. When considering the effect under the lifetime income 
approach, the narrow-based VAT can be progressive. Also, the partial substitution o f the 
current federal tax system with the VAT, such as the combination o f  the narrow-based 
VAT and federal personal income tax system, is more progressive than the VAT system. 
As a result, instead o f totally replacing the current federal tax system with an alternative 
tax system, a combination of the two tax systems might be a better choice.
As Bickley (2011) notes, the prevailing framework in evaluating any change in 
tax policy is to analyze the tax policy for equity, efficiency, and simplicity. Tradeoffs 
may exist between these three objectives. Any tax reform is a complicated task while 
keeping the balance among equity, efficiency, and simplicity. This study shed some light 
on the equity o f the current federal tax system and the alternative value-added tax system, 
which might help tax policy makers to make rational decisions.
Limitations of the Study
Although CES micro-data is widely used in tax incidence analysis, it is not 
without its limitations, as discussed in Gamer et al. (2009). First, even though the CES 
Interview is designed to collect data using personal interviews, there has been an 
increasing reliance on telephone interviews to collect data with no guidelines established 
for proper telephone interviewing. Second, certain expenditure estimates are subject to 
bias caused by underreporting in the form o f item non-response. Third, there is evidence 
that some CES expenditure estimates contain measurement error. Also, the CES income 
data are questioned for underreporting at the low end and top coding at the high end. 
Income underreporting at the low end of the income distribution can exaggerate the 
regressivity o f consumption taxes. Income top coding at the high end, on the other hand,
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could overstate the average tax rate for high-income people and thereby underestimate 
the regressivity o f a consumption tax. The capital income in the CES data seems to be too 
low when compared to capital income based on National Account data (e.g., Deaton, 
2003; Rutherford and Tarr, 2008). Nonetheless, the CES micro-data remains the best 
available comprehensive source o f information about consumption and how families 
allocate their incomes between various categories o f  spending and savings.
The current study does not consider the effect o f  substituting the current federal 
tax system with an alternative value-added tax system on consumer and business 
behavior. When adopting a new tax system, there will be unavoidable behavioral changes 
in consumption patterns, which may not be captured in the current study. Also, the 
current study does not consider the transitional gains and losses, which will be substantial 
when converting an income tax system to a consumption tax system.
Suggested Future Research
There are several potential research directions to follow based on the current 
study. Even though the current study finds some evidence that the current federal tax 
system becomes significantly more progressive over time based on 2005 and 2009 data, 
is it still true for other years after Picketty and Saez, 2007’s study period? And the current 
study finds that narrow-based value-added tax system and the partial substitution o f the 
current federal tax system with a VAT would significantly alleviate the regressivity o f  the 
consumption tax and even becomes progressive under the lifetime income approach. 
Further research on how to design and apply the narrow-based VAT and the partial 
substitution of the current federal tax system with the VAT is almost guaranteed. Also 
extending the current study by using dynamic tax analysis will be recommended.
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Conclusions
This paper investigates the distributional effects o f  replacing the current federal 
tax system (CFT) with the alternative value-added tax system (VAT) under both annual 
and lifetime income measures. This study finds some evidence that the current federal tax 
system becomes more progressive over the period o f 2005 and 2009 under the annual 
income approach, which is contrary to the prior research findings that the current federal 
tax system became less progressive from 1960 to 2004 (Piketty and Saez, 2007). A 
potential explanation for this result is that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
o f 2009 (ARRA, Public Law 111-5). This Act made several changes that lowered 
individual income taxes in 2009. Also, when only considering households who paid 
payroll taxes (working families), the current federal tax system is significantly less 
progressive, even regressive for year 2005, under the annual income approach. However, 
there is no significant difference about the progressivity level under the lifetime income 
approach for both full sample and subsample with only working families.
The broad-based value-added tax system is regressive under both the annual and 
lifetime income approaches, nonetheless, it is significantly less regressive under the 
lifetime income approach. The narrow-based value-added tax systems (zero ratings and 
universal rebate) significantly alleviate the regressivity o f the VAT under both the annual 
and lifetime income approaches. The narrow-based value-added tax system becomes 
progressive under the lifetime income approach, but it is significantly less progressive 
than the current federal tax system. And the partial substitution o f the current federal tax 
system with the VAT (such as the combination o f narrow-based VAT and federal 
personal income tax system) is proportional under the annual income approach and
progressive under the lifetime income approach. It's progressivity level is not 
significantly different from the current federal tax system (CBO 2012 method) under the 
lifetime income approach.
The current study also analyzes the distributional effects o f both systems 
based on age groups and locations (urban vs. rural). The results show that the 
progressivity levels among different age groups and locations are significantly different 
for both the current federal tax system and the alternative value-added tax system. 
Specifically, the current federal tax system for households with heads between 35 and 55 
is proportional, instead of progressive, under the annual income approach.
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APPENDIX A 
BOOTSTRAP-t CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
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Bootstrap-t Confidence Interval 
Anderson et al. (2003) introduce a bootstrap methodology discussed in Efron and 
Tibshirani (1993) to estimate confidence intervals for differences in Suits Indices. 
“Bootstrap-t” approach estimates the distribution o f the Suits index directly from the 
data. In essence, it builds a table that is appropriate for the data set at hand. Next, this 
table is used to construct a confidence interval in exactly the same way that the normal 
and t tables are used. The bootstrap table is built by generating 1,000 bootstrap samples, 
and then computing the bootstrap version o f Suits index for each sample. The bootstrap 
table consists o f the percentiles o f  these Suits index values (Efron & Tibshirani 1993, 
p i 60). The detailed procedures o f Bootstrap methodology applied by Anderson et al. 
(2003) are in the following steps:
1. and s 2 are estimates of Suits Indices Si and S2 computed from samples Xj and X 2 , 
respectively. The samples Xi and X2 consist o f n cross-section observations on 
income and tax liability drawn from the population o f tax returns filed under tax 
regimes one and two, respectively. Hence, Xi and X2 are both matrices o f  dimension 
nx2.
2. N independent bootstrap random samples are generated with replacement from the 
sample Xi and are denoted by the nx2N matrix,
X 1 =  l X l l ’ X 12>X 13> ■■■>X 1 N l n x 2 N
where represents the ith bootstrap random sample drawn with replacement from Xi 
and is denoted the nx2 matrix
*i*i =  [*1U'*1<,2] fora11 i=1>
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In this matrix , x iy  is the first column vector and x iu  is the second column vector each 
containing n observations on income (or current consumption in our case) and tax 
liability.
The same procedures is followed to draw N independent bootstrap random 
samples from the sample X 2 , denoted as the nx2N matrix,
x 2 —  [x 21>x 2 2 ’ x 23> < X 2 N  ] n x 2 N
where x 2i represents the ith bootstrap random sample drawn with replacement from X2  
and is denoted the nx2 matrix
X 2i =  [*21,1**24,2] fora11  i = 1 » • • • ’ N
where, X2 i,i is the first column vector and X2 i,2 is the second column vector containing n 
observation on income and tax liability, respectively.
3. Each random samples in both matrices x^and x{  is sorted by income. Sorted bootstrap 
samples are then used for the estimation o f bootstrap replications o f  the Suits Indices. 
Corresponding to each bootstrap sample in matrix, x \ ,  a bootstrap replication o f the 
Suits Index is calculated. An N xl vector represents N bootstrap replications o f Suits 
Indices as
5 1 =  [s l l »  s 12< s 13> ]/Vxl
where, for all i= l,...,N .
The sample procedure is followed for each bootstrap sample in vector x 2 to create the N 
bootstrap replications o f Suits Indices, defined by the N xl vector
5 2 =  [S 2 1 ’ S 2 2 ' S 23> ■■■>S 2 N  1/Vxl
where, s 2i =  s 2i(x 2i) for all i= l,...,N .
4. The difference between the two vectors s^and is computed as
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s d  =  t ( 5 21 — 5 l l ) <  ( S 22 — ^ 1 2 ) '  ( 5 23 — ^ 1 3 ) '  ••• < ( S 2 N  ~  S l A / ) ] / V x l  
=  l S dl> S d2> s d 3 ’ ■■■ ’ S d N  ] n x 1
where, s ^  =  s ^ x h ,  x2i) for all i= l,...,N .
The computation o f the bootstrap-t statistic requires the standard error o f each bootstrap 
replication o f Suits Indices. Since the distribution o f the Suits Index is unknown, there is 
no statistical formula for estimating standard errors o f the differences between the Suits 
Indices in vector s^. Thus, the next step in the process is to calculate the boot-strap 
estimate o f standard error for each element in vector s^. The bootstrap algorithm for 
estimating standard errors is as follows.
4(i). m bootstrap random samples (with m<N) are generated with replacement, 
corresponding to each random samples in vector x{ and is denoted by the nx2Mn matrix:
^1 =  [ y i l » y i 2 < y i 3 ' - " ' y i A /  ] nx27n/V
where each y ^ is  a matrix o f dimension nx2m and contains m random samples o f size n 
and can be written as
y ii =  [y i\i< y i£-,2-yii,3-”- y u i v ] n><2rn fo raii i= i,...,N .
Each y h j  is the j ,h random sample drawn with replacement from the ith sample in matrix, 
x{, and is denoted by the nx2 matrix
y*UJ = [ y u j v y u j 2 ]nx2 f°r j = U---,rn and i= l,...,N , where y-ujxis the first column
vector containing n observations on income and tax liability, respectively. Similarly, m 
(where m<N) bootstrap random samples are also generated with replacement 
corresponding to each random sample in vector x2 and is also denoted by the nx2Mn 
vector,
2^ =  [ y 2 p y 22-y23— y 2W ]nx2m/v
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where, each y 2lis a matrix o f bootstrap random samples nx2m drawn with replacement 
from sample and can be denoted as for all i= l,...N , where y 2i;- is the first column vector 
containing n observations on income and tax liability, respectively.
For the purpose o f computing bootstrap replications o f Suits Indices from m N 
random samples contained in matrices, Yf and V2 , the samples are sorted by income. 
Then a bootstrap replication o f the Suits Index is calculated corresponding to each sample 
in the ith matrix, y ^ ,  and denoted by the m xl vector,
S ! i  =  [5H l-5l7,2-Sl7,3-"-s l7,m]mxl fora11 i=l,.-.N.
Similarly, a bootstrap replication o f the Suits Index is calculated corresponding to each 
sample in the ith matrix, y 2i, and denoted by the m xl vector,
s 2i  =  [ s 2 i , l ' s 2 i , 2 ' s 2 i ,3 '  ■■■’ S 2 i , m  ] m x 2  ^o r  a ^
4(iii). The difference between the vectors s^* and s 2- is estimated for all i= l,.. .N  and 
denoted by the vector,
s S  =  [ f e  -  S l " l )  ( s ’i l m - s ' l U )  C X1 =   s J U m x l
where, s dij = SaU ( y u j , y 2i,j) for all i= l,...,N  and j= l,...m .
4(iv). The bootstrap standard errors o f each sdi ( i= l,...N ) are calculated by using the 
formula
rdl = -  sj;)2/(m -  I) for all i= l,...N , where Q ; =
5. The bootstrap-t statistic is then computed for each sdi and is defined by
tf = sit -  Sd/a’at
where Sd is a function o f X | and X2, and is the estimate o f  the population value Sd, and 
sd* is the ith bootstrap replication computed from the bootstrap samples x ^  and x 2i. Thus,
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N bootstrap-t statistics are computed using the above formula. The bootstrap-t table is 
then constructed from the ordered value o f t f . For example, for N -1,000 the estimates o f 
the 5% and 95% points are the 50th and 950th largest value o f  t f , respectively.
6, The estimation o f the confidence interval for Sd requires the standard error o f  its 
estimate, Sd. The bootstrap standard error, ddi o f  Sd is estimated utilizing the 
bootstrap method for calculating standard error.
7. Finally, the 100(l-2a)%  confidence interval for Sd is given by the expression
[Sd ~  id~aad .Sd ~  t d # d]
If Na is not an integer, the following procedure can be used. Assuming a < 5 , let 
k=[(N +l)a], the largest integer < (N +l)a. Then the a  and (1-a) quantiles are defined by 
the kth largest and (N +l-k)th largest values o f  (tb)s. Estimation of the bootstrap t interval 
requires N to be at least 1000, while the standard error estimation requires the number o f 
bootstrap samples to be in the range o f 25 to 100. The student t statistic is called an 
approximate pivot i.e. the distribution o f the student t statistic is approximately the same 
for each population value o f the parameter o f interest. Anderson et al. say that this 
property allows the construction o f bootstrap-t intervals from the distribution o f (tb)s.
